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Abstract 
Although the literature on choice-supportive memory – remembering the items of chosen 
options as more preferential and those of non-chosen options as less preferential than they 
actually were – is scarce and scattered, it has widely been accepted as a solid phenomenon that 
could lead to biased future decisions. In the published studies to date, different types of such 
misremembering have been observed using rather dissimilar methods, with the large majority 
testing memory solely with source recognition. The characteristics of the material to be 
remembered have not been particularly varied and the effect of different delay levels has not 
been properly investigated. Thus, at the onset of this project, there was a lack of insight into the 
nature and robustness of the phenomenon and no systematic review of the relevant literature 
had been done to provide an integrative assessment of its status. 
The objectives and scope of the current project are the following: (1) to conduct a systematic 
literature review on the phenomenon of choice-supportive misremembering; (2) to propose a 
new comprehensive taxonomy of the different types of memory distortions after choice, and (3) 
to investigate the empirical support for the proposed taxonomy and explore the conditions 
necessary for the choice-supportive misremembering effect. 
The first experiment involved four choice scenarios and had a typical design for studies in the 
decision-making literature (information presented in tables with a low number of attributes and 
only the value of each one differing between the two options). Memory was tested with free 
and cued recall only, and the delay between the choice and the memory tests was manipulated 
on three levels (2 minutes, 20 minutes, and 2 days). The results fully supported the proposed 
taxonomy, but also highlighted the absence of choice-supportive misremembering despite the 
high statistical power of the tests. 
In the second experiment, the scenarios and options were more complex and verbose, with a 
higher number of items. Four different scenarios were used and presented in two different 
formats (‘narrative’ vs list) as well as in an alignable and an unalignable version. The narrative 
versions presented the items of the two options in blocks of text (Option A above Option B), 
whereas the list versions displayed each item on a separate line (Option A adjacent to Option 
B). In the alignable version, the items presented had corresponding items on the same dimension 
in both options, while there was no such correspondence in the unalignable version. This time, 
memory was tested with free and cued recall in addition to a source recognition test that has 
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hitherto been more typical for studies on choice-supportive misremembering. In common with 
the first study, this second experiment provided full support for the proposed taxonomy, but it 
also demonstrated the existence of the choice-supportive misremembering effect regardless of 
the manipulated variables.  
Considered in unity, the results of the two experiments suggest that the type of stimuli used is 
a decisive factor and confirm that the phenomenon does not occur with the kind of materials 
typically used in the decision-making literature. Indeed, when participants are more likely to 
compare the options item by item rather than rely on gist-based processing, they do not seem to 
exhibit choice-supportive memory effects. This observation and the findings from the literature 
review and the two experiments are discussed in light of the various theories that have been 
proposed to explain misremembering. Finally, suggestions on how to further expand the 
knowledge through new research studies on specific populations are put forward. 
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Structure of the thesis 
In this thesis, I will start by providing the general context and aims of the project in a brief 
introduction. In Chapter 1, I will then progress into a more focused background to the topic 
before proposing a new taxonomy and presenting a critical literature review that reveals the 
current state of the art. Chapter 2 consists of a presentation of our first experiment, designed to 
investigate the effects of delay on choice-supportive misremembering, test the validity of the 
taxonomy and appraise the existence of choice-supportive misremembering in a standard choice 
context. After this follows Chapter 3, depicting our second experiment, which aims to elucidate 
which conditions are needed for the effect to occur. In the Overall conclusion and discussion, I 
will summarize and discuss the combined findings from the literature review and the two 
empirical studies. In this section, I will also deliberate upon the practical consequences of the 
findings and how this knowledge can be used to promote effective decision making. In the last 
section of the thesis – Limitation and future directions - I will discuss the shortcomings of our 
experiments and suggest directions for future research. 
 
Introduction 
The efficiency and accuracy of decision-making processes are interdisciplinary topics with 
wide-ranging impact on many academic fields, including psychology, economics, law and 
medicine. For the individual, the decisions one makes have a profound effect on everything 
from personal health, relationships, career and happiness. Much research concerns itself with 
the impact of memory and biases on the resulting decisions (e.g., Gluth, Sommer, Rieskamp, & 
Büchel, 2015), but significantly less on how decision-making processes may affect subsequent 
memory of the options. Nonetheless, if the recall of past options is inaccurate, it may influence 
future decisions down the line and exclude some options from even being considered at later 
stages. Undoubtedly, the effect of such distortions could potentially affect the entire life course 
of an individual. 
Choice-supportive misremembering – when chosen options are remembered as more 
preferential and non-chosen options as less preferential than they actually were – is not a new 
topic in the psychological literature (e.g., Mather, Shafir, & Johnson, 2000; Mather & Johnson, 
2000). However, in these times of ever-increasing polarization fueled by confirmation bias and 
fake news, it could be a largely relevant and influential factor. If the perceived attractiveness of 
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chosen options increases with time and that of rejected options decreases due to their 
components being distorted, polarization and false confidence in the superiority of one’s own 
standpoint inevitably follow. Furthermore, despite the widespread trust in the robustness of the 
phenomenon, it remains to be clarified why the effect has not been found in all experiments 
aimed at investigating it.  
 
Aims 
As no thorough review of the literature - or even a categorization of the different types of 
distortions - had been done, the aims of this project are three-fold: (1) to propose a taxonomy 
of the different types of potentially choice-supportive distortions, (2) to assess the robustness 
of the current evidence in support of the phenomenon, and finally, (3) to illuminate its 
boundaries and the conditions necessary for it to manifest. To address the first two aims, we 
reviewed the relevant literature and proposed a new taxonomy of the various types of choice-
supportive misremembering observed. (Note that this part of the thesis – Chapter 1 - has been 
previously published in Frontiers in Psychology). In two large empirical studies, we then 
proceeded to investigate gaps that we had found in the literature and to elucidate which 
conditions may be required for the phenomenon to appear.  
 
Decision-making rationality 
Numerous descriptive and prescriptive theories on decision making have been put forward since 
time immemorial, but the progress in the field does not follow a straight course towards ultimate 
rationality (for an enlightening time line describing the history of decision making, see 
Buchanan & O’Connell, 2006). Constraints have been recognized and while some theorists 
have argued that people would decide rationally if they could gather sufficient information and 
possessed unlimited processing capacity (the theory of bounded rationality, see e.g., Simon, 
1956), others present factors that can cause individuals to decide against their own economic 
interest (e.g., prospect theory, Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Evidence that emotions are a 
necessary ingredient for decision making has also been put forward (e.g., Damasio, 1994).  
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Rational choice is often assumed to involve a number of elements. For example, the process is 
expected to follow an orderly path from problem (or presentation of the options) to decision, 
seeking to maximize the expected utility. According to the expected utility theory, four axioms 
define rational decision making: completeness, transitivity, independence and continuity (Von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 2007). Completeness denotes that the decision maker has clear 
preferences and is always able to decide between any two alternatives. Transitivity refers to the 
idea that deciding according to the completeness axiom will lead to consistent decision making 
over time. Independence assumes that introducing an irrelevant alternative will not change the 
order of preferences of pre-existing (relevant) alternatives. Finally, continuity implies that if an 
individual prefers A to B to C, there should be a possible combination of A and C in which that 
individual is indifferent between a lottery of A and C, and receiving B with certainty. 
Satisfaction of all these axioms signifies that the individual is rational. The final, rational, choice 
should then correspond to the preferences of the decision maker, as well as be logically 
consistent and based on objective facts only. However, studies in such varied fields as 
psychology, mathematics, sociology, economics and political science show that this does not 
provide an accurate description of human decision making and that it would, indeed, not even 
be optimal in all situations. Instead, in some cases, an integral part of deciding involves a 
creation of an acceptable cognitive structure, reached by reordering and reconstructing the 
information in a way that makes sense to the decision maker. Not until that is accomplished can 
a decision be reached. 
Memories of earlier decisions – as well as decisions that are based on memories, such as 
eyewitness testimonies – will unavoidably be affected by these processes regardless of whether 
they are adaptive or detrimental. This is particularly the case for the restructuring that continue 
or start after the choice is made. For this reason, it is important to identify factors that can have 
an impact on the processes occurring during and after decision making.  
 
Self-serving bias  
Numerous types of biases are likely to affect both decision making and memory (see e.g., Hastie 
& Dawes, 2001). One that is especially relevant to choice-supportive misremembering is the 
self-serving bias, which can be described as a tendency to interpret the world in a manner 
conducive to maintaining self-confidence and a positive outlook. Most commonly, it refers to 
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the tendency to attribute favourable events to one’s own character and unfavourable events to 
external factors. In the context of memory, however, it may also refer to other ways that 
emotional needs can shape memories. High-school grades may be remembered as better than 
they were (Bahrick, Hall, & Berger, 1996) or - as discussed in this thesis – a chosen option as 
more advantageous than it actually was. Clearly, memory retrieval may be influenced by goals 
other than accuracy. Accurate memories that indicate that we are incompetent decision makers 
and/or that we have to live with the outcome of a bad choice satisfy our desire to form a correct 
model of the universe, whereas any desirable but inaccurate memories may serve a need to 
preserve our mental well-being.   
The question whether memory distortions are products of deficient cognitive processing has 
been widely studied and the conclusions are varied. Associations between higher proportions 
of false memories and false recognition with low intelligence as well as with brain damage and 
disorders have been found in several studies (e.g., Goodman et al., 2011; Moulin, Conway, 
Thompson, James, & Jones, 2005; Zhu et al., 2010). Nonetheless, it has also been demonstrated 
that in healthy individuals, self-serving memory distortions may be a product of a well-
functioning adaptive memory system (e.g., Boyer, 2009; Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Schacter & 
Coyle, 1997; Sutton, 2009). Indeed, choice-supportive memory errors could be both motivation-
driven (to serve the goal of self-enhancement) and cognition-driven (to maintain an existing 
self-view).  
Furthermore, as gist-based memory cues support the retention of meaning that enables 
generalizations and abstractions, and associative memory processes contribute with structure to 
facilitate retrieval, the same processes that may cause distortions also serve to improve memory 
performance. Some authors argue that cognitive and motivational theories are empirically 
indistinguishable and that so called motivated bias may in virtually all cases be explained in 
terms of information processing (see e.g., Kruglanski, 1999; Tetlock & Levi, 1982). As 
expressed by Kruglanski: “most organized cognition - that is, cognition involved in judgment, 
reasoning, problem solving, or impression formation - is purposeful and motivated” 
(Kruglanski, 1999, p. 55). Thus, instead of focusing on whether emotion or cognition is the 
main driver, it may be more useful to turn the attention to the factors needed for the effect and 
to the mental processes to which they give rise. 
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Chapter 1: Choice-supportive misremembering: A new 
taxonomy and review1 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Time and memory are true artists; they remold reality nearer to the heart’s desire (Dewey, 
1920). 
 
Decision-making processes have been widely studied both in basic research and in applied 
contexts, with a significant part of recent research concerning the impact of memory processes 
and memory-related biases on decisions (see e.g., Del Missier et al., 2013; Del Missier, 
Mäntylä, & Nilsson, 2015; Dougherty, Gronlund, & Gettys, 2003; Hoffmann, von Helversen, 
& Rieskamp, 2014; Tomlinson, Marewski, & Dougherty, 2011). Despite this interest in the 
relationships between memory and decision making, only a limited number of studies have 
investigated how decision making affects memory, and, more specifically, how the act of 
choosing and the actual choice one has made influence subsequent memory of the options 
(e.g., Mather, Shafir, & Johnson, 2000; Mather & Johnson, 2000; Mather, Shafir, & Johnson, 
2003). Although the issue of choice-supportive misremembering has both theoretical interest 
for cognitive and decision scientists and applied implications for practitioners in a variety of 
fields, research has been sparse and non-systematic and a unifying review is currently lacking. 
Moreover, each relevant paper tends to focus mainly on one of the different types of 
misremembering, but there has been no overarching attempt to clarify the categories into which 
such systematic distortions may be divided and their relationships. Finally, for some of these 
effects, results are not fully consistent across studies and diverse explanations have been 
proposed. 
Given this state of affairs, the present review has two aims: (1) to introduce a new taxonomy 
useful for understanding choice-supportive memory effects and their underlying processes; (2) 
to review the literature on choice-supportive memory and appraise the degree of support for the 
different aspects of the phenomenon and for the existing explanations. We will start by 
proposing a new theoretically motivated and empirically grounded taxonomy describing the 
                                                 
1 This paper has been published in the open access journal Frontiers in Psychological Science: Lind, Visentini, 
Mäntylä, & Del Missier (2017). 
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possible types of systematic choice-supportive misremembering that decision making may 
induce. Then, we will review papers accounting for the influence of potentially moderating 
factors on choice-related misremembering after decision making (i.e., alignability of attributes, 
delay before memory test, valence of stimuli, individual differences, and type of memory test). 
After that, following our taxonomy, we will appraise whether choice-supportive 
misremembering is a robust and well-supported phenomenon both within each category and 
overall. We will also discuss the proposed explanations for choice-related misremembering in 
terms of underlying cognitive and affective processes. 
From the theoretical viewpoint, the novel taxonomy and the associated review offer a new 
unifying and clarifying perspective on rather disconnected effects and phenomena, and the 
potential reasons behind them. This will highlight the similarities and differences between 
various kinds of misremembering after choice, allow an appraisal of their respective degree of 
empirical support, and provide more insight into the underlying processes. Furthermore, it will 
shed light on under-investigated aspects, unresolved issues, and the more promising new 
research directions. From the applied research viewpoint, gaining insight into whether, when, 
and why decision-making processes distort our memory could eventually help us determine to 
what extent human memory can be trusted and give indications on how to improve memory-
based decision making. Indeed, a strongly altered memory of past choices may affect future 
choices and hinder proper learning from experience and adaptation to reality. 
 
1.1.1 A new taxonomy of misremembering after decision making 
Starting from a theoretical analysis and a review of the literature connecting memory and 
decision making, we propose a new taxonomy and analysis systematically addressing choice-
supportive misremembering after decision making (i.e., misremembering choice-related 
information in a way that boosts the chosen option and/or demotes the foregone options). We 
identified four conceptually distinct types of choice-supportive misremembering, with clear 
face validity, corresponding to diverse research streams in the decision-making and memory 
literatures: misattribution, fact distortion, false memory, and selective forgetting (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: The taxonomy of choice-supportive misremembering 
Support for the proposed taxonomy comes from three different sources: (1) the a-priori 
grounding of the taxonomy categories in diverse and complementary theoretical views, (2) the 
face validity of the different types of misremembering that can be logically disentangled, (3) 
the empirical support coming from the studies that will be reviewed in the present paper. We 
introduce the taxonomy before presenting the review in order to provide a clear organizing 
principle for the description of the studies. 
Misattribution is when positive attributes are remembered as belonging to the chosen option 
when they in fact belonged to the foregone option, or when negative attributes are remembered 
as belonging to the foregone option when they in fact belonged to the chosen option. For 
example, if the choice is between two houses and the chosen house has a hole in the roof and 
the foregone one has a wonderful view, the chosen house is remembered as having a wonderful 
view or the foregone one as having a hole in the roof. Misattribution is a well-known type of 
commission error, where a memory is misattributed to the wrong source, and one of Schacter’s 
“seven sins of memory” (Schacter, 1999). In line with research in the decision-making field 
(Mather & Johnson, 2000; Mather et al., 2003), however, our operational definition is narrower 
than Schacter’s, specifically referring to the attribution of a correctly recalled feature to the 
wrong option. Indeed, misattribution presupposes correct encoding and recall of the actual 
information – only its source is confused – while false memory represents a separate category 
in our taxonomy, since it is a qualitatively different type of error (remembering information 
never presented), which may even be related to different underlying processes (e.g., Reyna & 
Lloyd, 1997), an issue that will be discussed later in the paper. 
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Fact distortion is when the objective values of features belonging to the chosen option are 
misremembered as more preferential than their actual values, and values of features belonging 
to the foregone option as less preferential. An example would be if in the choice between the 
two houses both were located 1 km from the work place, but the chosen one is remembered as 
being 500 m away and/or the foregone one as being 1.5 km away. This actual distortion of facts 
is distinct from changes in the subjective evaluation or attractiveness of options during the 
decision-making process, which are widely studied phenomena in the decision-making 
literature (e.g., Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Russo, Medvec, & Meloy, 1996; Shamoun & Svenson, 
2002; Svenson & Benthorn, 1992). Altering specific pieces of information is an error of 
commission possibly related to the biasing influence of current beliefs on memory (Schacter, 
1999). Fact distortion in memory after choice has been specifically postulated by the 
differentiation-consolidation theory (Svenson, 1992) and investigated by Svenson, Salo, & 
Lindholm (2009) and DeKay et al. (2014) in studies that will be discussed later in this review. 
False memory in the context of choice-supportiveness is when new attributes that were not part 
of the original options are ‘remembered’ as presented and, if their values are considered 
positive, as belonging to the chosen option, and if negative, as belonging to the foregone option. 
For example, the chosen house might be remembered as being well insulated even though no 
information about the insulation of either house had been presented. False memories have been 
widely investigated in the memory literature, for instance in relation to the misinformation 
paradigm (e.g., Ayers & Reder, 1998; Bernstein & Loftus, 2009; Cochran, Greenspan, Bogart, 
& Loftus, 2016; Laney, Morris, Bernstein, Wakefield, & Loftus, 2008). Some research has also 
been carried out on false memories in relation to decision making (e.g., Lindholm, Sjöberg, & 
Memon, 2014; Pennington & Hastie, 1988; Sharman, Garry, Jacobsen, Loftus, & Ditto, 2008; 
Corbin, Reyna, Weldon, & Brainerd, 2015). They represent a more dramatic and radical 
departure from reality than simple fact distortions, in that an entire new piece of non-existing 
evidence is remembered. Moreover, this type of error is not attributable to a properly encoded 
but later confused feature, thus it is conceptually distinct from misattributing a correctly recalled 
feature to one of the presented options (for a classification of memory errors and false memory 
phenomena see also Reyna & Lloyd, 1997). 
Selective forgetting is when the positive attributes of the chosen option and the negative 
attributes of the foregone option are remembered at a higher rate than vice versa. An example 
would be correctly remembering that the chosen house was close to the work place, but 
forgetting its leaking roof. This is a typical omission error, possibly fostered by the decreasing 
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accessibility of memory over time (“transience”: Schacter, 1999; Schacter, Chiao, & Mitchell, 
2003). Selective forgetting and remembering has traditionally been studied in relation to the 
confirmation bias (e.g., Levine & Murphy, 1943; Nickerson, 1998). Mather et al. (2000) 
and Depping & Freund (2013) have investigated the occurrence of this phenomenon after 
choice. Moreover, selective forgetting has been studied more generally as the outcome of 
incidental or motivated forgetting processes in the memory literature (e.g., Anderson & 
Hanslmayr, 2014; Anderson & Huddleston, 2012; Bäuml & Kliegl, 2013; Hirst & Echterhoff, 
2012).2  
 
1.1.2 Eligibility criteria for the review 
We included in the review only studies in which participants were presented with at least two 
options with multiple features, thus focusing on traditional multi-attribute choice problems, 
which represent the typical scenarios investigated in decision making (e.g., Payne, Bettman, & 
Johnson, 1993). Moreover, in the selected studies, participants were asked to make a deliberate 
preferential choice between the options after reviewing these features, which qualifies only 
proper decision-making studies (e.g., Hastie & Dawes, 2001). Based on evidence of important 
differences between judgment and choice processes (see e.g., Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006; 
Payne et al., 1993), any study where the participants are asked to make a judgment rather than 
a choice (e.g., Dellarosa & Bourne, 1984; Lindholm et al., 2014) or the decision is based on a 
mere esthetic preference (e.g., Johansson, Hall, Sikström, & Olsson, 2005; Lieberman, 
Ochsner, Gilbert, & Schacter, 2001) was also excluded from this review. 
In addition to these structural selection criteria, which adhere to traditional distinctions in 
judgment and decision-making research, we adopted some additional criteria with the specific 
aim to exert more control over the possibility that the conclusions drawn from the literature 
review are actually attributable to the influence of choice making on memory processes and not 
affected by extraneous factors. In particular, we excluded studies in which additional 
                                                 
2 The same misremembering classification can be applied in a straightforward way to attribute values that are not 
just perceived as positive or negative, but simply as better or worse along a common evaluation dimension. For 
instance, assuming that a lower price is preferable to a higher price for a product, but that a decision maker has 
chosen the product with the higher price due to its (other) better features, choice-supportive misattribution would 
imply switching the association between options and prices when remembering them. Choice-supportive fact 
distortion would imply remembering a price lower than the true one for the chosen option and/or a higher one for 
the foregone option. If price had not been presented at all, remembering that the chosen option had a lower price 
than the alternative one would represent a case of choice-supportive false memory. Finally, forgetting the price 
would represent an example of choice-supportive selective forgetting. 
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information (including misinformation) was introduced between the choice and the memory 
test. This left out from the review research on other types of distortions, such as those resulting 
from well-known hindsight paradigms. Indeed, in these conceptually different types of 
situations, the memory distortion is at least partly produced by the provision of information 
after the decision or the experience and not by the decision per se (for reviews see 
e.g., Bernstein, Erdfelder, Meltzoff, Peria, & Loftus, 2011; Calvillo, 2012; Erdfelder, Brandt, 
& Bröder, 2007; Louie, Rajan, & Sibley, 2007). Furthermore, in this review we are concerned 
solely with preferential choice and not with the predictability of an event or outcome, which is 
the main issue investigated in studies on the hindsight bias (Roese & Vohs, 2012). We also 
excluded studies in which participants themselves select which information to access (as in, 
e.g., Meffert, Chung, Joiner, Waks, & Garst, 2006; Redlawsk, 2001). 
Finally, the memory test had to be of the information provided and not of the influence of prior 
knowledge (see e.g., Biehal & Chakravarti, 1986; Dellarosa & Bourne, 1984) or merely of the 
choice made (e.g., Hall, Johansson, Tärning, Sikström, & Deutgen, 2010; Holyoak & Simon, 
1999), because these latter tests do not allow investigating choice-supportive misremembering. 
One study that appeared to qualify was excluded on the basis of lack of details (Davidson & 
Kiesler, 1964), since our attempt to obtain more information from the authors was unsuccessful. 
Another study with partial information was included (Chen & Zhang, 2003) but, due to the lack 
of detail, our review of that study is limited. 
Thorough searches using the key words “memor∗,” “recall∗,” “recog∗,” “remem∗,” and “recoll∗” 
combined with “decision,” “choice,” “option,” and “prefer∗” were conducted in the databases 
ERIC, Psycarticles and PsycINFO, as well as in Google Scholar. Additionally, after assessing 
the eligibility of the articles or proceedings found, all backward and forward references of the 
eligible papers were assessed using both Web of Science and Scopus. The time period covered 
by the search was until July 2017. Postings were made to relevant decision-making mailing lists 
(Society of Judgment and Decision Making, and European Association for Judgment and 
Decision Making) asking for both published and unpublished papers on memory biases or 
distortions or misremembering after choice. Table 1 summarizes the main features of the studies 
satisfying our inclusion criteria. 
  
 
  
 
Table 1: Summary of the eligible studies 
Study 
 
 
• Eligible 
experiment(s)  
Main misremembering 
category 
 
[other categories 
potentially relevant] 
Participants3 (age) Conditions or 
groups 
Scenarios Attribute 
alignability 
Delay Memory test 
Benney & Henkel 
(2006)  
Misattribution  
[Selective forgetting, 
False memory] 
172 adults (18–52) Best interest vs. 
free choice vs. 
assigned option 
• Restaurants 
• Movie 
theaters 
• Department 
stores 
• Gum 
Mainly unalignable, 
but gum options 
partly alignable 
30 min Recognition 
(source 
recognition) 
Chen & Zhang 
(2003)  
 
• Experiment 1  
• Experiment 2  
Misattribution  
[Selective forgetting] 
Number and age of 
participants not 
known 
High vs. low 
conflict scenarios 
Delay levels 
Not known Not known “Short” and 
“long” (details 
not known) 
Free recall and 
source 
recognition 
(details not 
known) 
DeKay et al. 
(2014)  
 
• Experiment 1 
• Experiment 2 
• Experiment 4 
Fact distortion • Experiment 1: 169 
adults (18–68)   
• Experiment 2: 470 
adults (18–71) 
• Experiment 4: 255 
adults (18–74) 
Choice vs. no 
choice 
• Apartments All alignable No delay Recognition 
(forced-choice 
recognition) 
Depping & Freund 
(2013)  
 
• Experiment 1 
• Experiment 2 
Selective forgetting  
[Misattribution] 
• Experiment 1: 66 
young (19–30), 73 
older (60–88)  
• Experiment 2: 62 
young (18–31), 60 
older (64–86) 
Choice vs. 
readability (no 
choice) 
Age 
• Travel 
packages 
• Hospitals (for 
surgery) 
Mainly not 
alignable 
7 min Free recall 
                                                 
3 Participants included in the analyses. 
  
 
  
 
Henkel & Mather 
(2007)  
 
• Experiment 1 
Misattribution  
[Selective forgetting, 
False memory] 
80 young adults  
(18–24) 
 
• Roommates 
• Internships 
• Apartments 
• Cars 
• Dating 
partners 
Mainly not 
alignable 
2 days Recognition 
(source 
recognition) 
Hess & Kotter-
Grühn (2011)  
 
• Experiment 1 
Misattribution  
[Selective forgetting] 
54 young (20–44),  
52 middle-age  
(45–64), 54 older 
(65–85) 
Impression (no 
choice) vs. 
interaction (and 
choice)  
Age 
• Persons with 
whom to spend 
a day (social 
partner) 
Not known, but the 
examples provided 
in the paper 
suggest mainly 
unalignable 
Short, length 
not specified 
Recognition 
(source 
recognition) 
Hess, Queen, & 
Patterson (2012)  
Misattribution 54 young (20–44),  
55 middle age  
(45–64),  
54 older (65–85) 
Active deliberation 
vs. no deliberation 
Alignable vs. 
unalignable 
attribute focus  
Age 
• Grocery store 
• Apartment to 
rent 
Half alignable Relatively short, 
length not 
specified 
Recognition 
(source 
recognition) 
Mather & Johnson 
(2000)  
Misattribution  
[Selective forgetting, 
False memory] 
54 young (18–26), 
108 older (64–83) 
Affective review vs. 
factual review vs. 
no review  
Delay levels  
Age 
• Houses 
• Job candidates 
• Flights 
• Blind dates 
Mainly not 
alignable 
30 min, 2 days Recognition 
(source 
recognition) 
Mather et al. 
(2000)  
 
• Experiment 1 
• Experiment 2 
• Experiment 3a 
• Experiment 3b 
Misattribution  
[Selective forgetting, 
False memory] 
• Experiment 1:  
142 students4 
• Experiment 2:  
75 under-graduates 
• Experiment 3a:  
77 undergraduates 
• Experiment 3b: 
379 students 
Experiment 3b: 
Choice vs. rejection 
• Job candidates 
• Blind dates 
• Roommate 
Mainly not 
alignable 
Experiment 1:  
5 min  
Experiments 2 
and 3a: 45 min 
Experiment 3b: 
5 min 
Recognition 
(source 
recognition) 
                                                 
4 The age of the participants is not specified for any of the experiments in this paper. 
  
 
  
 
Mather et al. 
(2003)  
 
• Experiment 2 
Misattribution  
[Selective forgetting, 
False memory] 
94 undergraduates 
(age not known) 
Choice vs. 
assignment 
• Houses 
• Roommates 
• Cars 
Mainly not 
alignable 
45 min Recognition 
(source 
recognition) 
Queen & Hess 
(2010)  
Misattribution  
[Selective forgetting] 
62 young adults (17–
28), 75 older adults 
(60–86) 
Age  
Conscious vs. 
unconscious 
thought 
Deliberative vs. 
Intuitive 
information 
• Apartments 
• Banks 
All attributes 
alignable 
Relatively short, 
not specified 
Recognition 
(source 
recognition) 
Svenson et al. 
(2009)  
 
• Experiment 1  
• Experiment 2 
• Experiment 3 
Fact distortion • Experiment 1: 64 
students (21–42)  
• Experiment 2: 35 
students familiar 
with scenario type 
(23–48)  
• Experiment 3: 77 
students (19–39) 
 
Patients 
needing surgery 
All attributes 
alignable 
Experiments 1 
and 2: Not 
known 
Experiment 3:  
1 h 
Cued recall 
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1.1.3 Influence of choice on choice-supportive misremembering 
Before discussing research on choice-supportive misremembering, it is necessary to appraise 
whether a necessary condition for the existence of this phenomenon holds: the very act of 
making a choice should influence subsequent memory of the options. Thus, it is essential to 
assess whether the effects are only observed after choice or whether they are also found when 
no active choice has been made. For this reason, several of the experiments use a design with a 
control group whose participants do not make a choice but are simply assigned an option 
(Benney & Henkel, 2006; Hess & Kotter-Grühn, 2011; Mather et al., 2003). In other studies 
participants are provided a “best interest” option (Benney & Henkel, 2006), or asked to focus 
on “readability” of a text rather than its contents (Depping & Freund, 2013). 
All of these studies, apart from the latter, found that making a choice induces choice-supportive 
misremembering. Such misremembering was found for assigned options only when the 
participants had been led to believe that the assignment was based on their best interest (Benney 
& Henkel, 2006). When participants had not been told that the assignment was in their best 
interest, participants’ memory slightly favoured the option they had not been assigned. In 
particular, Benney and Henkel did not observe choice-supportive misremembering in the 
assignment group and they observed the effect both in the free choice group and the best interest 
group, with these two latter groups not differing significantly. 
Likewise, Mather et al. (2003) found choice-supportiveness in their choice group, but not in the 
assignment group. Hess and Kotter-Grühn (2011) also found significantly higher level of 
choice-supportiveness of memory in the social interaction (choice) condition than in the 
impression (no choice) condition, but as the participants in the impression group were not told 
which option they had been assigned, the design did not enable an analysis of the effect on 
memory of being assigned an option. It is also worth noting that Mather et al. (2000) observed 
similar choice-supportiveness when participants had to choose one option vs. when they had to 
reject one option. Interestingly, Henkel and Mather (2007) observed misattribution to be 
supportive of the choice they thought they had made rather than of their actual choice. As 
pointed out by the authors, this indicates that belief at the time of retrieval can influence memory 
accuracy and thus that the observed misremembering cannot be entirely due to encoding 
processes. Only Depping and Freund (2013) did not find choice-supportive memory in the 
groups making a choice. 
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1.2 Factors potentially influencing memory choice-supportiveness 
Before reviewing the studies within each category of choice-supporting memory, we will 
discuss some factors potentially moderating misremembering, given that these factors may be 
influential across the four proposed categories. The main potential moderating factors are 
alignability of the attribute values, delay between presentation of the options and memory test, 
valence (of the scenarios, options and attributes), individual differences, and type of memory 
test. These factors have been found to affect decision making or memory significantly 
(e.g., Markman & Medin, 1995; Payne et al., 1993; Schacter, 1999; Schacter & Coyle, 1997) 
and thus they may play also a role in choice-supportive misremembering. 
 
1.2.1 Alignability 
A factor that may influence misremembering after choice is alignability (i.e., whether both 
options have directly comparable features). For example, when choosing between houses, an 
attribute value belonging to one option may be that it is 1 km from the city center and one 
belonging to the other option that it is located 2 km from the city center. These attribute values 
are alignable (or commensurable), whereas those features that do not have a comparable one in 
the other option are not. 
The effects of alignability on decision making or memory have been investigated in a number 
of studies (e.g., Markman & Gentner, 1997; Markman & Medin, 1995; Mather, Knight, & 
McCaffrey, 2005), and the degree of alignability varies across the studies we reviewed. All 
attributes of the options in Svenson et al. (2009), Queen and Hess (2010) and DeKay et al. 
(2014) were alignable, whereas others employed a design where half of the attributes were 
alignable and the other half unalignable (Budson, Mather, & Chong, 2006; Hess et al., 2012). 
The remaining studies did not specifically assess the importance of alignability and did not 
specify the alignability of the attributes. From the evidence available, it appears that none of 
the remaining papers used scenario features that were entirely or substantially alignable. 
Choice-supportive memory has been observed both in studies with alignable attributes and in 
studies with non-alignable attributes (see Table 1). However, Hess et al. (2012) observed an 
interaction between age and alignability, with choice-supportiveness scores increasing from the 
young to middle-aged to older groups for alignable attributes but not for unalignable attributes. 
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This effect was no longer significant when a composite ability measure was used as a covariate. 
Generally, they observed greater choice-supportiveness for alignable attributes. This suggests 
that the effect can be greater for alignable features, at least in some populations (see also Budson 
et al., 2006; Mather et al., 2005), and that this difference can be related to cognitive skills. 
However, more studies are needed to fully clarify the role of alignability in choice-supportive 
misremembering, especially in relation to the category of false memories and in different 
populations. 
 
1.2.2 Delay 
An important factor affecting memory is the extent of the delay between encoding (i.e., viewing 
the information about the options) and retrieval (i.e., the memory test). An increased delay is 
likely to result in more misremembering, but it is possible that delay affects different types of 
memory distortions differently. Unfortunately, although some memory studies have found false 
memories to increase over time (e.g., Howe, Candel, Otgaar, Malone, & Wimmer, 2010; Sulin 
& Dooling, 1974), the relative influence of delay, memory test, and material used on choice-
supportive misremembering has not been properly scrutinized. Indeed, none of the studies 
reviewed allow us to draw strong conclusions about this, as they did not systematically 
investigate types of misremembering vs. delay. However, some used a design with different 
delay levels in the same study (Chen & Zhang, 2003; Mather & Johnson, 2000), showing how 
delay affected the particular type of memory distortion studied. The other experiments all used 
rather short but variable time lags (Budson et al., 2006; DeKay et al., 2014). 
Chen and Zhang (2003) found that when using a “long” delay, positive attributes were more 
likely to be attributed to the chosen option in their high-conflict condition than in their low 
conflict condition (similar vs. diverse attractiveness of the choice options). Unfortunately, that 
paper does not specify exactly the length of the delays used, and we have not been able to obtain 
more information about the experiment from the authors. Mather and Johnson (2000) found 
that, although most participants exhibited a source attribution bias favouring their chosen 
option, there was no significant effect of delay (30 min vs. 2 days) other than the group with 
older participants and the longest delay (2 days) showing the weakest memory for every 
measure. It is clear that studies further investigating the effect of delay on choice-supportive 
misremembering are needed. Not only would it be interesting to see whether delays longer than 
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2 days (the longest delay after which choice-supportiveness was assessed) produce more 
choice-supportive misremembering compared with shorter delays, but also whether delay 
specifically affects the different types of distortions observed. 
 
1.2.3 Sequential vs. simultaneous presentation of information 
Choice-supportive memory phenomena can be the product of biased encoding or biased recall 
of the information presented (or both). In the former case, the decision maker may have encoded 
altered or partial information before making a choice (predecisional distortion: DeKay, 2015). 
In the latter case, choice-supportive memory originates from processes occurring after a 
decision has been made. Sequential presentation of information (vs. simultaneous presentation) 
might favour predecisional distortion (DeKay et al., 2014). 
The studies we reviewed vary in relation to the information presentation type. Some of them 
used a sequential presentation of the options or attributes (DeKay et al., 2014; Hess & Kotter-
Grühn, 2011; Hess et al., 2012; Queen & Hess, 2010), whereas the participants in the remaining 
studies made their choice with the information simultaneously and externally available. Choice-
supportive misremembering has been observed both with sequential and with simultaneous 
presentation of information. However, given that no study appraised systematically the 
influence of information presentation on choice-supportive memory, more research is needed. 
 
1.2.4 Valence 
The impact of valence in relation to misremembering after choice can be evaluated at three 
levels: scenario, option, and attribute. Making a choice in a positive scenario or situation (e.g., 
going on Holiday and choosing between two different destinations) may not result in the same 
degree and kind of misremembering as a choice in a negative scenario or situation (e.g., being 
seriously ill and choosing between two different methods of surgery). Similarly, a desirable and 
an undesirable option, or positive and negative attributes, may be distorted to different degrees. 
Out of the studies reviewed, only Depping and Freund (2013) attempted to clarify whether the 
valence of the scenarios/situation influence memory distortion. They conducted two 
experiments with older and younger participants to investigate the impact of valence and choice 
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on memory. Unfortunately, Depping and Freund failed to observe significant choice-supportive 
misremembering in their studies, regardless of the age group investigated, and therefore no 
interaction with valence was detectable. However, the other studies we reviewed found 
significant choice-supportive memory using positively, neutrally and negatively valence 
settings, although only Svenson et al. (2009) used a clearly negative scenario. This implies that 
valence may not be critical for observing choice-supportive memory effects, although more 
studies systematically investigating its influence on choice-supportive misremembering are 
needed. 
 
1.2.5 Individual differences 
Not everyone may misremember to the same degree. Age as well as individual differences in 
terms of cognitive abilities and personality are likely to be influential. Thus, several of the 
studies included different age groups (Depping & Freund, 2013; Hess & Kotter-Grühn, 2011; 
Hess et al., 2012; Mather & Johnson, 2000; Mather et al., 2005; Queen & Hess, 2010), and 
some also individual differences in cognitive ability (Hess & Kotter-Grühn, 2011; Hess et al., 
2012; Mather & Johnson, 2000; Queen & Hess, 2010). 
As far as overall choice-supportiveness is concerned, only Mather and Johnson (2000) found 
that older age is associated with greater choice-supportive misremembering (in particular, 
source misattribution). Indeed, Queen and Hess (2010), Hess and Kotter-Grühn (2011), Hess et 
al. (2012) and Depping and Freund (2013) all observed that the memory of older adults was not 
significantly more choice-supportive than that of younger adults. Although age has mainly been 
looked at in relation to valence or overall choice-supportiveness, Hess and Kotter-Grühn 
(2011) introduced another dimension: morality vs. competence judgments. The participants in 
their first experiment were older and younger adults, rating target persons based on statements 
focusing on either morality or competence. The participants in one subgroup made an 
impression of the target persons and those in the other chose whom to spend a day with socially. 
Only in the older adult group was choice-supportiveness specific to the morality domain. 
Curiously, although different adult age groups have been investigated in several studies, 
research in children is lacking and it would represent an interesting avenue for future 
investigations. 
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The participants in three of the reviewed studies (Hess & Kotter-Grühn, 2011; Hess et al., 2012; 
Mather & Johnson, 2000) completed cognitive tests as part of the experiments. However, only 
Mather and Johnson (2000) discussed the correlations between the scores obtained there in 
older participants and the observed choice-supportiveness in memory. They assessed cognitive 
capacity with nine neuropsychological tests, and found significant correlations between 
memory choice-supportiveness and scores on tests requiring the kind of executive and reflective 
processing associated with the frontal lobes of the brain, but no significant correlations with 
tests of memory functions associated with the medial-temporal regions (only in their control 
condition). They also did not find correlations between overall memory accuracy and choice-
supportive memory. In particular, participants with better performance in tests of 
frontal/executive functioning were less prone to choice-supportive memory. 
Mather and Johnson (2000) set out to explore the influence of emotional/motivational factors 
on memory after decision making by comparing groups of participants assigned to three 
different review conditions: affective (think about how you felt about the options), factual 
(review the details of the options) and no review (filler task). The emotional focus in the 
affective condition increased the rate of choice-supportive memory in younger adults. This was 
the case despite the fact that the actual choice features were remembered equally well in the 
different review conditions. Interestingly, general memory capacity and even recognition 
accuracy in the specific scenario did not predict the level of choice-supportive misattribution. 
 
1.2.6 Memory test 
Given that “whether a person remembers an event depends on how memory is assessed” 
(Roediger & Gallo, 2001, p. 19), the method of testing memory is likely to have an impact on 
memory distortion. In the majority of the reviewed studies, memory of the options was tested 
through recognition. For instance, after choosing between two houses to purchase (“Red brick 
house” vs. “White house built of wood”), participants were asked to say whether “Safe 
neighborhood” was a feature belonging to the former or to the latter option or if was a new 
feature (never presented) (Mather & Johnson, 2000). Chen and Zhang (2003) and Mather et al. 
(2005), however, also included free recall (e.g., asking participants to recall all the attributes 
they could from each of the choice options). Unfortunately, Chen and Zhang (2003) did not 
mention whether any differences were found between the two assessment methods, and we have 
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not been successful in obtaining more information about their experiment and findings. Mather 
et al. (2005) did not assess choice-supportive memory in their two free recall 
experiments. Depping and Freund (2013) used free recall and Svenson et al. (2009) cued recall. 
No choice-supportiveness was observed in the former study, while choice-supportive fact 
distortion was observed in the latter one. 
To sum up, we cannot draw any strong conclusions about the influence of the type of memory 
test, as none of the papers specifically addressed this question. In particular, although choice-
supportive memory has been observed repeatedly with recognition paradigms, it is not known 
whether the effect is reliable with free recall due to the scarcity of studies. In future research, it 
would be interesting to decipher whether recognition, cued and free recall yield differences in 
choice-supportive misremembering, also considering that free recall and cued recall are the 
more likely situations to occur in real life when someone is trying to remember the features of 
the options of a past choice in view of a related one. 
A more specific issue related to the memory test concerns the fact that recognition tests for 
source attribution generally include both new and old features, where the old features are those 
that had been attributed to one option in the initial presentation and the new ones are the foils 
for the test. According to some scholars, assessing the extent to which old and new features are 
misattributed is not only useful to unveil choice-supportive misremembering, but it can also 
give some partial insight into when in the memory process the distortion is likely to have 
occurred. Benney and Henkel (2006), for example, found more choice-supportive memory for 
old than for new features. Both correctly and incorrectly, participants were more likely to 
attribute positive old features to the chosen option, but this was not the case for new features. 
Conversely, Henkel and Mather (2007) found similar choice-supportive misattribution for old 
and new features. As they pointed out, although it may be the case that participants are more 
attentive to the positive features that subsequently make them choose one option over the other, 
the fact that choice-supportive distortion was observed also for new features indicates that 
biased encoding alone may not explain the observed systematic memory distortion. Mather et 
al. (2003) found that positive old features were both correctly and incorrectly more likely to be 
attributed to the chosen option. Negative old features, on the other hand, were more likely to be 
attributed to the foregone option, although this effect was significantly smaller. Finally, positive 
new features were even more likely to be attributed to the chosen option than any of the old 
attributes, and negative new features were the ones most likely to be attributed to the foregone 
option. Similarly, Mather et al. (2000) found choice-supportive memory for old and new 
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features, although it did not reach significance for new features in half of their scenarios. Again, 
the largest choice-supportiveness effect was found from positive features attributed to the 
chosen option rather than negative features attributed to the foregone option. 
 
1.2.7 Other factors 
Other factors could also affect misremembering after choice. For example, Queen and Hess 
(2010) and Hess et al. (2012) investigated the impact of deliberation (as opposed to intuition) 
during decision making on choice and on subsequent memory. Whereas Queen and Hess 
(2010) found no effect, Hess et al. (2012) observed more choice-supportive memory with no 
deliberation than with active deliberation, which was in line with their hypothesis that more 
attentive processing would decrease choice-supportive misremembering. 
Svenson et al. (2009) found that memory distortion effects were stronger on conflicting 
attributes than on the attribute that turned out to be the most decisive. One of the hypotheses 
supported in their experiments was that there would be no consolidation of the attribute that 
each participant considered to be the most important. This provides some support for the notion 
that a higher degree of conflict on less important attributes would increase the memory 
distortion of the attributes. Chen and Zhang (2003), who focused on the differences in memory 
distortion between high and low conflict options, also found more choice-supportive memory 
where the options were more balanced in terms of attractiveness (high conflict) when testing 
the participants after a “long” delay (the precise length of which is unspecified). 
Another factor that was looked at in one of the studies reviewed was how beliefs of what choice 
one has made affects subsequent memory (Henkel & Mather, 2007). Here, it was found that 
memory was biased in favour of the options the participants thought they had selected rather 
than their actual choices. The only difference compared to correctly remembered choices was 
that only somewhat, but not significantly, more negative items were attributed to the option 
they believe they had rejected. Not surprisingly, source accuracy was superior when the choice 
was correctly remembered. Similarly, Mather and Johnson (2000) discovered that, with 
increased delay, the believed choice became more likely to impact memory attributions than 
the actual choice. As the authors point out, this indicates that beliefs held at the time of retrieval 
is sufficient to create memory distortion, thus pointing to a crucial influence of the retrieval/test 
stage in the generation of choice-supportiveness. 
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1.3 Choice-supportive misremembering 
1.3.1 Misattribution 
The first type of memory distortion after decision making, misattribution, can be described as 
a type of choice-supportive misremembering where experimenters observe that participants 
misattribute attribute values to the wrong option when their memory is being tested after a 
delay. As mentioned previously, this is a narrower and thus more precise definition than 
previous ones (e.g., Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Schacter & Coyle, 1997). 
Misattribution is the most widely studied phenomenon in relation to memory distortion after 
choice. Much of the body of research on choice-blindness also investigates a kind of 
misattribution phenomenon of identifying a foregone option as the chosen one after a short 
delay (e.g., Pärnamets, Hall, & Johansson, 2015; Somerville & McGowan, 2016) as do other 
studies on the effect of bias on memory (Frost et al., 2015). 
Several studies found choice-supportive misattribution (Benney & Henkel, 2006; Chen & 
Zhang, 2003; Henkel & Mather, 2007; Hess & Kotter-Grühn, 2011; Hess et al., 2012; Mather 
et al., 2000; Mather & Johnson, 2000; Mather et al., 2003; Queen & Hess, 2010), and none of 
the studies in this category that investigated choice-supportiveness failed to find this effect. 
From the reviewed studies, as we have already seen in the Memory Test section, it can also be 
concluded that the choice-supportive memory is more due to attributing positive features to the 
chosen option than to attributing negative items to the foregone option, although both of these 
phenomena are common. 
Several processes may underlie misattribution. Biased encoding, errors in source attribution, 
and reconstructive remembering at the time of retrieval are the main ones proposed. As noted 
by Mather et al. (2003), attentional focus at encoding may provide a partial explanation, but 
their finding that new items are attributed in a choice-supportive manner points to the 
importance of the retrieval stage, as that is when source attribution takes place. When the source 
is not clearly remembered, the knowledge (or belief) of what choice one made may be used as 
an aid to infer the most likely source (Mather & Johnson, 2000). Indeed, Henkel and Mather 
(2007) found that the belief – at the time of retrieval – that one had made a particular choice, 
was sufficient to yield choice-supportive memory even when that belief was in fact incorrect. 
Explanations focused on emotional and motivational factors point to the influence of emotional 
goals: the desire to feel that one has made the right choice and that the chosen option is superior 
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to the foregone one may reduce regret and promote well-being (e.g., Kunda, 1990; Taylor & 
Brown, 1988). Mather et al. (2003) suggested that the belief and desire to have made the right 
decision provide a likely explanation for choice-supportiveness. Cognitive factors offer an 
alternative or complementary explanation. As the processing of stereotype inconsistent 
information has been found to be more cognitively demanding than that of stereotype consistent 
data (e.g., Henkel, Johnson, & De Leonardis, 1998; McIntyre & Craik, 1987), it may follow 
that any information inconsistent with the final choice may require more elaboration and 
cognitive effort. If such processing is rendered more difficult by age or cognitive capacity, there 
may be an increased reliance on feelings. 
 
1.3.2 Fact distortion 
As pointed out by Svenson et al. (2009), most research on memory distortion after decision 
making has focused on the subjective evaluation of the relevant facts rather than the recollection 
of the quantitative facts themselves. The focus of the three experiments covered in their paper 
and in three of the experiments in DeKay et al. (2014) was therefore the memory of the facts 
provided to the participants when asking them to make a choice between two options. 
Similar to the studies in the misattribution category, both Svenson et al (2009) and DeKay et 
al. (2014) found systematic misremembering favouring the chosen option and downgrading the 
foregone option. However, DeKay et al (2014) looked at memory misremembering resulting 
from predecisional distortion of options based on whether they were leading or trailing 
alternatives early on in the decision process, whereas Svenson et al. (2009) were interested in 
the effect of choice on memory. Interestingly, all the experiments in the DeKay et al. 
(2014) paper and two out of three of those in the Svenson et al. (2009) paper found that most 
of this distortion stemmed from upgrading the leader or chosen alternative, and only one (Study 
3, Svenson et al., 2009) that downgrading the foregone alternative contributed to most of the 
distortion. In Experiment 4 of the DeKay et al (2014) paper, downgrading the trailer did not 
even reach significance. The general trend in these six experiments is thus that bolstering the 
favoured option is the main contributor to this kind of memory distortion. However, the 
proposed mechanisms behind these effects can be considerably different and point to the 
importance of methodology when trying to discern underlying factors. 
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DeKay et al. (2014) found that participants’ predecisional distortion of attributes correlated 
with their postdecision memory of them and cannot be attributed to response bias or any 
processes occurring after the choice. The suggested explanation is instead that new information 
is subjectively encoded as superior relative to its true value if it belongs to the currently leading 
option, and as inferior relative to its true value if it belongs to the trailer. This bias during 
encoding then would cause the memory distortion observed during the recall of facts. The 
authors also concluded that the errors appear to stem from biases in the mental representation 
of the facts rather than from the judged importance of the information. DeKay et al. 
(2014) argued, following the outcome of specific control analyses in their studies, that response 
biases and inferences made from one’s choice are unlikely to explain choice-supportive 
memories of their participants. Thus, the authors allege that it is the initial mental representation 
of the information rather than any later processes that gives rise to the distortions in memory. 
Svenson et al. (2009) on the other hand, argued that the systematic self-serving fact distortion 
that they observe in their three experiments is more likely to have arisen in the postdecision 
stage, as the decisions were made with the information externally available. Thus, at the 
moment the decision was made, the facts could not be misperceived. The observed memory 
distortions were predicted by the differentiation-consolidation theory (e.g., Svenson, 1992), 
according to which decision making is a process of differentiation between the alternatives 
before deciding and then of consolidation of the decision once made. Thus, the delay between 
the decision and the recall of that decision would allow the strengthening (consolidation) of the 
decision and the decision maker’s confidence in it by means of increased choice-supportive 
memory. According to the differentiation-consolidation theory, fact distortion may occur either 
before or after a decision has been made and thus potentially both during encoding and during 
consolidation and it can be related both to cognitive factors (schema/gestalt-related processing) 
and to emotion-related factors (regret avoidance). 
More studies investigating fact distortion and the time course of the observed effects in different 
scenarios and using a variety of methods will be useful to better understand when choice-
supportive fact distortion takes place in different circumstances. It is also important to point out 
that fact distortion can be investigated only with free recall (and cued recall) and not with 
recognition, which represents the test that has been used in the great majority of studies on 
choice-supportive misremembering. 
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1.3.3 False memory 
The third type of self-serving memory distortion proposed in our taxonomy is false memory; 
when attributes or facts not previously presented are ‘remembered.’ Most often, false memories 
have been studied as a consequence of misinformation from the experimenter (e.g., Ayers & 
Reder, 1998; Bernstein, Laney, Morris, & Loftus, 2005). The wider concept of false memory, 
however, has also been observed in studies where participants are asked to make a judgment 
after attentive consideration of evidence (e.g., Lindholm et al., 2014). 
Studies offering evidence for choice-supportive false memories are reported by some of the 
papers fulfilling the inclusion criteria for this review and using source recognition when testing 
the memory of the options (e.g., Henkel & Mather, 2007; Mather & Johnson, 2000; Mara 
Mather et al., 2003). In those studies, the fact that some new features presented in the 
recognition test were recognized as old can be interpreted as indirect evidence of false memory, 
although other explanations are possible (e.g., the use of a more inference-based decision 
strategy for the ‘new’ items, perceived as less accessible). 
None of the reviewed studies assessed false memory using free or cued recall. In particular, free 
recall tests will be highly informative in that they may provide less ambiguous and indirect 
information on the occurrence of a false memory than the just-mentioned source recognition 
studies. In future research, it would be useful to investigate the conditions needed for false 
memories to arise even without misinformation and when memory is assessed using free or 
cued recall (e.g., long delay). Moreover, considering that the memory literature has highlighted 
sizable individual differences in proneness to false memories (e.g., Winograd, Peluso, & 
Glover, 1998; Zhu et al., 2010), it would be interesting to consider the role of individual 
differences in choice-supportive false memories. 
The papers reviewed do not discuss the specific mechanisms behind false memories directly, 
as none of them focused exclusively on this type of misremembering. Constructive or schema-
based explanations (Loftus, 1995), Fuzzy-Trace Theory (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995), and the 
Source Monitoring Framework (Johnson et al., 1993) are three of the main theories attempting 
to explain the mechanisms behind false memory and they can be applied also in the context of 
choice-supportive false memories. Constructive or schema-based explanations assume that 
false memories originate from semantic integration and inferences that can change memory 
traces or simply produce competing and thus interfering traces (Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978). 
Fuzzy-Trace Theory stresses the distinction between verbatim and gist memory traces, where 
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verbatim traces focus on precise details and gist traces on core meaning. These two types of 
traces arise in parallel, but verbatim traces are more susceptible to interference and the negative 
effects of increased delay rather than gist traces. Thus, false memories may arise when the gist 
affects remembering of verbatim information, or when verbatim memories from different 
sources are confused with one another. The Source Monitoring Framework, on the other hand, 
stipulates that false memories are caused by thoughts, images and feelings from one source 
being mistakenly attributed to another source. 
In the context of our taxonomy false memories may consist in the production of an entirely new 
attribute with its values. This kind of phenomenon is more difficult to explain by making 
reference to wrong source attribution and easier to explain referring to constructive semantic 
processes or gist-based influences, assuming that the new attribute and their values are 
semantically consistent with the choice context and the overall attractiveness of choice options. 
However, choice-supportive false memories may be alternatively considered as failures of 
reality monitoring (i.e., the inability to discriminate between internal and external sources of 
information), although it would remain unexplained how these memories are initially formed. 
We will come back later to the theories of false memory in the general discussion on the 
explanations of the various types of misremembering in our taxonomy. 
An understanding of the false memory phenomenon is important in the context of choice-
supportive memory not only because it is one main type of misremembering, but also because 
the false memory literature shows that both actual events and falsely remembered events can 
affect our future attitudes and possibly our future decisions. For example, implanting false 
memories about loving asparagus the first time they were tried led participants to appreciate the 
food more and be willing to pay a higher sum for it (Laney et al., 2008), whereas false memories 
about becoming ill after eating a particular food (Bernstein & Loftus, 2009) or drinking a 
particular alcoholic beverage (Clifasefi, Bernstein, Mantonakis, & Loftus, 2013) diminished 
their liking of it, although consolidated food-related behavior seems difficult to change 
(Bernstein & Loftus, 2009). In line with these findings, Henkel and Mather (2007) found that 
memory was affected by the choice the participants thought they had made rather than the one 
they had actually made. 
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1.3.4 Selective forgetting 
The final type of misremembering in our taxonomy is what we have labeled ‘selective 
forgetting’: when the negative features of the chosen option or the positive features of the 
foregone option are selectively forgotten. Mather et al. (2000) observed not only choice-
supportive misattribution, but also choice-supportive recognition. That is, participants were 
more likely to recognize positive features of the selected option than positive features of the 
foregone option, thus showing selective forgetting of the latter ones. Choice-supportive 
recognition, however, was observed only for positive and not for negative features and not in 
all the scenarios tested. Thus, in some scenarios, “which option participants selected affected 
which positive items but not which negative items they recognized as old” (Mather et al., 2000, 
p. 136). 
Depping and Freund (2013) primarily investigated selective forgetting (rather than 
misattribution or fact distortion). The main conclusion of their studies was that processing of 
decision-relevant information promotes a stronger focus on negative information in older adults 
and older adults remember more negative information in choice contexts. However, in their 
studies, Depping and Freund did not observe significant choice-supportive selective forgetting. 
Other studies, not reviewed here because not specifically concerned with choice-supportive 
memory, suggest that making a choice may produce selective forgetting (or remembering). For 
instance, Biehal & Chakravarti (1983) contrasted memory for options after choice vs. directed 
learning of the same information. They observed that memory for chosen options had a similar 
level of accuracy as memory under directed learning, while accuracy of memory for rejected 
brands was poorer. The possible implication is that decision makers focus more on the chosen 
option and on the more choice-relevant information and this may have consequences for 
subsequent memory, both in terms of better remembering of the chosen option and, possibly, 
in terms of choice-supportive remembering. However, although there is some evidence that 
choice-supportive selective forgetting may take place, as we have seen, the evidence is very 
limited and more studies are needed. 
For what concerns potential explanations, existing research, together with research in related 
topics like confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998) and incidental and motivated forgetting 
(Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014; Anderson & Huddleston, 2012; Bäuml, 2008), suggest that both 
biased encoding and biased retrieval processes may contribute to the phenomenon, possibly 
together with suppression of information not supportive of the chosen option and retrieval-
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based strengthening of supportive information. Interestingly, related research seems to suggest 
a more important role for encoding-related processes in this kind of distortion as compared, for 
instance, to more retrieval-based phenomena (like false memories). However, direct research 
on the processes underlying choice-supportive selective forgetting is lacking and new studies 
on this topic are needed. 
 
1.4 General discussion and conclusion 
1.4.1 Summary of the findings 
In this review, we have presented a novel taxonomy of choice-supportive misremembering after 
decision making and reviewed papers where the participants make a deliberate choice between 
options described by multiple attributes and their memory of those attributes is then tested. Our 
taxonomy represents a theoretically and empirically derived classification of the main types of 
misremembering after choice: misattribution, fact distortion, false memory, and selective 
forgetting. 
Misattribution is by far the most frequently investigated phenomenon and there is good 
evidence for it when source recognition tests are used. Indeed, the reviewed evidence seems 
robust and manifests itself primarily as biased attribution of positive features to the chosen 
option rather than negative items to the foregone option. Conversely, fact distortion has rarely 
been investigated, and merits further research, and so does selective forgetting (for which only 
weak evidence exists). Although some studies provided some evidence compatible with the 
existence of these two latter types of distortions, there is clearly not sufficient research to date 
to draw solid conclusions as to the extent of choice-supportive memory in these categories. 
Therefore, further studies are needed to clarify whether these phenomena are robust, especially 
when memory is assessed through free or cued recall. The evidence for choice-supportive false 
memories after decision making is also meager and obtained mainly with a recognition 
paradigm, which may complicate the interpretation of the findings due to potential alternative 
explanations. 
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1.4.2 Proposed explanations 
Most of the papers where choice-supportive memory was observed do not delve deeply into the 
proposed mechanisms and explanations behind the phenomenon, but several theories can 
account for the various types of decision-related misremembering observed. The proposed 
explanations of the effects can be broadly classified in ‘cognitive’ vs. ‘affective,’ with some 
accounts making reference to both aspects. At the moment, the relative roles of cognition and 
emotion are not entirely clear. Neither have the specific processes behind choice-supportive 
misremembering been fully ascertained, even if some studies have provided preliminary 
evidence. 
From a cognitive perspective, Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) 
generally predicts that healthy adults seek to avoid holding conflicting beliefs or values, and 
thus tend to distort them in a manner that reduces that dissonance. This would imply that after 
making a choice one’s memory of the options would be distorted in a manner that would 
diminish any conflict and the choice would be remembered as more consistent (e.g., Brehm, 
1956). The process of reducing conflict could be instrumental in reaching a decision, and 
continue once it has been made. The result would be choice-supportive memory. A cognitive 
account of choice-supportive misremembering can also be provided by the Fuzzy-Trace Theory 
(Reyna & Brainerd, 1995), suggesting that memory processes can produce verbatim or gist 
representations, with the former focusing on specific details and the latter on the core meaning 
of experiences. When a choice has to be made, gist is more important and better remembered 
than the precise details and the individual may therefore remember mainly that one alternative 
was superior enough to be chosen, and this general idea of superiority may then bias memory 
toward choice-supportiveness. Likewise, schema-driven or constructive processing 
(e.g., Loftus, 1995; Sulin & Dooling, 1974; see also Dooling & Christiaansen, 1977) would 
imply that memory would be distorted in agreement with the mental representation of the choice 
made (i.e., the chosen option is better than the alternative one and thus it was selected). Finally, 
the Source Monitoring Framework (Johnson, 2006; Johnson et al., 1993; Mitchell & Johnson, 
2000; Mitchell & Johnson, 2009) would explain choice-supportive misremembering either in 
terms of confusion between different sources (options) for a retrieved item or in terms of a 
failure of discrimination between internal and external sources of information (depending on 
the type of misremembering). 
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Among these theories, source monitoring seems to be naturally and directly applicable to the 
misattribution category in our taxonomy (as a case of source attribution error), but it is less 
directly applicable to selective forgetting, false memory, and fact distortion. This does not mean 
that the theory cannot explain these effects, because they could be considered as the result of 
confusion between internal and external sources of information, but their explanation would 
require additional assumptions and specification. In particular, source monitoring needs 
additional major assumptions to cover selective forgetting. Moreover, the theory should also be 
able to explain how false memories are generated before being confused with the reality and 
how attribute values are distorted before being associated with real options, and why wrong 
attributions tend to boost the chosen option and demote the foregone one (e.g., perhaps due to 
the knowledge of one owns choice or related beliefs). Furthermore, bringing knowledge- or 
belief-related assumptions into the theory would blur the distinction between the Source 
Monitoring Framework and the constructive/schema-related theories. These latter theories, as 
well as Fuzzy-Trace Theory, have complementary strengths/weaknesses: they seem more able 
to explain choice-supportive false memory, fact distortion, and selective forgetting, due to 
postulated semantic/knowledge or gist-based influences on encoding and/or retrieval processes, 
and perhaps less directly able to explain choice-supportive misattribution. Neither can it be 
excluded that different mechanisms may explain different kinds of misremembering in out 
taxonomy. Additionally, it is also important to remember that other specific processes may even 
be involved in specific cases, like inhibition of non-supportive information or retrieval-based 
strengthening of supportive information in the case of selective forgetting/remembering 
(e.g., Bäuml, 2008). 
From an affective perspective, memory may be choice-supportive as an implicit means to 
enhance positivity about oneself and one’s decision making via emotion regulation (Mather & 
Carstensen, 2005). Indeed, socioemotional selectivity theory underlines the individual’s 
adaptations to her or his life course, with the reduction in time horizons strengthening the 
motivation to preserve emotional balance (vs. knowledge-related goals), and leading to a greater 
focus on emotion regulation and positive aspects of life (e.g., Carstensen, 2006). These changes 
are thought to affect attention and memory processes in a way that promotes the maintenance 
of a positive emotional state also via choice-supportive misremembering. This would be in line 
with the notion of self-protecting memory in the field of autobiographical memories: the 
motivationally driven pursuit of a positive self-definition taking precedence over accuracy and 
truthfulness (see e.g., Sedikides, Green, & Pinter, 2004; see also Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; 
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Sedikides & Green, 2000; Tesser, 2001). An explanation referring both to cognitive and to 
emotional factors is provided by the differentiation-consolidation theory (Svenson, 2003). The 
theory holds that, once the differentiation process needed to reach a decision has been 
completed, “postdecision processes (called consolidation) work in support of the chosen 
alternative to maintain this alternative as the preferred gestalt separated from the non-chosen 
alternative, but also to protect the decision against poor outcomes, regrets, and so on” (p. 291). 
This suggests the intriguing possibility that multiple and diverse determinants underlie choice-
supportive misremembering. 
One of the major questions still open is therefore whether a higher degree of choice-supportive 
memory is better explained by higher degree of emotion regulation or whether it instead reflects 
more reliance on schema-driven, gist-based processing, or on error-prone source monitoring. 
Some of the evidence for the affective explanation of choice-supportive memory comes from 
studies comparing older and younger adults, starting from the assumption that older adults, due 
to their greater effort in maintaining a positive emotional balance due to age-related changes in 
high level goals (Carstensen, 2006; Mather & Carstensen, 2005), would show a greater degree 
of choice-supportive memory distortion than younger adults. Indeed, although a difference was 
found in one study (e.g., Mather & Johnson, 2000), as we have seen, the evidence is generally 
negative. In the study of Mather and Johnson (2000), the results of the ‘affective review’ 
condition in younger adults also point to the role of socio-emotional factors. However, the 
negative relation between control measures and choice-supportive distortion in older 
participants is not in agreement with the general statement that control abilities are needed to 
ensure emotion-regulation success (Mather & Knight, 2005; Mather & Carstensen, 2005), 
suggesting to the need for clarification of the role of cognitive control in different kinds of 
positivity biases. A possibility is that less effective active encoding and recollection processes, 
together with emotion-related factors, might contribute to older adults’ stronger positivity bias 
for past choices (Mather & Johnson, 2000) – assuming that this age-related exacerbation of the 
bias exists – with the decline of executive control processes playing a significant role (Del 
Missier, Mäntylä, & de Bruin, 2012; Del Missier et al., 2015). 
Another issue that would deserve more investigation is to elucidate more precisely the possible 
interplay between emotional and cognitive factors in determining choice-supportive 
misremembering and to provide more direct evidence for the proposed relations. While some 
approaches, like the socio-emotional one, seem to imply that affective and motivational drivers 
affect memory of choice options via cognitive mechanisms like those underlying biased source 
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attribution (Mather & Johnson, 2000; Mather & Knight, 2005; Mather & Carstensen, 2005), 
there is no sufficient evidence, at the moment, to support empirically a more distal role of affect 
and a more proximal one of cognition. It may well be that cognition contributes to choice-
supportive monitoring beyond emotion, as cognitive theories of false memory seem to suggest. 
And, as we have just discussed, more studies are also needed to better appraise the specific 
cognitive and emotional mechanisms involved and the time course of their potential interaction. 
Clearly, given the mixed results of the studies, research investigating more directly the 
paramount issue of the processes underlying the choice-supportive misremembering is needed, 
both to shed light on the respective contribution of cognitive and emotional factors and to clarify 
what kinds of cognitive (e.g., cognitive control, attention, episodic encoding and/or retrieval) 
and emotional processes (e.g., implicit or explicit emotion regulation, regret avoidance, goal 
setting) are involved. 
 
1.4.3 Limitations and future directions 
Our review did not cover all the factors that could potentially influence memory after choice. 
Given our necessarily restrictive eligibility criteria, we left out studies based on information 
provision after choice (e.g., hindsight bias and misinformation effects) and investigations based 
on the self-selection of information before choice. Another limitation is represented by the fact 
that the reviewed studies used a variety of methods and materials, which may have affected the 
specific results obtained in specific circumstances. For this reason, we included an analysis of 
potentially moderating factors, as a first step toward a systematic experimental appraisal of their 
role. 
Our extensive search for published and unpublished studies on misremembering after a 
deliberate choice between options described by multiple attributes yielded a surprisingly low 
amount of papers, and pointed to several gaps in the literature. A fundamental question that 
remains to be answered is whether choice-supportive memory can be shown to be a robust 
phenomenon even in studies not focusing on misattribution and not testing only recognition 
memory. More research is also needed both on the temporal aspect of distortions (at encoding, 
during memory consolidation or retention, at retrieval), on the relative contribution and type of 
cognitive and socio-emotional processes involved, and on their interactions. This implies 
setting up studies specifically targeting the time-course of choice-related misremembering and 
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their underlying processes, using both experimental and individual-difference approaches, 
eventually together with neuroimaging investigations capable of highlighting the cognitive and 
affective development of processing. It would also be interesting to explore choice-supportive 
memory in clinical populations (e.g., in patients with damage to the orbitofrontal cortex vs. the 
dorsolateral cortex vs. different areas in the temporal lobe, and in patients with autism spectrum 
disorder or alexithymia) to help unveiling the processes involved, and in children and 
adolescents to elucidate the developmental aspect. 
Research on individual differences would also be useful to elucidate the relationships between 
individual differences in cognition, motivation, emotion and choice-supportive memory, as this 
could provide useful information about potential explanations of choice-supportive 
misremembering. For example, if individual differences in need for closure and rumination or 
regret were found to correlate with the degree of choice-supportiveness, this would lend support 
to the importance of motivational or emotional factors. Conversely, correlations between the 
degree of choice-supportiveness and the effectiveness of recollection measures would support 
a more cognitive account. 
As a final issue, it would be useful to understand to what extent choice-supportive memory can 
lead to suboptimal decisions in repeated (or related/similar) future memory-based or mixed 
decisions (Chen & Zhang, 2003) and how it is connected to emotional balance, self-esteem and 
life satisfaction, in order to properly weigh the relative costs and benefits of choice-supportive 
misremembering. Just as it is important to assess the behavioral consequences of false memories 
(e.g., Bernstein et al., 2005; Laney et al., 2008), a better understanding of the behavioral 
influence of choice-supportive misremembering over time would be fruitful. Along this line of 
investigation, individual differences in proneness to different types of choice-supportive 
misremembering could also be examined in relation to personality variables to appraise when 
a normal and even adaptive degree of self-deception turns into a dangerous and delusional 
alteration of reality. 
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Chapter 2: Experiment 1 
 
2.1 Introduction and aims 
In our critical literature review, we found that the large majority of studies on choice-supportive 
misremembering used source recognition as the sole memory test, and, indeed, that the evidence 
in support of the phenomenon is weak for any other type of memory test. Predominantly, source 
misattribution was investigated and found to be significantly choice-supportive. For this reason, 
we suggested a taxonomy of the different types of misremembering choice information that 
could potentially be choice-supportive: misattribution, false memory, fact distortion and 
selective forgetting (see Figure 1). We then designed an experiment to test our taxonomy by 
investigating whether we would observe the four different types in a laboratory experiment. In 
this experiment, we also wished to characterize the memory of option information at different 
delays after the choice and with free and cued recall, since this was largely missing from the 
existing literature. Furthermore, we wanted to appraise the existence of choice-supportive 
memory in a standard choice context, with alignable items, participant-relevant scenarios, 
tabular presentation, and free followed by cued recall of information. This differed from most 
of the previous research that used mainly nonalignable items, non-tabular presentation and only 
source recognition memory tests. Our hope was to also gain insight into the temporality issue: 
whether any bias effects occur at the stage of encoding, consolidation or retrieval. Lastly, we 
wished to explore the influence of individual differences in cognition and 
motivation/personality to illuminate which may be the most influential in giving rise to choice-
supportiveness effects. 
 
2.1.1 Hypotheses 
We predicted that recall would worsen over time and that both omission errors (forgetting) and 
commission errors (distortions/false memories) would increase due to decreased accessibility 
of the presented information (Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966). Furthermore, we expected to find 
all four types of misremembering, with the most dramatic alteration - false memory - being the 
least common and most significantly affected by the passage of time (see e.g., Loftus, 2005). 
Regarding the hypotheses relating to individual differences, we predicted the following: 
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• Better episodic memory → less choice-supportive misremembering (as better episodic 
memory should act as a boundary against misremembering) 
• Better inhibition → stronger effect (as more effective motivated forgetting - supported 
by inhibitory processes – may boost choice-supportive misremembering, see Anderson, 
Bjork, & Bjork, 2000) 
• More need for closure → stronger effect (as premature closure of decisions may be 
associated with more shallow processing and encoding of decision stimuli, which might 
facilitate choice-supportive misremembering) 
• More proneness to regret → stronger effect (as a stronger tendency to feel regret may 
lead to more choice-supportive misremembering in order to avoid regretting the choice 
made, see e.g., Bjälkebring, Västfjäll, Svenson, & Slovic, 2016; Svenson, 2003) 
• More general rumination → weaker effect (as a stronger tendency to ruminate 
correlates with negative emotions: Thomsen, Yung Mehlsen, Christensen, & Zachariae, 
2003, and may therefore increase choice-opposing misremembering) 
• More depression → weaker effect (due to the phenomenon of ‘depressive realism’, 
see e.g., Gaddy & Ingram, 2014; Lyubomirsky & Ross, 1999; Storbeck & Clore, 2005; 
Wittekind et al., 2014) 
• More anxiety → weaker effect (as anxious individuals may have a memory bias 
favouring threatening information, see e.g., Hertel & Brozovich, 2010; Mitte, 2008; 
Witthoft et al., 2016) 
Lastly, we anticipated to find a tendency to distort memories in a choice-supportive direction 
mainly in the two longer delay groups (20 minutes and 2 days), with more choice-
supportiveness with the longest delay, as memory research has documented more distortion 
with the passage of time, possibly due to the decay of memory traces or interference (Sulin & 
Dooling, 1974) and to the greater influence of schema-driven or reconstructive processes. 
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2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Participants 
We computed the sample size for a mixed Anova, with an a-priori power of .80 for a medium 
effect size on choice-supportiveness (f = .25), alpha = .05, considering the repeated 
measurements (scenarios). The overall number of participants needed was 78. We also 
computed the sample size for a paired t-test (two-tailed) with an a-priori power of .80 for a 
medium effect size on choice-supportiveness (dz = .50), alpha = .05. Considering the repeated 
measurements (scenarios), the number of participants needed was 34 per delay level. Therefore, 
we recruited approximately 50 participants for each delay level. In total, we recruited 155 
undergraduates at the University of Trieste, Italy (F = 76%), aged 18-39 years (M = 20.32, SD 
= 2.32, median age = 20). 
 
2.2.2 Design 
A 3 x 5 mixed design was used, with the delay between choice and free recall manipulated 
between-subjects on three delay levels (2 minutes, 20 minutes, 2 days), and the scenario within 
subject on five levels. 
 
2.2.3 Materials 
The materials consisted of five scenarios with binary options in pre-tested student-relevant 
scenarios, and a battery of tests on individual differences. The choices were between pairs of 
rooms to rent, restaurants, entertainment bundles, gym packages, partners for a student project. 
Each option consisted of values on six attributes, common to the two options. Thus, the items 
were entirely alignable: only the value on each one differed between the options. Trade-offs 
were required, as Option A has more advantageous values on three attributes and Option B on 
the remaining three. The scales used for the different attributes were varied between purely 
numeric, stars, and verbal. Two scales of each type were used in each scenario. The tables with 
the two options presented side by side were presented simultaneously after a brief introduction 
to each scenario. The scenario order, right/left position of options and the order of the items 
were counter-balanced. 
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The battery of tests on individual differences consisted of: 
Six tests measuring aspects of cognitive capacity  
 Primary mental abilities (PMA) vocabulary (Thurstone & Thurstone, 1963) 
 Episodic memory test (paired associates) (Del Missier, Visentini, & Mäntylä, 2015) 
 Stroop test with manual response (Del Missier, Mäntylä, & de Bruin, 2012) 
 Numeracy scale (Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001)  
 Applying Decision Rules (ADR) from the Adult Decision-Making Competence (A-DMC) scale 
(Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2007) 
 Socio-demographics questionnaire (age, gender, education) 
 
Three affective tests 
 Regret scale (Schwartz et al., 2002) 
 Rumination scale (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999) 
 STAI Y2 Trait Anxiety (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) 
 
One test on motivation 
 Need for closure (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993) 
 
2.2.4 Procedure 
The experiment was split into two separate sessions (or three, for the two day delay group). 
Before starting the experiment, participants received general information about the study and 
signed the informed consent form. They were then presented with the first scenario and asked 
to make their choice between the two options after attentive consideration of their features. 
They had two minutes (decided after a pretest) to do this for each choice, with the experimenters 
timing the procedure. The choice procedure was repeated for each scenario. After the delay 
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associated with the between-subject condition (2 min, 20 min, or 2 days between the last choice 
and the first free recall), participants performed the surprise memory test, where free recall for 
each scenario was followed by cued recall for each scenario. In the 2- and 20-minute conditions, 
the delay between choices and memory tests was filled with unrelated tasks (as it was for 20 
minutes after the choice phase of the 2-day delay condition). In the free recall tests, the 
participants were asked to write down as much specific information as they could remember 
about the values of the two options in three minutes (also decided after a pretest), being provided 
only with the options names. They were also asked to recall the choice made. In the cued recall, 
the attribute names were provided together with the option names and the participants were 
asked to fill in the values for each attribute and each option in two minutes, and to recall the 
choice they had made.  
In the last session, the participants completed the battery of tests on individual differences. 
 
 
Figure 2: Experiment 1 procedure 
 
After conclusion of the study, participants were debriefed and provided with full information 
about the study, which followed APA ethical guidelines and well as data protection and privacy 
standards. 
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2.2.5 Scoring procedures 
Misremembering occurrences were categorized according to the taxonomy presented in Lind, 
Visentini, Mäntylä, & Del Missier (2017), constituting Chapter 1 of this thesis. For an 
illustration of the taxonomy, see Figure 1 (page 18 of this thesis). An error was classified as a 
misattribution when the item itself was correctly remembered, but it was attributed to the wrong 
option. For example, in the room scenario, if option A contained the item ‘300 euro’ as the 
monthly rent and option B contained the item ‘250 euro’ and the participants entered 250 euro 
as the monthly rent belonging to A, this was scored as a misattribution. If the misattribution 
made the chosen option better than it actually was (for instance by lowering the rent of the 
chosen room), it was scored as choice-supportive, whereas if the reverse happened, it was 
scored as nonsupportive. 
If an item was remembered, but its value was distorted in a way that changed its attractiveness, 
for instance by lowering the chosen rent of room A from 300 to 150 euro, this counted as a fact 
distortion. Again, if the value distortion improved the chosen option, it was scored as choice-
supportive, whereas if the reverse happened, it was scored as nonsupportive. 
Selective forgetting implies selectively forgetting an attribute value. If the forgetting involved 
a value or an entire attribute that made the chosen option appear better than it actually was (for 
instance forgetting a rent value that was higher in the chosen vs. foregone option, or entirely 
forgetting such a rent attribute), it was considered as choice-supportive, and as nonsupportive 
if the reverse happened. 
False memories are ‘remembered’ attributes that had never been presented. If the falsely 
recalled attribute favoured the chosen option, the false memory was scored as choice-
supportive, whereas if it favoured the foregone option, it was scored as nonsupportive. For 
instance, falsely remembering that the chosen room was in a house that received high ratings 
on social media constitutes choice-supportive false memory, as no such attribute was presented 
in the room scenario. Importantly, to be considered as a false memory in a given scenario, a 
retrieved attribute had to have a different meaning from the presented ones. This was assessed 
by not considering as false memories mere synonyms of any of the presented attributes in the 
scenario under scrutiny. 
Other types of misremembering, such as vague memories (e.g., ‘I remember that room A had a 
higher rent than room B’), were scored in a separate category, but their overall frequency was 
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low compared to the other types of misremembering. Therefore, they were not considered in 
the data analysis presented in the next sections. 
An experienced and trained research assistant scored the responses of all participants. For the 
free recall, another trained independent rater scored 10% of the responses. Inter-rater reliability 
was over .60 (Cohen’s kappa) for each scenario and the debated cases were resolved after a 
joint discussion. 
 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Descriptive statistics on choice shares and choice misremembering 
Choice shares were as follows: Student partner (.34 vs. .66), Room to rent (.54 vs. .46), 
Restaurant (.55 vs. 45), Entertainment bundle (.35 vs. .65), and Gym package (.38 vs. .62). The 
proportion of participants misremembering their choice increased from 20 minutes to 2 days 
both in free and cued recall tests (Table 2.1 shows the findings per scenario and delay level in 
the free recall test). This shows a delayed form of choice blindness that could be worth 
investigating in future research, given that misremembering one’s choice after a short delay 
(i.e., the more 'traditional' choice blindness phenomenon) was – in the present study - 
considerably rarer than doing so after a long delay. The cases in which participants 
misremembered their choices were excluded from the subsequent analyses on a scenario-by-
scenario basis and test-by-test basis, and considered as missing data. 
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Table 2.1: Proportion of participants misremembering their choice in free recall per delay 
level and scenario 
 SCENARIO 
DELAY PARTNER      
Prop. (95% CI) 
ROOM 
Prop. (95% CI) 
RESTAURANT 
Prop. (95% CI) 
ENTMT. BUNDLE 
Prop. (95% CI) 
GYM PACKAGE 
Prop. (95% CI) 
2 minutes 
(n = 52) 
.00 (.000-.082) .04 (.003-.137) .04 (.003-.137) .13 (.064-.256) .06 (.014-.162) 
20 minutes 
(n = 51) 
.00 (.000-.082) .06 (.014-.165) .04 (.003-.140) .06 (.014-.165) .04 (.003-.140) 
2 days      
(n = 52) 
.12 (.050-.233) .23 (.136 -.363) .35 (.199-.443) .19 (.106 - .321) .31 (.198-.443) 
 
 
2.3.2 Accuracy in recall tests 
As shown in Table 2.2, accuracy was lower in free recall than in cued recall, reproducing a 
typical pattern in memory research. There were much more omission than commission errors 
in free recall, and the opposite pattern was apparent in cued recall. As expected, accuracy 
decreased with an increasing delay, in particular after 2 days, and both kinds of errors increased 
in free recall after 2 days. In cued recall, accuracy also decreased with time delay, especially 
after two days. Likewise, commission errors increased, but not omissions. Results seem to be 
consistent across scenarios, showing rather similar percentages of accurate responses and errors 
and largely similar trends. 
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Table 2.2: Accuracy and errors (proportions) for the different memory tests and scenarios  
 PARTNER FOR STUDENT PROJECT 
FREE RECALL CUED RECALL 
DELAY 
(n = free, cued) 
Correct 
recall 
Commission 
errors 
Omission 
errors 
Correct 
recall 
Commission 
errors 
Omission 
errors 
2 minutes (n = 52, 52) .516 .173 .311 .716 .280 .004 
20 minutes (n = 51, 51) .513 .181 .306 .663 .322 .015 
2 days (n = 46, 44) .279 .274 .447 .435 .554 .012 
 
 ROOM 
FREE RECALL CUED RECALL 
DELAY 
(n = free, cued) 
Correct 
recall 
Commission 
errors 
Omission 
errors 
Correct 
recall 
Commission 
errors 
Omission 
errors 
2 minutes (n = 50, 50) .672 .182 .147 .792 .200 .008 
20 minutes (n = 48, 48) .616 .194 .189 .720 .265 .015 
2 days (n = 40, 42) .306 .406 .288 .446 .542 .012 
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 RESTAURANT 
FREE RECALL  CUED RECALL 
DELAY 
(n = free, cued) 
Correct 
recall 
Commission 
errors 
Omission 
errors 
Correct 
recall 
Commission 
errors 
Omission 
errors 
2 minutes (n = 50, 50) .497 .293 .210 .587 .405 .008 
20 minutes (n = 49, 50) .473 .276 .252 .568 .400 .032 
2 days (n = 34, 37) .240 .353 .407 .440 .548 .012 
 
 ENTERTAINMENT BUNDLE 
FREE RECALL CUED RECALL 
DELAY 
(n = free, cued) 
Correct 
recall 
Commission 
errors 
Omission 
errors 
Correct 
recall 
Commission 
errors 
Omission 
errors 
2 minutes (n = 45, 46) .459 .231 .309 .540 .411 .050 
20 minutes (n = 48, 47) .368 .274 .358 .470 .462 .068 
2 days (n = 42, 38) .188 .333 .478 .327 .649 .024 
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 GYM PACKAGE 
FREE RECALL CUED RECALL 
DELAY 
(n = free, cued) 
Correct 
recall 
Commission 
errors 
Omission 
errors 
Correct 
recall 
Commission 
errors 
Omission 
errors 
2 minutes (n = 49, 51) .578 .180 .241 .673 .310 .018 
20 minutes (n = 49, 50) .520 .238 .241 .655 .326 .019 
2 days (n = 36, 33) .234 .398 .368 .298 .690 .012 
 
 
2.3.3 ANOVAs on accuracy and errors 
A series of 3 x 5 mixed ANOVAs was carried out on accuracy measures and 
commission/omission errors for the two memory tests and considering as factors: 
1) Delay (2-minute, 20-minute, and 2-day) - between-subjects 
2) Scenario (Student partner, Room, Restaurant, Entertainment bundle, Gym package) - 
 within subjects 
The 3 x 5 mixed ANOVA was repeated for the two different types of memory tests and the 
results will be presented accordingly. Missing data due to choice misremembering were treated 
with case wise exclusion (thus the means in the following analyses may differ from the means 
reported in Table 2.2, based on all the available cases for each scenario). 
 
2.3.3.1 Free recall 
For what concerns accuracy (proportion correct) in the free recall test, the ANOVA highlighted 
a main effect of delay (F(2,95) = 19.791, Mse = .105, p<.001, η2 = .29), with better accuracy in 
the 2-minute and 20-minute delay vs. the 2-day delay condition (M2min = .57, M20min = .51, M2day 
= .28). The 2-minute and the 2-day conditions differed significantly (HSD, p <.001) as well as 
the 20-minute and the 2-day conditions (HSD, p <.001), but not the 2-minute and the 20-minute 
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conditions (HSD p = .176). The main effect of the scenario was also significant (F(4,380) = 
16.054, Mse = .028, p<.001, η2 = .14), with better accuracy in the Room scenario (HSD, all p 
<.001) and worse accuracy in the Entertainment bundle scenario (HSD, all p <.001), and all the 
other scenarios falling in between. 
The ANOVA on the proportion of commission errors highlighted main effects of the delay 
(F(2,95) = 12.528, Mse = .021, p<.001, η2 = .21), with fewer errors in the 2-minute and 20-
minute delay vs. the 2-day delay condition (M2min = .202, M20min = .227, M2day = .354), with the 
2-minute and the 2-day conditions differing significantly (HSD, p <.001) as well as the 20-
minute and the 2-day conditions (HSD, p <.01), but not the 2-minute and the 20-minute 
conditions (HSD p = .483). Here too, the main effect of the scenario was significant (F(4,380) 
= 7.682, Mse = .021, p<.001, η2 = .07), with lower errors in the Student partner scenario (HSD, 
all at least p <.05, not different from Room) and Room scenario (HSD, all at least p <.05, not 
different from Student partner and Gym package). 
The ANOVA on the proportion of omission errors highlighted main effects of delay (F(1,95) = 
7.712, Mse = .061, p<.001, η2 = .14), with fewer errors in the 2-minute and 20-minute delay vs. 
the 2-day delay condition (M2min = .233, M20min = .226, M2day = .371), with the 2-minute and the 
2-day conditions differing significantly (HSD, p <.01) as well as the 20-minute and the 2-day 
conditions (HSD, p <.05), but not the 2-minute and the 20-minute conditions (HSD p = .368). 
Again, the main effect of the scenario was significant (F(4,380) = 15.348, Mse = .020, p<.001, 
η2 = .14), with lower errors in the Room scenario (HSD, all at least p <.05) and Restaurant 
scenario (HSD, all at least p <.05, not different from Gym package and worse than Room). 
 
2.3.3.2 Cued recall 
For what concerns accuracy (proportion correct) in the cued recall test, the ANOVA highlighted 
a main effect of delay (F(2,97) = 1.974, Mse = .09, p<.001, η2 = .31), with better accuracy in 
the 2-minute and 20-minute delay vs. the 2-day delay condition (M2min = .662, M20min = .615, 
M2day = .389). The 2-minute and the 2-day conditions differed significantly (HSD, p <.001) as 
well as the 20-minute and the 2-day conditions (HSD, p <.001), but not the 2-minute and the 
20-minute conditions (HSD p = .253). The main effect of the scenario was significant (F(4,388) 
= 15.238, Mse = .031, p<.001, η2 = .14), with better accuracy in the Student partner scenario 
(HSD, all p <.001, but not differing from Room and Gym package) and the Room scenario 
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(HSD, all p <.001, but not differing from Student partner) and worse accuracy in the 
Entertainment bundle scenario (HSD, all at least p <.05). 
The ANOVA on the proportion of commission errors highlighted main effects of the delay 
(F(2,97) = 23.829, Mse = .087, p<.001, η2 = .33), with fewer errors in the 2-minute and 20-
minute delay vs. the 2-day delay condition (M2min = .321, M20min = .355, M2day = .596), with the 
2-minute and the 2-day conditions differing significantly (HSD, p <.001) as well as the 20-
minute and the 2-day conditions (HSD, p <.01), but not the 2-minute and the 20-minute 
conditions (HSD p = .468). Once again, the main effect of the scenario was significant (F(4,388) 
= 11.230, Mse = .029, p<.001, η2 = .10), with lower errors in the Student partner scenario (HSD, 
all at least p <.05, not different from Room) and Room scenarios (HSD, all at least p <.01, not 
different from Student partner). The ANOVA on the proportion of omission errors highlighted 
only the main effect of the scenario (F(4,388) = 4.333, Mse = .004, p<.01, η2 = .04), with more 
omissions in the Entertainment bundle (HSD, all p <.001). 
 
2.3.3.3 Differences between free and cued recall 
A series of 2 x 3 x 5 mixed ANOVAs was carried out to show the differences between free and 
cued recall in accuracy, commission errors, and omission errors. For what concerns accuracy 
(proportion correct), the ANOVA highlighted a main effect of delay (F(2,90) = 20.655, Mse = 
.176, p<.001, η2 = .31), with better accuracy in the 2-minute and 20-minute delay vs. the 2-day 
delay condition (M2min = .619, M20min = .566, M2day = .338), with the 2-minute and the 2-day 
conditions differing significantly (HSD, p <.001) as well as the 20-minute and the 2-day 
conditions (HSD, p <.001), but not the 2-minute and the 20-minute conditions (HSD p = .189). 
The main effect of the test was also significant (F(1,90) = 104.762, Mse = .018, p<.001, η2 = 
.54), with better accuracy in cued recall vs. free recall (Mcued = .560, Mfree = .455) at any delay 
level (HSD, all p < .001; see also Figure 2.1). Again, the main effect of the scenario was 
significant (F(4,360) = 17.634, Mse = .046, p<.001, η2 = .16), with better accuracy in the Room 
scenario (HSD, all p <.001) and worse accuracy in the Entertainment bundle scenario (HSD, 
all p <.001), and all the other scenarios falling in between. 
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Figure 2.1: Main effects of the delay and of the test on accuracy of recall 
 
The ANOVA on the proportion of commission errors showed a main effect of delay (F(2,90) = 
20.083, Mse = .105, p<.001, η2 = .33), with fewer errors in the 2-minute and 20-minute delay 
vs. the 2-day delay condition (M2min = .255, M20min = .288, M2day = .478), with the 2-minute and 
the 2-day conditions differing significantly (HSD, p <.001) as well as the 20-minute and the 2-
day conditions (HSD, p <.001), but not the 2-minute and the 20-minute conditions (HSD p = 
.352). The main effect of the test was also significant (F(1,90) = 177.740, Mse = .026, p<.001, 
η2 = .66), with a lower proportion of commission errors in free recall vs. cued recall (Mfree = 
.257, Mcued = .423) at any delay level (HSD, all p < .001). Delay and test interacted (F(2,90) = 
8.963, Mse = .026, p<.001, η2 = .17), with a larger difference in the proportion of commission 
errors in cued recall (vs. free recall) seen at the longer delay (2 days Δ: .25) vs. the other delays 
(2 minutes Δ: .11; 20 minutes Δ: .13), see also Figure 2.2. The main effect of the scenario was 
significant (F(4,360) = 10.301, Mse = .036, p<.001, η2 = .10), with fewer errors in the Student 
partner (HSD, all p <.001, no difference with Room and Gym package) and Room scenarios 
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(HSD, all p <.001, no difference with Student partner). The effect of the scenario interacted 
with the test (F(4,360) = 4.986, Mse = .014, p<.001, η2 = .05), so that the difference between 
cued and free recall in the proportion of commission errors was smaller in the Room scenario. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Interaction between delay and test on commission errors 
 
The ANOVA on the proportion of omission errors highlighted the main effect of delay (F(1,90) 
= 3.574, Mse = .046, p = .032, η2 = .07), with fewer errors in the 2-minute and 20-minute delay 
vs. the 2-day delay condition (M2min = .125, M20min = .146, M2day = .184), but only the difference 
between 2-minute and 2-day being close to significance (HSD, p = .091). A main effect of the 
memory test was also detected (F(1,90) = 480.770, Mse = .026, p<.001, η2 = .84), with much 
more omission errors in free recall vs. cued recall (Mfree = .287, Mcued = .016). This effect was 
qualified by an interaction with the delay, showing a bigger difference in the 2-day condition 
than in the other conditions (Δ = .36 vs. .21 and .24). Once again, the main effect of the scenario 
was significant (F(4,360) = 13.678, Mse = .014, p<.001, η2 = .13), with fewer omissions in the 
  
 
60 
 
Room scenario (HSD, all at least p <.05) and more omissions in the Entertainment bundle 
scenario (HSD, all at least p <.05). As shown by a significant interaction between test and 
scenario (F(4,360) = 10.166, Mse = .011, p<.001, η2 = .10), the difference between free and 
cued recall test in omission errors was smaller in the Room scenario and bigger in the 
Entertainment bundle scenario. 
 
2.3.3.4 Summary 
To summarize the results of the analyses on accuracy in free recall, it can be stated that 
participants were much less accurate and made both more commission and omission errors after 
a long delay (2 days), while there were no substantial differences at shorter delays (2 or 20 
minutes). Some differences between the scenarios were apparent, with the Room and Student 
partner scenarios remembered better and the Entertainment bundle scenario remembered 
worse. 
Also as expected, cued recall performance was better than free recall performance for accuracy, 
worse for commission errors (especially at the longer delay), and again better for omission 
errors. Scenario-related variation was similar to the one observed in free recall. 
 
2.3.4 ANOVAs on misremembering occurrences  
A series of 2 x 3 x 5 mixed ANOVAs was carried out on the number of misremembering 
occurrences per participant and considering as factors: 
1) Choice-supportiveness (vs. non choice-supportiveness) - within-subjects 
2) Delay (2-minute, 20-minute, and 2-day) - between-subjects 
3) Scenario (Student partner, Room, Restaurant, Entertainment bundle, Gym package) - 
 within subjects 
This 2 x 3 x 5 mixed ANOVA was repeated for the four different kinds of misremembering and 
for the two different types of tests. Missing data were treated with case wise exclusion. 
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2.3.4.1 Free recall 
The ANOVA on selective forgetting occurrences highlighted main effects of time delay and 
scenario5. Table 2.3 presents the significant effects. Post hoc tests showed an increase of 
selective forgetting after two days (vs. 2 minutes HSD p = .007 and vs. 20 minutes p = .053), 
and less forgetting in the Room scenario (HSD all p < .05 at least) with Entertainment bundle 
and Student partner showing the most forgetting (HSD all p < .05 at least) and not differing 
from each other. 
 
Table 2.3: Significant effects for selective forgetting in free recall 
Effect F (df) Mse p η2 Means 
Delay F(2, 95) = 7.380 1.08 p = .001 .13 2 minutes = .698 
20 minutes = .795 
2 days = 1.100 
Scenario F(4, 380) = 14.822 .364 p < .001 .14 student partner = 1.005 
room = .602 
restaurant = .779  
entmt. = 1.093 
gym = .842 
 
The ANOVA on misattributions in free recall did not show any significant effect, except for 
the scenario one (F(4,380) = 2.821, Mse = .193, p = .025, η2 = .03), with significantly more 
misattribution in the Restaurant scenario vs. the others (HSD at least p < .01; M = .364 vs. .264 
or lower)6. 
                                                 
5 Selective forgetting was analyzed at the attribute level, as single values were rarely forgotten (the median value 
of single value forgetting was zero for each scenario and the mean value close to zero). 
6 Misattribution was analyzed at the single misattribution level, as double switches of values between the options 
rarely happened (the median value of double switches was zero for each scenario and the mean value close to 
zero). 
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The ANOVA on false memories highlighted only the main effect of time delay (F(2,95) = 6.859, 
Mse = .010, p = .002, η2 = .13), with the number of false memories increasing with time (M2min 
= .063, M20min = .070, M2day = .117, HSD 2-min vs. 2-day p = .013). 
The ANOVA on fact distortion highlighted the main effects of time delay and scenario and their 
interaction. Table 2.4 presents the significant effects. Post hoc tests showed a marginally 
significant increase of fact distortions after two days (vs. 2 minutes HSD p = .063), and overall 
fewer fact distortions in the Student partner scenario (HSD all p < .05 at least) but not differing 
from Room. The interaction shows a more marked increase in fact distortion in the Room 
scenario after 2 days than in the other conditions (but the HSD was only marginally significant 
p = .096). 
 
Table 2.4: Significant effects for fact distortion in free recall 
Effect F (df) Mse p η2 Means 
Delay F(2, 95) = 4.170 1.524 p = .018 .08 2 minutes = .820 
20 minutes = .852 
2 days = 1.169 
Scenario F(4, 380) = 9.482 .812 p < .001 .09 student partner = .628 
room = .852 
restaurant = 1.257  
entmt. = .998 
gym = .999 
Delay × scenario F(8, 380) = 2.311 .812 p = .020 .05 2 min - partner = 0.659 
2 min - room = 0.524 
2 min - restaurant = 1.098 
2 min – entmt. = 1.085 
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2 min - gym = 0.732 
20 min - partner = 0.534 
20 min - room = 0.648 
20 min - restaurant = 1.136 
20 min – entmt. = 0.909 
20 min - gym = 1.034 
2 days - partner = 0.692 
2 days - room = 1.385 
2 days - restaurant = 1.538 
2 days – entmt. = 1.000 
2 days - gym = 1.231 
 
Overall, choice-supportive misremembering in free recall was never detected, but 
misremembering was apparent (especially after 2 days) and, as predicted, increased over time 
(but misattribution did not). With the exception of false memories, scenario-related variation 
was observed for all types of misremembering. 
 
2.3.4.2 Cued recall 
For cued recall, an ANOVA was carried out on selective forgetting (at the attribute level) 
highlighting only the main effect of the scenario (F(4, 388) = 4.526, Mse = .068, p = .001, η2 = 
.04), with significantly more forgetting in the Entertainment bundle vs. all the other scenarios 
(HSD all p < .001, M = .16 vs. .05 or lower). 
In the case of misattribution (single value), the main effects of time delay and scenario and their 
interaction were significant. Table 2.5 presents the results. Misattributions increased 
significantly with delay, being more frequent after 2 days vs. after 2 minutes or 20 minutes 
(HSD p = .010 and p = .031, respectively). More misattributions were apparent in the 
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Restaurant scenario (HSD all p < .01 at least, but no difference from the Entertainment bundle 
scenario). The interaction qualified a marginally significant increase of misattributions at the 2-
day delay vs. the 2-minute delay for the Room scenario (HSD p = .073). 
 
Table 2.5: Significant effects for misattribution in cued recall 
Effect F (df) Mse p η2 Means 
Delay F(2, 97) = 6.834 .477 p = .002 .12 2 minutes = .383 
20 minutes = .416 
2 days = .629 
Scenario F(4, 388) = 4.405 .330 p = .002 .04 student partner = .514 
room = .375 
restaurant = .605  
entmt. = .504 
gym = .381 
Delay × 
scenario 
F(8, 388) = 1.975 .330 p = .048 .04 2 min – partner = 0.333 
2 min - room = 0.262 
2 min - restaurant = 0.619 
2 min - entertainment = 0.452 
2 min - gym = 0.250 
20 min - partner = 0.352 
20 min - room = 0.364 
20 min - restaurant = 0.625 
20 min – entmt. = 0.489 
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20 min - gym = 0.250 
2 days - partner = 0.857 
2 days - room = 0.500 
2 days - restaurant = 0.571 
2 days – entmt. = 0.571 
2 days - gym = 0.643 
 
No analyses were carried out for false memories in cued recall, given that false memories were 
defined as remembering an attribute with a positive value that was never presented, and thus 
there is no chance to produce this type of misremembering when the real attributes are presented 
as cues like in cued recall of Experiment 1. 
The ANOVA on fact distortion occurrences highlighted both the main effect of the delay (F(2, 
97) = 15.317, Mse = 2.707, p < .001, η2 = .24), and the main effect of the scenario (F(4, 388) = 
14.272, Mse = 1.162, p < .001, η2 = .13). Fact distortion increased with the delay (M2min = 1.262, 
M20min = 1.330, M2day = 2.121, HSD 2-day vs. 2-min p < .001; HSD 2-day vs. 20-min p < .001). 
It was less frequent in the Room scenario and in the Student partner scenario, differing from all 
the other scenarios (HSD all at least p < .01 for the Room scenario and Student partner scenario, 
with the exception of the nonsignificant difference between Student partner and Gym package; 
M = 1.062 and M = 1.414 respectively vs. 1.759 or more). 
Overall, choice-supportive misremembering in cued recall was never detected, but 
misremembering was apparent (especially after 2 days) and, as expected, increased over time 
(but selective forgetting did not), also showing scenario-related variation.  
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2.3.4.3 Differences between free and cued recall 
A series of 2 x 2 x 3 x 5 mixed ANOVAs was carried out to show the differences between free 
and cued recall in each type of misremembering, with the independent factors being: 
1) Choice-supportiveness (vs. non choice-supportiveness) - within-subjects 
2) Memory test (free recall, cued recall) - within-subjects 
2) Delay (2-minute, 20-minute, and 2-day) - between-subjects 
3) Scenario (Student partner, Room, Restaurant, Entertainment bundle, Gym package) - 
 within subjects 
This 2 x 2 x 3 x 5 mixed ANOVA was repeated for the three different kinds of misremembering 
(false memories were not present by design in cued recall). Missing data due to choice 
misremembering were treated with case wise exclusion. 
For what concerns selective forgetting (at the attribute level), main effects of condition, test, 
and scenario were detected. Moreover, significant interactions were shown between delay and 
test and between scenario and test. The effects are presented in Table 2.6. Selective forgetting 
increased with delay, but only the difference between 2 minutes and 2 days was marginally 
significant (HSD, p = .098). It was also detected more often in free recall vs. cued recall (p < 
.001), more often in the Entertainment bundle scenario (HSD at least p < .05) and less often in 
the Room scenario (HSD at least p < .05). The interaction between test and delay showed more 
selective forgetting in free vs. cued recall with this difference being more pronounced after 2 
days (HSD all p < .001). The interaction between test and scenario showed more selective 
forgetting in free vs. cued recall with this difference being slightly more pronounced in the 
Student partner and Entertainment bundle scenarios (HSD all p < .001). 
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Table 2.6: Significant effects for selective forgetting in free and cued recall 
Effect F (df) Mse p η2 Means 
Delay F(2, 90) = 3.474 .809 p = .035 .07 2 minutes = .374 
20 minutes = .437 
2 days = .546 
Test F(1, 90) = 221.235 .466 p < .001 .84 free recall = .854 
cued recall = .048 
Scenario F(4, 360) = 13.331 .242 p < .001 .13 student partner = .505 
room = .314 
restaurant = .403  
entmt. = .604 
gym = .436 
Delay × test F(2,90) = 9.189 .466 p < .001 .17 free recall - 2 minutes = .700 
free recall - 20 min. = .786 
free recall - 2 days = 1.083 
cued recall - 2 minutes = .049 
cued recall - 20 min. = .088 
cued recall - 2 days = .008 
Test × scenario F(4, 360) = 9.770 .192 p < .001 .10 free recall - partner = 0.990 
free recall - room = 0.604 
free recall – rest. = 0.766  
free recall - entmt. = 1.088 
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free recall - gym = 0.834 
cued recall - partner = 0.020 
cued recall - room = 0.024 
cued recall – rest. = 0.040 
cued recall - entmt. = 0.120 
cued recall n - gym = 0.037 
 
The analysis on misattributions (at the value level), showed main effects of condition, test, and 
scenario, and a significant interaction between memory test and scenario. The effects are 
presented in Table 2.7. Misattribution increased with delay, with more misattributions after 2 
days than after 20 minutes (HSD, p = .037) and 2 minutes (HSD, p = .019). It was also detected 
more often in cued recall vs. free recall (p < .001), and in the Restaurant scenarios vs. all the 
other scenarios (HSD at least p < .01). The interaction between test and scenario highlighted 
significantly more misattributions in cued recall vs. free recall (HSD, p < .001) with the 
exception of the Room and the Gym package scenarios (HSD, p = .835, p = .267). 
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Table 2.7: Significant effects for misattribution in free and cued recall 
Effect F (df) Mse p η2 Means 
Delay F(2, 90) = 6.128 .488 p = .003 .12 2 minutes = .299 
20 minutes = .315 
2 days = .475 
Test F(1, 90) = 72.423 .206 p < .001 .45 free recall = .258 
cued recall = .468 
Scenario F(4, 360) = 4.592 .338 p = .001 .05 student partner = .350 
room = .308 
restaurant = .485  
entmt. = .376 
gym = .295 
Test × scenario F(4, 360) = 3.231 .172 p = .013 .03 free recall - partner = 0.201 
free recall - room = 0.267 
free recall – rest. = 0.361  
free recall - entmt. = 0.242 
free recall - gym = 0.220 
cued recall - partner = 0.500 
cued recall - room = 0.349 
cued recall – rest. = 0.610 
cued recall - entmt. = 0.511 
cued recall n - gym = 0.371 
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Finally, the analysis of fact distortion highlighted significant main effects of delay, memory 
test, and scenario, and significant interactions between delay and test and between test and 
scenario. The effects are presented in Table 2.8. Fact distortion increased with delay, with 
significant differences between 2 days and 2 minutes (HSD, p < .001) and between 2 days and 
20 minutes (HSD p = .003). Fact distortion was also detected more often in cued recall vs. free 
recall (p < .001), and less often in the Room and the Student partner scenarios (HSD all p < 
.01). The interaction between test and delay showed more fact distortion in cued vs. free recall 
with this difference being more pronounced after 2 days (HSD all p < .001). The interaction 
between test and scenario showed more fact distortion in cued vs. free recall with this difference 
being more pronounced in the Entertainment bundle and Gym package scenarios (HSD p < 
.001). 
 
Table 2.8: Significant effects for fact distortion in free and cued recall 
Effect F (df) Mse p η2 Means 
Delay F(2, 90) = 11.729 2.980 p < .001 .21 2 minutes = 1.012 
20 minutes = 1.077 
2 days = 1.617 
Test F(1, 90) = 136.750 1.010 p < .001 .60 free recall = 0.916 
cued recall = 1.554 
Scenario F(4, 360) = 11.756 1.379 p < .001 .11 student partner = 1.015 
room = 0.934 
restaurant = 1.487  
entmt. = 1.382 
gym = 1.357 
Delay × test F(2,90) = 7.879 1.010 p < .001 .15 free recall - 2 minutes = 0.803 
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free recall - 20 min. = 0.829 
free recall - 2 days = 1.117 
cued recall - 2 min. = 1.221 
cued recall - 20 min. = 1.326 
cued recall - 2 days = 2.117 
Test × scenario F(4, 360) = 7.972 0.572 p < .001 .08 free recall - partner = 0.624 
free recall - room = 0.820 
free recall – rest. = 1.215  
free recall - entmt. = 0.945 
free recall - gym = 0.975 
cued recall - partner = 1.406 
cued recall - room = 1.048 
cued recall – rest. = 1.760 
cued recall - entmt. = 1.820 
cued recall - gym = 1.738 
 
Overall, choice-supportive misremembering was never detected in free or cued recall. Selective 
forgetting was more frequent in free recall vs. cued recall, while the opposite was true for 
misattribution and fact distortion. Misremembering increased over time, especially after 2 days. 
Scenario-related variation was always observed. 
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2.3.5 Detailed analysis of misremembering 
2.3.5.1 Occurrence of the different kinds of misremembering in free recall 
The occurrence of the four different kinds of misremembering in free recall was analyzed 
scenario per scenario. Missing data were excluded on a scenario per scenario basis. 
Consequently, the means in the following analyses may differ from the case wise-computed 
means reported in the ANOVAs. 
Confidence intervals (95%) of the proportion of participants showing at least one occurrence 
of each specific misremembering type were computed, regardless of the choice-supportive 
nature of the misremembering. As Table 2.9 shows, all four types of misremembering in the 
taxonomy took place at least in one occurrence for a proportion of participants significantly 
different from zero. It is apparent that selective forgetting and fact distortion took place in at 
least one case for a large fraction of participants. A sizable fraction of participants also produced 
at least one misattribution, while false memories were less frequent but still apparent (the 
proportion was always greater than zero). False memories tended to increase with time delay, 
as predicted. The results are consistent across scenarios. 
 
Table 2.9: Occurrence of the four different kinds of misremembering in free recall in each 
choice scenario (proportion of cases showing at least one occurrence of each specific type) 
PARTNER FOR A STUDENT PROJECT 
 SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FALSE MEMORY FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI 
2 min (n = 52) .90 .79-.97 .35 .22-.49 .21 .11-.35 .67 .53-.80 
20 min (n = 51) .90 .79-.97 .29 .17-.44 .14 .06-.26 .63 .48-.76 
2 days (n = 46) 1.0 .92-1.0 .50 .35-.65 .37 .23-.52 .76 .62-.86 
Overall (n = 149) .93 .88-.97 .38 .30-.47  .23 .16-.30  .68 .60-.75 
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ROOM SCENARIO 
 SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FALSE MEMORY FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI 
2 min (n = 50) .64 .49-.77  .62 .47-.75 .00 .00-.07 .66 .51-.79 
20 min (n = 48) .75 .60-.86  .50 .35-.65 .10 .03-.23 .60 .45-.74 
2 days (n = 40) .90 .76-.97 .60 .43-.75 .13 .04-.27 .93 .80-.98 
Overall (n = 138) .75 .67-.82 .57 .49-.66 .07 .04-.13 .72 .63-.79 
 
RESTAURANT SCENARIO 
 SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FALSE MEMORY FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI 
2 min (n = 50) .86 .73-.94 .70 .55-.82 .14 .06-.27 .92 .81-.98 
20 min (n = 49) .90 .78-.97 .63 .48-.77 .10 .03-.22 .92 .80-.98 
2 days (n = 34) .97 .85-1.00 .59 .41-.75 .38 .22-.56 .88 .73-.97 
Overall (n = 133) .90 .84-.95  .65 .56-.73 .19 .13-.26 .91 .85-.95 
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ENTERTAINMENT BUNDLE 
 SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FALSE MEMORY FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI 
2 min (n = 45) .93 .82-.99 .36 .22-.51 .22 .11-.37 .89 .76-.96 
20 min (n = 48) .94 .83-.99 .52 .37-.67 .21 .10-.35 .85 .72-.94 
2 days (n = 42) 1.0 .92-1.0 .43 .28-.59 .38 .24-.54 .79 .63-.90 
Overall (n = 135) .96 .92-.99 .44 .35-.53 .27 .19-.35 .84 .76-.89 
 
GYM PACKAGE  
 SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FALSE MEMORY FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI 
2 min (n = 49) .94 .83-.99 .37 .23-.52 .02 .00-.11 .71 .57-.83 
20 min (n = 49) .84 .70-.93 .37 .23-.52 .14 .06-.27 .76 .61-.87 
2 days (n = 36) .97 .85-1.0 .58 .41-.74 .19 .08-.36 .83 .67-.94 
Overall (n = 134) .91 .85-.95 .43 .35-.52 .11 .06-.18 .76 .68-.83 
 
The occurrence of the four different misremembering types in free recall was also analyzed via 
one-sample t-tests on the mean number of each specific misremembering type (against a zero 
mean). This analysis provided results converging with the ones obtained on the proportion of 
participants showing at least one occurrence of each specific misremembering type and the 
previous ANOVAs. 
The findings are presented, scenario per scenario, in Table 2.10. They show that the mean 
number of the four different kinds of misremembering in free recall in each choice scenario is 
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always greater than zero in one-tailed (directional) tests. The mean number of selective 
forgetting instances is greater than the mean number of fact distortion occurrences, which is in 
turn greater than the mean number of misattributions and false memories (low means in these 
cases). Misremembering tends to increase with time delay and, again, results are consistent 
across scenarios. 
 
Table 2.10: Mean number of the four different kinds of misremembering in free recall in each 
choice scenario (one-sample tests against a zero mean) 
PARTNER FOR A STUDENT PROJECT 
 SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FALSE MEMORY FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY 
Mean  
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
Mean 
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
Mean 
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
Mean 
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
2 min 
3.731 
2.097 
12.830 (51) 
p < .001 
0.462 
0.727 
4.581 (51) 
p < .001 
0.231 
0.469 
3.546 (51) 
p < .001 
1.269 
1.157 
7.913 (51) 
p < .001 
20 min 
3.667 
2.169 
12.070 (50) 
p < .001 
0.510 
0.946 
3.849 (50) 
p < .001 
0.137 
0.348 
2.820 (50) 
p < .001 
1.078 
1.036 
7.432 (50)  
p < .001 
2 days 
5.370 
2.471 
14.739 (45)  
p < .001 
0.804 
1.046 
5.215 (45) 
p < .001 
0.500 
0.782 
4.338 (45) 
p < .001 
1.511 
1.236 
8.069 (45)  
p < .001 
Overall 
4.215 
2.358 
21.815 (148) 
p < .001 
0.584 
0.916 
7.780 (148) 
p < .001 
0.282 
0.570 
6.032 (148) 
p < .001 
1.268 
1.148 
13.480 (148) 
p < .001 
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ROOM SCENARIO 
 SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FALSE MEMORY FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY 
Mean   
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
Mean 
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
Mean 
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
Mean    
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
2 min 
1.760 
2.046 
6.083 (49) 
p < .001 
.980 
1.020 
6.794 (49) 
p < .001 
0.000 
0.000 
--- (49) 
--- 
1.160 
1.201 
6.828 (49) 
p < .001 
20 min 
2.271 
1.783 
8.822 (47) 
p < .001 
0.771 
0.951 
5.617 (47) 
p < .001 
0.104 
0.309 
2.338 (47) 
p = .012 
1.271 
1.250 
7.042 (47) 
p < .001 
2 days 
3.450 
2.218 
9.837 (39) 
p < .001 
1.050 
1.108 
5.992 (39) 
p < .001 
0.150 
0.427 
2.223 (39) 
p < .001 
2.500 
1.553 
10.184 (39) 
p < .001 
Overall 
2.428 
2.113 
13.495 (137) 
p < .001 
0.928 
1.023 
10.655 (137) 
p < .001 
0.080 
0.297 
3.148 (137) 
p = .001 
1.587 
1.443 
12.915 (137) 
p < .001 
 
RESTAURANT SCENARIO 
 SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FALSE MEMORY FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY 
Mean   
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
Mean 
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
Mean 
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
Mean    
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
2 min 
2.520 
1.752 
10.168 (49) 
p < .001 
1.100 
0.974 
7.985 (49) 
p < .001 
0.014 
0.351 
2.824 (49) 
p = .003 
2.260 
1.651 
9.677 (49)     
p < .001 
20 min 
3.020 
1.797 
11.766 (48) 
p < .001 
0.918 
0.886 
11.766 (48) 
p < .001 
0.122 
0.389 
2.203 (48) 
p = .016 
2.224 
1.462 
10.654 (48) 
p < .001 
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2 days 
4.882 
2.384 
11.942 (33) 
p < .001 
1.000 
1.101 
5.296 (33)  
p < .001 
0.412 
0.557 
4.311 (33) 
p < .001 
2.441 
1.862 
7.646 (33) 
p < .001 
Overall 
3.308 
2.154 
17.714 (132) 
p < .001 
1.008 
0.973 
11.941 (132) 
p < .001 
0.203 
0.440 
5.325 (132) 
p < .001 
2.293 
1.632 
16.205 (132) 
p < .001 
 
ENTERTAINMENT BUNDLE 
 SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FALSE MEMORY FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY 
Mean   
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
Mean 
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
Mean 
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
Mean    
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
2 min 
3.711 
2.096 
11.879 (44) 
p < .001 
0.444 
.659 
4.524 (44) 
p < .001 
0.222 
0.420 
3.546 (44) 
p < .001 
2.133 
1.424 
10.051 (44) 
p < .001 
20 min 
4.292 
2.509 
11.850 (47) 
p < .001 
0.896 
1.115 
5.564 (47) 
p < .001 
0.208 
0.410 
3.517 (47) 
p < .001 
1.813 
1.214 
10.341 (47) 
p < .001 
2 days 
5.738 
2.642 
14.077 (41) 
p < .001 
0.738 
1.014 
4.719 (41) 
p < .001 
0.429 
0.590 
4.705 (41) 
p < .001 
2.024 
1.732 
7.573 (41) 
p < .001 
Overall 
4.548 
2.547 
20.746 (134) 
p < .001 
0.696 
0.964 
8.392 
p < .001 
0.281 
0.483 
6.767 (134) 
p < .001 
1.985 
1.456 
15.845 (134) 
p < .001 
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GYM PACKAGE 
 SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FALSE MEMORY FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY 
Mean   
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
Mean 
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
Mean 
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
Mean    
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
2 min 
2.898 
1.874 
10.827 (48) 
p < .001 
0.510 
0.767 
4.656 (48) 
p < .001 
0.020 
0.143 
1.000 (48) 
p = .161 
1.571 
1.369 
8.033 (48) 
p < .001 
20 min 
2.898 
1.960 
10.347 (48) 
p < .001 
0.510 
0.767 
4.656 (48) 
p < .001 
0.163 
0.426 
2.685 (48) 
p = .005 
1.980 
1.574 
8.802 (48) 
p < .001 
2 days 
4.417 
2.500 
10.600 (35) 
p < .001 
1.167 
1.363 
5.137 (35) 
p < .001 
0.194 
0.401 
2.907 (35) 
p = .003 
2.472 
1.682  
8.821 (35) 
p < .001 
Overall 
3.306 
2.181 
17.549 (133) 
p < .001 
0.687 
0.999 
7.952 (133) 
p < .001 
0.119 
0.348 
3.974 (133) 
p < .001 
1.963 
1.563 
14.538 (133) 
p < .001 
 
 
2.3.5.2 Occurrence of the different kinds of misremembering in cued recall 
The occurrence of the four different kinds of misremembering in cued recall was also analyzed 
scenario per scenario. The number of cases may differ between free and cued recall due to the 
fact that some participants may have forgotten the option they chose in a given scenario in the 
test made with free recall but not in the same test made with cued recall (or the reverse). As in 
the previous analyses, data from misremembered choices were excluded on a scenario per 
scenario basis. Confidence intervals (95%) of the proportion of participants showing at least 
one occurrence of each specific misremembering type were computed, regardless of the choice-
supportive nature of the misremembering. As Table 2.11 shows, misattribution and fact 
distortion took place in at least one case in a large fraction of participants, while only a limited 
fraction of participants (albeit nonzero) exposed at least one case of selective forgetting, 
especially at the shorter delays. The results are consistent across scenarios. 
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Table 2.11: Occurrence of the four different kinds of misremembering in cued recall in each 
choice scenario (proportion of cases showing at least one occurrence of each specific type) 
 
PARTNER FOR A STUDENT PROJECT 
 SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI 
2 min (n = 52) .038 .011-.013 .577 .441-.701 .827 .703-.906 
20 min (n = 51) .058 .020-.156 .686 .550-.797 .824 .697-904 
2 days (n = 44) .205 .111-.345 .841 .706-.921 .909 .788-.964 
Overall (n = 147) .095 .058-.153 .694 .615-.763 .850 .784-.899 
 
ROOM SCENARIO 
 SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI 
2 min (n = 50) .040 .011-.135 .580 .442-.706 .660 .521-.77 
20 min (n = 48) .083 .033-.196 .750 .612-.851 .750 .612-.851 
2 days (n = 42) .190 .010-.333 .857 .721-.933 .952 .842-987 
Overall (n = 140) .100 .061-.161 .721 .642-789 .779 .703-.839 
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RESTAURANT SCENARIO 
 SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI 
2 min (n = 50) .060 .021-.162 .820 .692-.902 .940 .838-.979 
20 min (n = 50) .180 .098-.308 .860 .738-.930 1 .929-1 
2 days (n = 37) .162 .076-.311 .784 .628-886 1 .906-1 
Overall (n = 137) .131 .085-.198 .825 .752-.879 .978 .938-.992 
 
 
  
ENTERTAINMENT BUNDLE 
 SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI 
2 min (n = 46) .174 .091-.307 .783 .644-.877 .957 .51-.988 
20 min (n = 47) .255 .152-.395 .809 .674-.896 .957 .857-.988 
2 days (n = 38) .211 .111-.363 .789 .637-.889 1 .908-1 
Overall (n = 131) .214 .152-.291 .794 .717-.854 .969 .924-.988 
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GYM PACKAGE 
 SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI 
2 min (n = 51) .098 .041-.210 .608 .471-.730 .882 .766-.945 
20 min (n = 50) .120 .056-.238 .500 .366-.634 .880 .762-.944 
2 days (n = 33) .182 .086-.344 .758 .590-.872 1 .896-1 
Overall (n = 134) .127 .081-.194 .604 .520-.683 .910 .850-.948 
 
The occurrence of the three different misremembering types in cued recall was also analyzed 
via one-sample t-tests on the mean number of each specific misremembering type (against a 
zero mean). This analysis provided results converging with the ones obtained on the proportion 
of participants showing at least one occurrence of each specific type of misremembering. 
The findings are presented, scenario per scenario, in Table 2.12. They show that the mean 
number of the three different kinds of misremembering in cued recall in each choice scenario 
is almost always greater than zero in one-tailed (directional) tests. The exceptions occur in some 
scenarios for selective forgetting, mainly at the shortest delay (2 minutes). The mean number 
of fact distortion occurrences is greater than the mean number of misattributions, which is in 
turn greater than the mean number of selective forgetting instances (low means in this case). 
Fact distortions and misattributions tend to increase with delay. Results are consistent across 
scenarios. 
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Table 2.12: Mean number of the four different kinds of misremembering in cued recall in 
each choice scenario (one-sample tests against a zero mean) 
 
PARTNER FOR A STUDENT PROJECT 
 SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY Mean      
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
Mean    
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
Mean        
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
2 min 0.192 
1.138 
1.218 (51) 
p = .115 
0.885 
1.041 
6.126 (51) 
p < .001 
2.423 
1.742 
10.033 (51) 
p < .001 
20 min 0.157 
0.674 
1.661 (50) 
p = .052 
1.431 
1.300 
7.863 (50) 
p < .001 
2.314 
1.679 
9.840 (50) 
p < .001 
2 days 0.795 
1.837 
2.872 (43) 
p = .003 
1.841 
1.569 
7.782 (43) 
p < .001 
3.341 
1.842 
12.031 (43) 
p < .001 
Overall 0.361 
1.298 
3.368 (146) 
p < .001 
1.361 
1.355 
12.178 (146) 
p < .001 
2.660 
1.796 
17.955 (146) 
p < .001 
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ROOM SCENARIO 
 SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY Mean  
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
Mean    
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
Mean        
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
2 min 0.080 
0.396 
1.429 (49) 
p = .079 
1.100 
1.233 
6.308 (49) 
p < .001 
1.500 
1.474 
7.194 (49) 
p < .001 
20 min 0.208 
0.743 
1.944 (47) 
p = .029 
1.438 
1.335 
7.458 (47) 
p < .001 
1.792 
1.501 
8.269 (47) 
p < .001 
2 days 0.571 
1.272 
2.913 (41) 
p = .003 
2.405 
1.668 
9.341 (41) 
p < .001 
3.381 
1.766 
12.405 (41) 
p < .001 
Overall 0.271 
0.872 
3.683 (139) 
p < .001 
1.607 
1.502 
12.664 (139) 
p < .001 
2.164 
1.761 
14.539 (139) 
p < .001 
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RESTAURANT SCENARIO 
 SELECTIVE FORGETTING MISATTRIBUTION FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY Mean  
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
Mean    
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
Mean        
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
2 min 0.160 
0.681 
1.661 (49) 
p = .051 
1.680 
1.236 
9.610 (49) 
p < .001 
3.140 
1.906 
11.649 (49) 
p < .001 
20 min 0.460 
1.129 
2.882 (49) 
p < .001 
1.360 
0.985 
9.765 (49) 
p < .001 
3.200 
1.773 
12.764 (49) 
p < .001 
2 days 0.649 
1.567 
2.517 (36) 
p = .008 
2.108 
1.853 
6.921 (36) 
p < .001 
4.432 
1.951 
13.817 (36) 
p < .001 
Overall 0.401 
1.147 
4.097 (136) 
p < .001 
1.679 
1.377 
14.270 (136) 
p < .001 
3.511 
1.941 
21.175 (136) 
p < .001 
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ENTERTAINMENT BUNDLE 
 SELECTIVE FORGETTING MISATTRIBUTION FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY Mean  
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
Mean    
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
Mean        
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
2 min 0.543 
1.295 
2.847 (45) 
p = .004 
1.435 
1.223 
7.957 (45) 
p < .001 
3.543 
1.810 
13.278 (45) 
p < .001 
20 min 0.809 
1.702 
3.256 (46) 
p = .001 
1.809 
1.555 
7.972 (46) 
p < .001 
3.277 
1.753 
12.812 (46) 
p < .001 
2 days 0.526 
1.109 
2.927 (37) 
p = .003 
1.553 
1.501 
6.375 (37) 
p < .001 
4.184 
1.768 
14.585 (37) 
p < .001 
Overall 0.634 
1.404 
5.164 (130) 
p < .001 
1.603 
1.429 
12.842 (130) 
p < .001 
3.634 
1.803 
23.071 (130) 
p < .001 
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GYM PACKAGE 
 SELECTIVE FORGETTING MISATTRIBUTION FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY Mean  
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
Mean    
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
Mean        
SD 
t-test (df) 
p one-tail 
2 min 0.176 
0.555 
2.270 (50) 
p = .014 
1.176 
1.178 
7.131 (50) 
p < .001 
2.627 
1.886 
9.947 (50) 
p < .001 
20 min 0.400 
1.212 
2.333 (49) 
p = .012 
0.980 
1.152 
6.018 (49) 
p < .001 
2.820 
1.859 
10.725 (49) 
p < .001 
2 days 0.485 
1.228 
2.268 (32) 
p = .015 
2.152 
1.679 
7.360 (32) 
p < .001 
4.848 
1.873 
14.872 (32) 
p < .001 
Overall 0.336 
1.018 
3.818 (133) 
p < .001 
1.343 
1.383 
11.247 (133) 
p < .001 
3.246 
2.075 
18.106 (133) 
p < .001 
 
2.3.5.3 Choice-supportiveness 
McNemar tests and paired t-test were used to test the hypothesis that the different types of 
distortions are choice-supportive (vs. non choice-supportive). The tests were carried out 
scenario per scenario on free recall and cued recall on the specific types of distortions that could 
be assessed with each kind of test (i.e., all four types in free recall, all but false memories in 
cued recall). 
 
2.3.5.3.1 Choice-supportiveness in free recall 
McNemar test were computed on the frequencies of participants showing at least one case of 
choice-supportiveness vs. at least one case of non-choice-supportiveness. Probabilities 
associated with the test were computed as one-tailed, given the defined directionality of the 
choice-supportiveness hypothesis. The robustness of the findings was assessed after Bonferroni 
correction for the number of the test at the scenario level (Bonferroni-corrected alpha levels for 
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free recall is α = .05/4 = .013). Table 2.13 shows the results, highlighting choice-supportiveness 
in two cases and four tests running against the hypothesis. Only one of these tests resisted 
Bonferroni correction (against the hypothesis). Therefore, we can conclude that generally there 
is no difference and specifically there is no significant choice-supportive bias. Findings are 
consistent across scenarios. 
 
Table 2.13: McNemar tests for choice-supportiveness (CS) vs. non choice-supportiveness 
(NCS) in free recall on participants showing (vs. not showing) at least one case of each 
(Bonferroni-corrected alpha levels for free recall is α = .05/4 = .013) 
 
STUDENT PARTNER 
 SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FALSE MEMORY FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY  
Prop 
 CS  
Prop 
NCS 
Mc 
Nemar 
p 
Prop 
 CS  
Prop 
NCS 
Mc 
Nemar 
p 
Prop  
CS  
Prop 
NCS 
Mc 
Nemar 
p 
Prop 
 CS  
Prop 
NCS 
Mc 
Nemar 
p 
2 MIN .79 .65 .09 .13 .17 .40 .15 .06 .12 .56 .50 .32 
20 MIN .69 .73 .41 .16 .18 .50 .10 .04 .23 .51 .41 .17 
2 DAYS .89 .76 .11 .26 .33 .32 .15 .26 .15 .57 .54 .50 
Overall .79 .71 .09 .18 .22 .22 .13 .11 .37 .54 .48 .13 
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ROOM 
 SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FALSE MEMORY FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY Prop 
 CS  
Prop 
NCS 
Mc 
Nemar 
p 
Prop 
 CS  
Prop 
NCS 
Mc 
Nemar 
p 
Prop  
CS  
Prop 
NCS 
Mc 
Nemar 
p 
Prop 
 CS  
Prop 
NCS 
Mc 
Nemar 
p 
2 MIN .34 .42 .28 .20 .20 .50 .00 .00 .50 .52 .40 .13 
20 MIN .42 .52 .22 .21 .27 .32 .04 .06 .50 .50 .50 .50 
2 DAYS .58 .68 .19 .25 .43 .07 .05 .08 .50 .83 .78 .38 
Overall .43 .53 .07 .22 .29 .10 .03 .04 .38 .60 .54 .14 
 
RESTAURANT 
 SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FALSE MEMORY FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY 
Prop 
 CS  
Prop 
NCS 
Mc 
Nemar 
p 
Prop 
 CS  
Prop 
NCS 
Mc 
Nemar 
p 
Prop  
CS  
Prop 
NCS 
Mc 
Nemar 
p 
Prop 
 CS  
Prop 
NCS 
Mc 
Nemar 
p 
2 MIN .62 .48 .08 .38 .44 .35 .04 .10 .23 .64 .68 .43 
20 MIN .67 .59 .28 .37 .37 .50 .06 .06 .50 .78 .63 .10 
2 DAYS .82 .85 .50 .41 .18 .02 .18 .24 .39 .62 .76 .14 
Overall .69 .62 .09 .38 .35 .36 .08 .12 .20 .68 .68 .50 
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ENTERTAINMENT BUNDLE 
 SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FALSE MEMORY FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY Prop 
 CS  
Prop 
NCS 
Mc 
Nemar 
p 
Prop 
 CS  
Prop 
NCS 
Mc 
Nemar 
p 
Prop  
CS  
Prop 
NCS 
Mc 
Nemar 
p 
Prop 
 CS  
Prop 
NCS 
Mc 
Nemar 
p 
2 MIN .71 .69 .50 .13 .18 .39 .11 .11 .50 .69 .73 .40 
20 MIN .67 .77 .19 .10 .33 .02 .13 .08 .38 .77 .56 .02 
2 DAYS .79 .83 .40 .14 .26 .15 .26 .14 .15 .60 .64 .40 
Overall .72 .76 .26 .13 .26 .01 .16 .11 .16 .69 .64 .24 
 
GYM PACKAGE 
 SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FALSE MEMORY FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY Prop 
 CS  
Prop 
NCS 
Mc 
Nemar 
p 
Prop 
 CS  
Prop 
NCS 
Mc 
Nemar 
p 
Prop  
CS  
Prop 
NCS 
Mc 
Nemar 
p 
Prop 
 CS  
Prop 
NCS 
Mc 
Nemar 
p 
2 MIN .53 .57 .44 .10 .18 .21 .00 .02 .50 .59 .55 .40 
20 MIN .45 .67 .03 .14 .16 .39 .08 .08 .50 .67 .67 .50 
2 DAYS .64 .81 .12 .25 .17 .28 .14 .06 .23 .72 .75 .50 
Overall .53 .67 .03 .16 .17 .37 .07 .05 .40 .66 .65 .50 
 
Paired t-tests were also used to test the hypothesis that the different types of distortions are 
choice-supportive (vs. non choice-supportive), by comparing the mean number of choice-
supportive distortions vs. non choice-supportive ones at the participant level. Also in this case, 
one-tailed probabilities were computed, given the directional prediction, and the robustness of 
the findings was assessed after Bonferroni correction for the number of the test at the scenario 
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level. Table 2.14 shows the results, highlighting three significant differences in support of the 
choice-supportiveness hypothesis and five against it, but only four of them survived the 
Bonferroni correction (two for and two against the hypothesis). Therefore, there is no clear 
indication of choice-supportiveness overall, and no evidence of an overall difference between 
the conditions. Note that statistically significant values are highlighted in bold type in the 
following tables. 
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Table 2.14: Paired t-tests of choice-supportiveness (CS) vs. non choice-supportiveness (NCS) in 
free recall (Bonferroni-corrected alpha levels for free recall is α = .05/4 = .013) 
 
STUDENT PARTNER 
 SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FALSE MEMORY FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired 
t-test 
df  
p 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired 
t-test 
df 
p 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired 
t-test 
df 
p 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired 
t-test 
df 
p 
2 MIN 
1.019 
0.671 
0.846 
0.724 
1.352 
51 
.091 
0.135 
0.345 
0.173 
0.382 
-0.531 
51 
.149 
0.137 
0.430 
0.058 
0.235 
1.629 
51 
.055 
0.673 
0.596 
0.677 
0.664 
0.813 
51 
.209 
20 MIN 
0.882 
0.739 
0.941 
0.705 
-0.444 
50 
.329 
0.176 
0.434 
0.176 
0.385 
0.00 
50 
.500 
0.098 
0.300 
0.039 
0.196 
1.137 
50 
.130 
0.569 
0.510 
0.608 
0.703 
0.518 
50 
.303 
2 DAYS 
1.457 
0.836 
1.196 
0.859 
1.521 
45 
.067 
0.282 
0.502 
0.348 
0.526 
-0.621 
45 
.268 
0.174 
0.438 
0.326 
0.634 
-1.360 
45 
.091 
0.783 
0.696 
0.814 
0.726 
0.645 
45 
.261 
Overall 
1.107 
0.781 
0.987 
0.771 
1.456 
148 
.073 
0.195 
0.430 
0.228 
0.437 
-0.698 
148 
.243 
0.148 
0.392 
0.134 
0.414 
0.288 
148 
.387 
0.671 
0.702 
0.597 
0.697 
1.129 
148 
.130 
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ROOM 
 SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FALSE MEMORY FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired 
t-test 
df 
p 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired 
t-test 
df 
p 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired 
t-test 
df 
p 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired 
t-test 
df 
p 
2 MIN 
0.380 
0.602 
0.500 
0.678 
-1.098 
49 
.139 
0.220 
0.465 
0.200 
0.404 
0.227 
49 
.411 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
--- 
40 
--- 
0.640 
0.722 
0.520 
0.735 
1.030 
49 
.154 
20 MIN 
0.500 
0.684 
0.625 
0.703 
-0.814 
47 
.210 
0.208 
0.410 
0.271 
0.449 
-0.771 
47 
.222 
0.042 
0.202 
0.063 
0.245 
-0.443 
47 
.330 
0.625 
0.733 
0.646 
0.729 
-0.191 
47 
.425 
2 DAYS 
0.825 
0.844 
0.900 
0.744 
-0.416 
39 
.340 
0.275 
0.506 
0.475 
0.599 
-1.842 
39 
.037 
0.050 
0.221 
0.100 
0.379 
-0.703 
39 
.243 
1.350 
0.921 
1.150 
0.864 
1.433 
39 
.080 
Overall 
0.551 
0.726 
0.659 
0.720 
-1.294 
137 
.099 
0.232 
0.457 
0.304 
0.492 
-1.365 
137 
.087 
0.029 
0.168 
0.051 
0.251 
-0.831 
137 
.204 
0.841 
0.848 
0.746 
0.811 
1.352 
137 
.081 
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RESTAURANT 
 SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FALSE MEMORY FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired 
t-test 
df 
p 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired 
t-test 
df 
p 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired 
t-test 
df 
p 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired 
t-test 
df 
p 
2 MIN 
0.680 
0.587 
0.580 
0.673 
0.778 
49 
.220 
0.400 
0.535 
0.460 
0.542 
-0.535 
49 
.298 
0.040 
0.198 
0.100 
0.303 
-1.137 
49 
.131 
1.180 
1.173 
1.080 
1.047 
0.475 
49 
.318 
20 MIN 
0.857 
0.736 
0.633 
0.566 
1.596 
48 
.059 
0.429 
0.612 
0.408 
0.574 
0.167 
48 
.434 
0.061 
0.242 
0.061 
0.242 
0.000 
48 
.500 
1.184 
0.928 
1.041 
0.999 
0.795 
48 
.215 
2 DAYS 
1.265 
0.828 
1.147 
0.657 
0.780 
33 
.221 
0.471 
0.615 
0.176 
0.387 
2.539 
33 
.008 
0.176 
0.387 
0.235 
0.431 
-0.572 
33 
.286 
1.000 
1.044 
1.441 
1.284 
-1.814 
33 
.040 
Overall 
0.895 
0.741 
0.744 
0.670 
1.874 
132 
.032 
0.429 
0.581 
0.368 
0.529 
0.872 
132 
.193 
0.083 
0.276 
0.120 
0.327 
-1.043 
132 
.150 
1.135 
1.100 
1.158 
1.050 
-0.186 
132 
.853 
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ENTERTAINMENT BUNDLE 
 SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FALSE MEMORY FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired 
t-test 
df 
p 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired 
t-test 
df 
p 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired 
t-test 
df 
p 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired 
t-test 
df 
p 
2 MIN 
1.000 
0.853 
0.844 
0.706 
0.894 
44 
.188 
0.133 
0.344 
0.178 
0.387 
-0.573 
44 
.285 
0.111 
0.318 
0.111 
0.318 
0.000 
45 
.500 
1.067 
0.956 
0.918 
0.864 
1.570 
134 
.059 
20 MIN 
0.875 
0.815 
1.271 
0.893 
-2.360 
47 
.011 
0.125 
0.393 
0.354 
0.526 
-2.296 
47 
.013 
0.125 
0.334 
0.083 
0.279 
0.628 
47 
.266 
1.067 
1.009 
1.067 
0.837 
0.000 
44 
.500 
2 DAYS 
1.286 
0.944 
1.548 
0.942 
-1.230 
41 
.113 
0.143 
0.354 
0.310 
0.563 
-1.553 
41 
.064 
0.286 
0.508 
0.143 
0.354 
1.432 
41 
.080 
1.146 
0.850 
0.667 
0.663 
3.599 
47 
.000 
Overall 
1.044 
0.880 
1.215 
0.893 
-1.585 
134 
.057 
0.133 
0.362 
0.281 
0.499 
-2.686 
134 
.004 
0.170 
0.397 
0.111 
0.315 
1.301 
134 
.097 
0.976 
1.024 
1.048 
1.035 
-0.416 
41 
.339 
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GYM PACKAGE 
 SELECTIVE FORGETTING MISATTRIBUTION FALSE MEMORY FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired 
t-test 
df 
p 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired 
t-test 
df 
p 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired 
t-test 
df 
p 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired 
t-test 
df 
p 
2 MIN 
0.714 
0.816 
0.735 
0.758 
-0.133 
48 
.455 
0.122 
0.389 
0.184 
0.391 
-0.724 
48 
.236 
0.000 
0.000 
0.020 
0.143 
-1.000 
48 
.161 
0.796 
0.816 
0.775 
0.797 
0.167 
48 
.434 
20 MIN 
0.571 
0.736 
0.878 
0.726 
-1.977 
48 
.027 
0.143 
0.353 
0.163 
0.373 
-0.274 
48 
.392 
0.082 
0.277 
0.082 
0.277 
0.000 
48 
.500 
1.020 
0.877 
0.959 
0.841 
0.621 
48 
.268 
2 DAYS 
1.000 
0.956 
1.194 
0.822 
-0.909 
35 
.185 
0.306 
0.577 
0.194 
0.467 
0.941 
35 
.176 
0.138 
0.350 
0.055 
0.232 
1.138 
35 
.131 
1.194 
0.980 
1.278 
1.003 
-0.475 
35 
.319 
Overall 
0.739 
0.840 
0.910 
0.780 
-1.649 
133 
.051 
0.179 
0.439 
0.179 
0.403 
0.000 
133 
.500 
0.067 
0.251 
0.052 
0.223 
0.533 
133 
.297 0.796 
0.978 
0.888 
0.101 
133 
.459 
 
2.3.5.3.2 Choice-supportiveness in cued recall 
McNemar tests were computed on the frequencies of participants showing at least one case of 
choice-supportiveness vs. at least one case of non-choice-supportiveness. Probabilities 
associated with the test were computed as one-tailed, given the defined directionality of the 
choice-supportiveness hypothesis. The robustness of the findings was assessed after Bonferroni 
correction for the number of the test at the scenario level (Bonferroni-corrected alpha levels for 
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free recall is α = .05/4 = .013). Table 2.15 shows the results, highlighting choice-supportiveness 
in only one case and three tests running against the hypothesis. Only one of these tests resisted 
Bonferroni correction. Thus, there is no difference overall and specifically there is no bias 
towards choice-supportiveness. Findings are consistent across scenarios. 
Table 2.15: McNemar tests for choice-supportiveness (CS) vs. non choice-supportiveness 
(NCS) in cued recall on participants showing (vs. not showing) at least one case of each 
(Bonferroni-corrected alpha levels for free recall is α = .05/4 = .013) 
STUDENT PARTNER 
 SELECTIVE FORGETTING MISATTRIBUTION FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY Prop 
CS 
Prop 
NCS 
McNemar 
p 
Prop 
CS  
Prop 
NCS 
McNemar 
p 
Prop 
CS  
Prop 
NCS 
McNemar 
p 
2 MIN  .019 .038 0,500 .308 .327 0,500 .808 .673 0,023 
20 MIN  .039 .039 0,240 .353 .373 0,500 .725 .667 0,289 
2 DAYS  .182 .114 0,124 .568 .455 0,202 .864 .841 0,500 
Overall .075 .061 0,341 .401 .381 0,402 .796 .721 0,027 
 
ROOM 
 SELECTIVE FORGETTING MISATTRIBUTION FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY Prop 
CS 
Prop 
NCS 
McNemar 
p 
Prop 
CS  
Prop 
NCS 
McNemar 
p 
Prop 
CS  
Prop 
NCS 
McNemar 
p 
2 MIN .020 .020 0,240 .220 .260 0,411 .580 .460 0,090 
20 MIN .063 .021 0,308 .250 .417 0,085 .583 .604 0,500 
2 DAYS .095 .143 0,341 .405 .476 0,345 .881 .810 0,252 
Overall .057 .057 0,386 .286 .379 0,077 .671 .614 0,128 
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RESTAURANT 
 SELECTIVE FORGETTING MISATTRIBUTION FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY Prop 
CS 
Prop 
NCS 
McNemar 
p 
Prop  
CS  
Prop 
NCS 
McNemar 
p 
Prop 
CS  
Prop 
NCS 
McNemar 
p 
2 MIN .060 .020 0,240 .500 .600 0,202 .800 .800 0,395 
20 MIN .120 .080 0,362 .600 .540 0,350 .860 .880 0,500 
2 DAYS .135 .108 0,500 .568 .432 0,166 .838 .973 0,065 
Overall .102 .066 0,134 .555 .533 0,403 .832 .876 0,196 
 
ENTERTAINMENT BUNDLE 
 SELECTIVE FORGETTING MISATTRIBUTION FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY 
 
Prop 
CS 
Prop 
NCS 
McNemar 
p 
Prop 
CS  
Prop 
NCS 
McNemar 
p 
Prop 
CS  
Prop 
NCS 
McNemar 
p 
2 MIN .109 .065 0,362 .283 .413 0,188 .848 .891 0,362 
20 MIN .149 .170 0,362 .234 .489 0,350 .851 .851 0,500 
2 DAYS .079 .158 0,225 .316 .421 0,270 .921 .947 0,500 
Overall .115 .130 0,419 .275 .443 0,012 .870 .893 0,338 
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GYM PACKAGE 
 SELECTIVE FORGETTING MISATTRIBUTION FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY Prop 
CS 
Prop 
NCS 
McNemar 
p 
Prop 
CS  
Prop 
NCS 
McNemar 
p 
Prop 
CS  
Prop 
NCS 
McNemar 
p 
2 MIN .039 .039 0,308 .275 .235 0,386 .765 .824 0,252 
20 MIN .100 .080 0,500 .220 .240 0,022 .840 .820 0,376 
2 DAYS .061 .121 0,341 .364 .576 0,035 1 .970 0,500 
Overall .067 .075 0,500 .276 .321 0,196 .851 .858 0,500 
 
Paired t-tests were also used to test the hypothesis that the different types of distortions are 
choice-supportive (vs. non choice-supportive) in cued recall, by comparing the mean number 
of choice-supportive distortions vs. non choice-supportive ones at the participant level. Also in 
this case, one-tailed probabilities were computed, given the directional prediction, and the 
robustness of the findings was assessed after Bonferroni correction for the number of the test at 
the scenario level. Table 2.16 shows the results, highlighting two cases of choice-
supportiveness in fact distortion and one case running against the hypothesis in misattribution, 
all resisting Bonferroni correction. Overall, the evidence is not sufficient to conclude that any 
general significant trend towards choice-supportiveness is apparent in cued recall. 
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Table 2.16: Paired t-tests of choice-supportiveness (CS) vs. non choice-supportiveness (NCS) in 
cued recall (Bonferroni-corrected alpha levels for free recall is α = .05/4 = .013) 
STUDENT PARTNER 
 SELECTIVE FORGETTING MISATTRIBUTION FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired 
t-test 
df  
p 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired 
t-test 
df 
p 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired 
t-test 
df 
p 
2 MIN 
0.019 
0.139 
0.077 
0.436 
-1.352 
51 
.091 
0.327 
0.513 
0.327 
0.475 
-0.000 
51 
.500 
1.250 
0.883 
1.173 
1.108 
0.599 
51 
.276 
20 MIN 
0.039 
0.196 
0.039 
0.196 
-0.000 
50 
.500 
0.372 
0.528 
0.431 
0.608 
-0.596 
50 
.277 
1.216 
0.986 
1.098 
1.025 
0.759 
50 
.225 
2 DAYS 
0.227 
0.522 
0.159 
0.479 
1.138 
43 
.130 
0.659 
0.644 
0.545 
0.663 
0.797 
43 
.215 
1.909 
1.235 
1.432 
0.846 
3.029 
43 
.002 
Overall 
0.088 
0.329 
0.888 
0.387 
0.000 
146 
.500 
0.442 
0.574 
0.428 
0.585 
0.212 
146 
.416 
1.435 
1.073 
1.224 
0.999 
2.470 
146 
.007 
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ROOM 
 SELECTIVE FORGETTING MISATTRIBUTION FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired 
t-test 
df  
p 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired   
t-test 
df 
p 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired 
t-test 
df 
p 
2 MIN 
0.020 
0.141 
0.200 
0.141 
-0.000 
49 
.500 
0.220 
0.418 
0.280 
0.497 
-0.622 
49 
.268 
0.780 
0.764 
0.720 
0.904 
0.535 
49 
.297 
20 MIN 
0.083 
0.347 
0.021 
0.144 
1.137 
47 
.131 
0.313 
0.589 
0.458 
0.582 
-1.188 
47 
.120 
0.875 
0.890 
0.917 
0.871 
-0.313 
47 
.377 
2 DAYS 
0.119 
0.395 
0.167 
0.437 
-0.573 
41 
.285 
0.452 
0.593 
0.524 
0.594 
-0.518 
41 
.304 
1.786 
1.094 
1.595 
1.170 
0.870 
41 
.194 
Overall 
0.071 
0.309 
0.064 
0.274 
0.217 
139 
.414 
0.321 
0.540 
0.414 
0.562 
-1.367 
139 
.087 
1.114 
1.011 
1.050 
1.041 
0.722 
139 
.236 
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RESTAURANT 
 SELECTIVE FORGETTING MISATTRIBUTION FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired    
t-test 
df  
p 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired  
t-test 
df 
p 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired  
t-test 
df 
p 
2 MIN 
0.060 
0.240 
0.020 
0.141 
1.429 
49 
.079 
0.580 
0.642 
0.660 
0.593 
-0.663 
49 
.260 
1.660 
1.171 
1.480 
1.199 
0.903 
49 
.185 
20 MIN 
0.120 
0.328 
0.100 
0.364 
0.330 
49 
.371 
0.620 
0.530 
0.620 
0.667 
0.000 
49 
.500 
1.720 
1.213 
1.480 
0.909 
1.409 
49 
.082 
2 DAYS 
0.216 
0.630 
0.108 
0.315 
1.071 
36 
.145 
0.784 
0.821 
0.622 
0.794 
0.902 
36 
.186 
1.919 
1.362 
2.514 
1.170 
-2.227 
36 
.016 
Overall 
0.124 
0.410 
0.073 
0.288 
1.405 
136 
.081 
0.650 
0.660 
0.635 
0.674 
0.185 
136 
.426 
1.752 
1.235 
1.759 
1.179 
-0.059 
136 
.476 
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ENTERTAINMENT BUNDLE 
 SELECTIVE FORGETTING MISATTRIBUTION FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired   
t-test 
df  
p 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired 
t-test 
df 
p 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired  
t-test 
df 
p 
2 MIN 
0.174 
0.529 
0.087 
0.354 
0.892 
45 
.188 
0.370 
0.645 
0.587 
0.805 
-1.201 
45 
.118 
1.783 
1.094 
1.761 
1.099 
0.119 
45 
.453 
20 MIN 
0.170 
0.433 
0.234 
0.598 
-0.724 
46 
.236 
0.319 
0.629 
0.681 
0.810 
-2.121 
46 
.019 
1.702 
1.178 
1.574 
1.037 
0.643 
46 
.261 
2 DAYS 
0.105 
0.338 
0.158 
0.370 
-0.627 
37 
.267 
0.421 
0.683 
0.553 
0.795 
-0.695 
37 
.245 
2.132 
1.298 
2.053 
0.985 
0.329 
37 
.744 
Overall 
0.153 
0.455 
0.160 
0.461 
-0.145 
130 
.442 
0.366 
0.647 
0.611 
0.800 
-2.362 
130 
.010 
1.855 
1.190 
1.779 
1.055 
0.650 
130 
.258 
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GYM PACKAGE 
 SELECTIVE FORGETTING MISATTRIBUTION FACT DISTORTION 
DELAY 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired   
t-test 
df  
p 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired 
t-test 
df 
p 
CS 
Mean 
 SD 
NCS  
Mean 
 SD  
Paired  
t-test 
df 
p 
2 MIN 
0.039 
0.196 
0.039 
0.196 
0.000 
50 
.500 
0.274 
0.451 
0.235 
0.428 
0.573 
50 
.284 
1.294 
1.045 
1.333 
1.033 
-0.321 
50 
.374 
20 MIN 
0.100 
0.303 
0.100 
0.364 
0.000 
49 
.500 
0.260 
0.527 
0.280 
0.536 
-0.275 
49 
.392 
1.380 
0.966 
1.440 
1.013 
-0.622 
49 
.268 
2 DAYS 
0.121 
0.545 
0.121 
0.331 
0.000 
32 
.500 
0.515 
0.755 
0.788 
0.781 
-1.955 
32 
.029 
2.485 
1.176 
2.364 
1.055 
0.571 
32 
.285 
Overall 
0.082 
0.348 
0.082 
0.302 
0.000 
133 
.500 
0.328 
0.572 
0.388 
0.612 
-1.156 
133 
.125 
1.619 
1.155 
1.627 
1.108 
-0.095 
133 
.462 
 
 
2.3.6 Summary of findings on choice-supportiveness 
Table 2.17 shows the overall picture of the results in relation to choice-supportiveness in the 
four different types of misremembering and the three types of memory tests.  
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Table 2.17: Summary of choice-supportiveness in the four different types of misremembering 
and three types of memory tests 
TEST of  
CHOICE-SUPPORTIVENESS 
SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FALSE MEMORY FACT 
DISTORTION 
ANOVA free recall 
No significant 
effect of CS 
No significant 
effect of CS 
No significant 
effect of CS 
No significant 
effect of CS 
ANOVA cued recall 
No significant 
effect of CS 
No significant 
effect of CS 
NA No significant 
effect of CS 
McNemar test 
free recall 
No CS overall 
trend 
No CS overall 
trend 
No CS overall 
trend 
No CS overall 
trend 
McNemar test 
cued recall 
No CS overall 
trend 
No CS overall 
trend 
NA No CS overall 
trend 
Paired-t-test 
free recall 
No CS overall 
trend 
No CS overall 
trend 
No CS overall 
trend 
No CS overall 
trend 
Paired-t-test 
cued recall 
No CS overall 
trend 
No CS overall 
trend 
NA No CS overall 
trend 
 
The findings show no evidence for a general choice-supportiveness trend, but instead 
occasional McNemar or t-tests running for or against the hypotheses in a nonsystematic pattern 
(see above). This holds both for free and cued recall, and despite the clear and converging 
evidence for the existence of all the four types of misremembering hypothesized. 
The sample size was computed for a mixed Anova, with an a-priori power of .80 for a medium 
effect size on choice-supportiveness (f = .25), alpha = .05. The overall number of participants 
needed was 78. We had also computed the sample size for a paired t-test (two-tailed) with an 
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a-priori power of .80 for a medium effect size on choice-supportiveness (dz = .50), alpha = .05. 
Again, taking into account the repeated measures provided by the multiple scenarios, the 
number of participants needed was 34 per delay level. Thus, we recruited approximately 50 
participants per condition. 
However, in order to exclude the risk that choice-supportiveness went undetected due to low 
power of the single tests and missing data, we combined the probabilities of the overall (i.e., all 
the delays pooled) paired t-tests in free recall over the five scenarios using Fisher's method, and 
we did this separately for each kind of misremembering. Total sample size over the five 
scenarios in this case is n = 688, and the findings are summarized in Table 2.18. As shown in 
the table, there is no evidence of significant choice-supportiveness for any kind of distortion. 
The power for the combined sample size is 1 for a moderate effect size (.40) and .99 for a small 
effect size (.20) if computed as for a paired t-test on the total sample size. If the power is 
computed as for a meta-analysis with low heterogeneity (Valentine, Pigott, & Rothstein, 2010), 
it is 1 for a moderate effect size (.40), and .89 for a small effect size (.20). 
 
Table 2.18: Combined probabilities of the overall paired t-test for each kind of misremem-
bering in free recall over the five scenarios, using the Fisher's method 
 
Fisher's Χ2 df 
Combined 
prob. 
SELECTIVE FORGETTING 12,549 10 0,250 
MISATTRIBUTION 5,423 10 0,861 
FALSE MEMORY 9,774 10 0,461 
FACT DISTORTION 15,327 10 0,121 
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2.4 Discussion 
In this experiment, we hoped to investigate the effects of delay and individual differences on 
memory choice-supportiveness. Due to the lack of a main choice-supportive effect, we were 
not able to do so, or to assess whether such distortions occur mainly at encoding, consolidation 
or retrieval. However, our findings nonetheless provided insight into the nature of memory 
errors after decision making, their potential origins, and the robustness of the choice-supportive 
memory phenomenon. 
As expected, we found that the memory for option information worsened significantly over 
time. Correct recall after a 2- and a 20-minute delay was significantly better than after a 2-day 
delay. Likewise, we observed more commission and omission errors after 2 days in free recall 
than after a 20-minute or a 2-minute delay. This finding – albeit expected – adds to the available 
evidence with implications for memory-based and mixed choices. Any choice that is made or 
recalled after a rather long delay is likely to be affected by that passage of time due to forgetting 
and distortions of the information regarding the options. Previous research has shown that the 
overall evaluations of facts can both be retrieved and used separately from those facts and are, 
indeed, more durable in memory than the original facts themselves (e.g., Hastie & Park, 1986; 
Lynch, Jr., Marmorstein, & Weigold, 1988). Furthermore, Wirtz, Kruger, Scollon, & Diener 
(2003) found that the willingness to repeat a past enterprise is more dependent on the memory 
of the experience rather than on how it was perceived at the time. This was confirmed by Stragà, 
Del Missier, Marcatto, & Ferrante (2017), who also showed that two separate memory sources 
contribute in distinct manners to future intentions (see also Hastie & Park, 1986). 
The recall problems were likely partly due to reduced accessibility at retrieval, as evidenced by 
the deterioration with time and the fact that there was an improvement when the attribute names 
were provided as cues. This provides a valuable hint for those trying to develop methods of 
decision support: attribute names could form the basis of an effective recall strategy. Perhaps it 
might even be useful to attempt to retrieve the choice attributes first and then their values, rather 
than simply trying to bring all remembered information of the options to mind. This, however, 
would need to be experimentally tested before determining its usefulness. 
Considering that we found some forgetting and errors even after a short delay - and that some 
errors persisted even with attribute cues - recall problems could depend on encoding factors, as 
well. In this experiment, we did not include a recognition test and we can therefore not 
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determine whether this was mainly an availability or accessibility issue. Nonetheless, 
considering that even the cued recall did not yield perfect scores after a short delay, our results 
indicate that some information may not have been successfully encoded. Possibly, this could 
be due to how this kind of decision is made: when the attributes are the same – only differing 
in the individual values of each one – it may be likely to trigger a strategy whereby the 
participant first decides which attributes are the most important, and then merely compares the 
values on those, weighing the attributes according to that importance ranking. The focus would 
be on which option has the most advantageous value on each important attribute rather than on 
each option considered as a whole, or on the precise values, which would then quickly be 
forgotten. Indeed, mere comparatives occurred in the free recall. For example, in some instances 
the participants wrote that the option was better or worse than the alternative on the remembered 
attributes rather than providing the actual values, despite explicit instructions to be precise.  
It should also be mentioned that choice-supportive memory has previously been hypothesized 
to be more due to bias at retrieval than at encoding (e.g., Mather & Johnson, 2000; Mather et 
al., 2000). Likewise, other phenomena that share characteristics with it, such as wishful thinking 
effects (distorting memories to create source reliability - Gordon, Franklin, & Beck, 2005) and 
schema-based halo/devil effects (Cook, Marsh, & Hicks, 2003) have also been found to 
originate not in the encoding phase, but during retrieval of the information. Thus, imperfect 
encoding may in itself limit or prevent these kinds of effects. 
The evidence from this experiment fully supported the new taxonomy of misremembering. 
Indeed, all four different types of misremembering were observed at all delay levels. As 
predicted, false memories were the least common, but in three of the five scenarios, they were 
present even after the shortest delay, and their occurrence increased with time. However, despite 
the high statistical power of the tests, we found no evidence of choice-supportive memory in 
this ecological standard choice context with alignable items, tabular presentation and free and 
cued recall. In this regard, our findings were similar to those of Depping & Freund (2013), 
indicating that it may be an overgeneralization to state that we remember chosen options as 
better than they were and not chosen ones as worse than they were. It appears justified to point 
out the need to determine when this effect is likely to occur and then acknowledge those 
boundaries. Clearly, the robustness of the phenomenon should be further appraised with 
memory tests other than source recognition of verbal unalignable features to reveal the origin 
and the conditions needed for the effect.  
  
 
108 
 
Chapter 3: Experiment 2 
 
3.1 Introduction and aims 
In our first experiment, we found no tendency of choice-supportive misremembering when 
using six short, alignable items describing each option in binary choice scenarios, and testing 
memory with free and cued recall. This provided further evidence that certain conditions are 
necessary for the effect to occur. In our next experiment, we therefore wanted to investigate 
which those conditions might be. Since the effect had been absent in earlier studies testing 
memory only with free recall, the methods used to test memory could be an influential factor. 
Alternatively - or additionally - the presentation format of the scenarios and options could play 
a crucial role. If memory choice-supportiveness stems from gist-based encoding, consolidation 
and retrieval of the information, facts that are not perceived as a coherent narrative may be 
processed in a way that protects from this bias. To test this hypothesis and investigate which 
conditions are needed for a choice-supportive misremembering effect, we designed an 
experiment with the option information presented in four different configurations. 
 
3.1.1 Hypotheses 
Our main hypothesis was based on the findings in our critical literature review (Lind, Visentini, 
Mäntylä, & Del Missier, 2017, Chapter 1 of this thesis) and our first experiment: since many 
studies - including our own with short, alignable items - failed to find a choice-supportive 
tendency, it appears that certain conditions are needed for the effect. In turn, those conditions 
might induce schema- or gist-based processing, without which there would be no such 
tendency. If any choice-supportive memory effects are the result of having constructed a 
schema according to which the chosen option is not only distinct from the alternative in terms 
of the general idea of what that kind of option would include (e.g., when having chosen between 
a wilderness and a beach holiday, most people might be more likely to attribute the item 
‘crowded’ to the beach version even if the item had been entirely forgotten), but also as being 
the preferred option. If the participant has chosen a specific option and then forgotten what it 
involved, she might still have a general idea of that option being better, merely based on the 
fact that she chose it. Consequently, she might be more inclined to attribute positive items to 
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that option rather than to the foregone option. If this is an important reason behind choice-
supportiveness observations, we hypothesized that a more ‘narrative’ presentation of the 
options would enhance choice-supportive misremembering.  
Since our ‘nonalignable’ versions did not include corresponding items in the same dimensions 
in the two options, we hypothesized that they would make it more likely that the participant 
would form a general idea of each option and base their decision on the attractiveness of that 
general idea rather than compare item by item (Item 1 from A vs. Item 1 from B, Item 2 from 
A vs. Item 2 from B, etc.) and then choose the option that contained the largest amount of 
positive items (or the items that seemed most appealing, but ignoring any overarching general 
idea of the option). Likewise, we expected our ‘narrative’ versions (displaying the items of each 
option in blocks of text, with B underneath A) to produce more choice-supportiveness than our 
‘list’ versions (displaying the items of the options in lists, with B to the right of A). Thus, we 
expected the most choice-supportiveness for the nonalignable version presented as a ‘narrative’.    
We also speculated that stronger effects would be seen in source recognition memory tests than 
in cued and free recall, with free recall yielding the least choice-supportive memory bias. The 
rationale behind this hypothesis was partly that our literature review showed strong support for 
choice-supportive memory from experiments where source recognition was used as the memory 
test, but insufficient evidence from free recall studies, and that our own first experiment – in 
which we used only free and cued recall memory tests – also did not yield any choice-
supportiveness. Thus, we hypothesized that part of the gist or schema that remained in memory 
consisted of the general idea of superiority of the chosen option, and that it may have been 
strong enough to produce choice-supportive effects in recognition, but too weak to distort free 
recall. As suggested by the Source Monitoring Framework mentioned in Chapter 1, uncertain 
sources are subjected to a cue-based reconstruction at the time of retrieval. This implies that 
people generally attribute memories to the option for which it is most characteristic (Johnson 
et al., 1993). In addition to being in line (in this context) with both gist- and schema-based 
processing, this is similar to a satisfying search strategy (Simon, 1956) or System I thinking 
(Kahneman, 2011) requiring a minimum amount of effort. Both of these describe strategies 
whereby the first logical answer that comes to mind is accepted. In cases where the item is not 
particularly characteristic of either option, other heuristics may be used. Since they have chosen 
their preferred option, a rudimentary heuristic may be that the chosen option is the best.  
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If explained by a signal detection theory, there is no cost of answering that most of the positives 
belong to the chosen and the probability that they actually do should be higher than the reverse, 
since that option was chosen. In source recognition tests, participants normally has to tick 
whether the item belonged to the chosen, the nonchosen or none, whereas in free recall tests, 
the likelihood of participants guessing is lower. Finally, we expected to find all four types of 
choice-supportive memory manifestations: misattribution, false memory, fact distortion and 
selective forgetting, but that misattributions and false memories would be rare in free recall.  
It is worth mentioning here that although we included diverse scenarios designed to represent 
high importance/positive valence, low importance/positive valence, high importance/negative 
valence and low importance/negative valence, we did not form any specific hypotheses 
regarding the differences in effect between the scenarios. Our literature review did not provide 
evidence of perceived importance or valence affecting choice-supportiveness, but we wanted 
to use diverse scenarios to cover as wide a range of choices as possible. 
 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
We computed the sample size for a mixed Anova, with an a-priori power of .80 for a medium 
effect size on choice-supportiveness (f = .25), alpha = .05. Considering the repeated 
measurements (scenarios), the number of participants needed was 82 overall. Thus, we recruited 
a total of 100 participants, aged 19 – 45 years at the Department of Psychology at Stockholm 
University, Sweden, and online. 56 of the participants were undergraduate Psychology students 
compensated with course credits, and 44 were recruited online, compensated with a cinema 
ticket. Of those recruited online, 30 also completed the study online at home (or elsewhere) and 
the remaining 14 in the university laboratory. 55 of the Psychology students completed the 
study in the university laboratory and 1 at home. 4 of the Psychology students were excluded 
because of their age (above 45 years). Two additional Psychology students and one non-
Psychology participant were excluded for not completing the study according to the 
instructions. This yielded a total of 50 Psychology undergraduate participants and 43 other 
participants. Out of these, one Psychology student and 26 others completed the survey outside 
the laboratory (e.g., at home). 5 participants (2 Psychology students, 3 others) failed to 
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remember one of their choices. They were excluded only for the forgotten scenario. One 
participant completing from home only completed two scenarios due to an IT issue. 
 
3.2.2 Design 
The design was a 2 (alignability) x 2 (presentation format) x 4 (scenario) mixed design. 
Alignability and format were manipulated between-subjects and scenario within subjects by 
creating four different sets of materials, in which each choice scenario was presented as (1) 
alignable list, (2) nonalignable list, (3) alignable narrative, and (4) nonalignable narrative. All 
four scenarios were presented to each participant. The experiment involved three main phases: 
(1) presentation of each scenario and choice between the binary options, (2) fillers, and (3) free 
recall, then cued recall followed by a source recognition test for each scenario. The order of the 
scenarios was randomized for each participant, but presented in the same order in the first and 
the third stage. 
 
3.2.3 Materials 
The study was computer-based and run online using Qualtrics. As mentioned, the majority of 
the participants completed the survey in the laboratory at Stockholm University, Sweden. The 
survey was written in Swedish, but translated into English and therefore available in both 
languages. Four of the participants completed the survey in English and all others in Swedish. 
Four different scenarios were presented to the participants, who were asked to make binary 
choices for each one. The order of the scenarios was randomized and participants were 
randomized to complete one of the four versions of the survey, with each participant completing 
all four scenarios (except for the participant who was unable to access two of the scenarios). 
Each option contained 12 items, one out of which was identical for the two options. Any 
qualifiers (e.g., ‘somewhat’, ‘a bit’) were balanced between the two options and each option 
contained six positive and six negative items. The perceived valence had been tested in pilot 
studies and the present survey also included a section where the participants had to sort all items 
according to how positive/negative they felt they were. 
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We presented the four different scenarios and options in four different formats. These versions 
were alignable list, nonalignable list, alignable narrative and nonalignable narrative. ‘List’ and 
‘narrative’ refer to how the options were presented: in a list with A on the right and B on the 
left with each item listed underneath each other, or in a manner that more resembles a narrative: 
A above B with the items presented in a block of text with each item separated from the next 
with a full stop. ‘Alignable’ refers to options containing items with a corresponding item on the 
same dimension in the other option (e.g., if A states ‘Expensive’, B might state ‘Cheap’). In the 
‘nonalignable’ versions, on the other hand, for each item included, there was no corresponding 
item in the other option. For example, the first item in the Glass scenario in the alignable 
versions reads ‘Very economical’ for A and ‘Offer no economical option’ for B. In the 
nonalignable versions, the first item in B is unchanged, but the one in A reads ‘You have heard 
their glass is durable’. Please see the appendices for the English translation of the four versions 
of the scenarios. 
The free recall test consisted of empty boxes where the participants were asked to enter as much 
information about each option as they could remember, and the cued recall tests listed four 
sentences from the options, with the numeric values left blank. Those were the only numeric 
values amongst the option items, and participants had to fill in those numbers in the cued recall 
test. Finally, the source recognition test included all the items describing the scenarios – except 
those tested in the cued recall – as well as 10 lures. Half of the lures were positive and half 
negative. One positive and one negative lure were designed to be consistent with the gist of 
each option (i.e., 4 out of 10 lures).  
 
3.2.4 Procedure 
Before the study, the participants were informed about the general procedure, but not that the 
study would include memory tests. They were told that they would make choices between 
different alternatives and the survey was referred to as ‘a preference survey’. Their participation 
was voluntary and they were informed that they could withdraw at any time. After signing the 
informed consent form, they completed the survey online – in the university laboratory or at 
home (see the Participants section for proportions of participants completing at home and in 
the laboratory). Those participating at home agreed to complete the survey undisturbed and 
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without distractions, and all participants were given the opportunity to ask questions about the 
study before, during and after participation.  
The surveys were divided into three sections: the encoding phase (reading the scenarios and 
options, and making the choices), the consolidation phase (fillers), and the retrieval phase (free 
recall, cued recall and source recognition). In the first section, the participants were given 2½ 
minutes to make each choice and were then automatically sent forward in the survey. After each 
choice, they were asked two quick questions: how important and how engaging the choice had 
felt. Once all the choices had been made and the two quick questions had been answered for 
each one, the participants reached the second section. The fillers – with questions about 
nutrition - lasted 10 minutes. After each separate part of the fillers, the participants were 
automatically sent forward. Thus, they were not able to spend more or less time than 10 minutes 
on the fillers. After that came the memory tests with free recall followed by cued recall and 
then recognition. The minimum delay between the presentation of the scenarios and options, 
and the free recall, was 22 minutes. For the scenarios that were not randomized to be presented 
first, the delay was longer, as the time of the previous memory tests added to the delay. For the 
free recall, the participants were first asked which option they had chosen. As mentioned, there 
were five occasions of a participant not remembering their choice correctly, and their memory 
tests were not scored for the scenario in question. The following text was displayed before each 
free recall test: ‘Please think carefully and write down everything you remember about the 
features of your chosen [/the alternative (not chosen)] LUNCH RESTAURANT [/ SURGERY 
/ GLASS REPAIR / HOLIDAY DESTINATION] option. Be as precise and specific as possible. 
You are automatically sent to the next page when time is up.’ After two minutes, the subsequent 
page was displayed. For the cued recall part, which consisted of the four sentences from the 
scenarios with the numbers removed, the participants chose themselves when to move forward. 
The sentences had the name of the option from which it was taken in parenthesis and italics, 
e.g., ‘Including ordering, being served takes on average [?] min. (The Bluebell)’, and the 
missing number had to be completed in the space provided. In the recognition part, the 
participant had to tick whether the item belonged to their chosen option, the alternative (not 
chosen) option, both or was not presented at all. If more than one box was ticked for any other 
item than the item that formed part of both options, it was counted as a missing value. Once 
finished, the participant clicked to proceed to the next page.  
The memory tests were followed by questions relating to ranking of the items and values to 
enable the scorer to judge whether any fact distortions of values presented were made in a 
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choice-supportive direction (i.e., whether the participant felt that a higher/lower value for each 
number presented made the option more or less attractive), and to see whether item importance 
affected the rate of choice-supportiveness for each item.   
After completion of the survey, which took approximately 1 hour and 10 minutes, all 
participants were thoroughly informed about the purpose of the study and were given either 
course credits (for the Psychology undergraduates) or a cinema ticket (for all others). 
 
3.2.5 Scoring procedures 
The memory errors and omissions were categorized according to the taxonomy presented in 
Lind et al. (2017), reproduced in Chapter 1 of this thesis, and following the same guidelines as 
in Experiment 1. For an illustration of the taxonomy, see Figure 1, page 18 of this thesis. 
An error was classified as a misattribution when the item itself was correctly remembered, but 
it was attributed to the wrong option. For example, if option A contained the item ‘Near the 
beach’ and the participant entered this as an item belonging to B, this was scored as a 
misattribution. If an item was remembered, but its value was distorted in a way that changed its 
attractiveness, this counted as a fact distortion. For example, the original sentence might have 
been that only four different meals were served in the restaurant, but it was remembered as six 
different meals. To judge whether a fact distortion was choice-supportive or not, we looked at 
a section in the survey where each participant had ranked the original sentence along with two 
more sentences, identical to the first except that one had a higher value and the other one a 
lower value. If the participant had ranked a higher value as more beneficial than a lower, the 
misremembering in the example would be choice-supportive if belonging to the chosen option 
(and choice-opposing if belonging to the alternative option).  
False memories were any items ‘remembered’, but not presented in the original scenarios. The 
recognition test contained 10 lures for each scenario, and if any of these were attributed to one 
of the options, this was scored as a false memory (in line with earlier studies in the field, e.g., 
Mather, Knight, & McCaffrey, 2005). Using the same logic in the free recall, any items 
belonging to options in one of the other three scenarios presented were scored as false 
memories, but those that belonged to the other option in the same scenario was scored as 
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misattributions. As in Experiment 1, where synonyms were remembered instead of the actual 
word(s) used, they were scored as correct answers. 
Choice-supportive selective forgetting is when beneficial items from the nonchosen option and 
undesired items from the chosen option are forgotten rather than the other way around (which 
would constitute choice-opposing selective forgetting). An extreme case of choice-supportive 
selective forgetting in free recall would be if a participant remembers all the positive items 
describing their chosen option and all the negative items describing the foregone option, and 
none of the other items. The section where the participant had rated the valence of each item 
was used to determine whether an item was positive or negative. In the free recall, each positive 
item that was forgotten from the non-chosen option and each negative item that was forgotten 
from the chosen option counted as choice-supportively selectively forgotten. Forgetting of 
negative items from the non-chosen option and positive items from the chosen option was 
scored as non-choice-supportively selectively forgotten. In the cued recall, only entries 
completed with ‘0’, ‘don’t know’ or ‘?’ counted as forgotten, and in the source recognition test, 
ticking the box ‘not presented’ for an item that had indeed been presented was interpreted as an 
instance of selective forgetting. The direction of the selective forgetting in the cued recall and 
source recognition was calculated in the same way as in the free recall. 
The first author scored the responses of all participants in all tests, using a purpose-made 
template for the recognition test to avoid errors. For the free recall, an independent rater was 
trained and subsequently scored 10% of the responses.7 Inter-rater reliability was .85 (Cohen’s 
kappa) and the debated cases were resolved after a joint discussion.  
 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Descriptive statistics on choice shares, scenario evaluation and choice 
misremembering 
Choice shares were reasonably balanced in all the scenarios, except the Lunch one. In the Lunch 
scenario the shares were .85 vs. .15, in the Glass scenario .29 vs. .71, in the Holiday scenario 
.57 vs. .43, and in the Surgery scenario .51 vs. .49. 
                                                 
7 Sincere thanks to Anna-Maria Tuomiluoma for her contribution as independent rater. 
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The Lunch scenario received average ratings (on five-point scales) for what concerns difficulty 
of choice (2.656) and engagement (2.667). Only 2% of the initial sample (2 cases out of 96) 
misremembered the choice they made in this scenario. Similar figures were observed for the 
Glass scenario (difficulty = 2.758; engagement = 2.568; 3% misremembering of the initial 
sample - 3 cases out of 96). The Holiday scenario was perceived as slightly more involving 
(difficulty = 2.811; engagement = 2.842; 3% misremembering of the initial sample - 3 cases 
out of 96) as was the Surgery scenario (difficulty = 2.074; engagement = 2.947; 3% 
misremembering of the initial sample - 3 cases out of 96). 
The few cases in which participants misremembered their choices as well as the cases in which 
they did not answer any question for a given scenario were excluded from the following 
analyses (on a scenario by scenario basis). 
 
3.3.2 Accuracy in recall and recognition tests 
As shown in Table 3.1, accuracy was lower in free recall than in recognition with cued recall 
falling in-between, reproducing a typical pattern in memory research. There were much more 
omission than commission errors in free recall (indeed a low percentage of commission errors). 
Generally, accuracy was rather low in free recall, but this is reasonable considering the delay 
between choice and recall and the interference from information belonging to other scenarios, 
as well as the large amount of information to be remembered. This may have been related more 
to retrieval processes than to encoding processes, given the high accuracy of recognition tests. 
Results are consistent across scenarios, showing highly similar percentages of accurate 
responses and errors. The relatively low accuracy in free recall may have reduced the possibility 
to observe misremembering occurrences (other than selective forgetting) with this type of test 
and, as a consequence, choice-supportiveness. Therefore, the findings presented in the next 
paragraphs may need to be considered as conservative estimates (i.e., running against the 
choice-supportiveness hypotheses). 
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Table 3.1: Accuracy and errors (proportions) for the different memory tests and scenarios 
 
 LUNCH SCENARIO 
FREE RECALL (n = 93) CUED RECALL (n = 92) RECOGNITION (n = 92) 
Correct 
recall 
Commission 
errors 
Omission 
errors 
Correct 
recall 
Commission 
errors 
Omission 
errors 
Correct 
recall 
Commission 
errors 
Omission 
errors 
.269 .095 .636 .652 .329 .019 .836 .104 .060 
 
GLASS SCENARIO 
FREE RECALL (n = 87) CUED RECALL (n = 85) RECOGNITION (n = 87) 
Correct 
recall 
Commission 
errors 
Omission 
errors 
Correct 
recall 
Commission 
errors 
Omission 
errors 
Correct 
recall 
Commission 
errors 
Omission 
errors 
.308 .050 .642 .621 .353 .026 .823 .126 .051 
 
HOLIDAY SCENARIO 
FREE RECALL (n = 90) CUED RECALL (n = 90) RECOGNITION (n = 90) 
Correct 
recall 
Commission 
errors 
Omission 
errors 
Correct 
recall 
Commission 
errors 
Omission 
errors 
Correct 
recall 
Commission 
errors 
Omission 
errors 
.358 .047 .595 .522 .433 .044 .856 .082 .062 
 
SURGERY SCENARIO 
FREE RECALL (n = 88) CUED RECALL (n = 88) RECOGNITION (n = 88) 
Correct 
recall 
Commission 
errors 
Omission 
errors 
Correct 
recall 
Commission 
errors 
Omission 
errors 
Correct 
recall 
Commission 
errors 
Omission 
errors 
.278 .059 .580 .557 .395 .048 .826 .127 .047 
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3.3.3 ANOVAs on accuracy and errors 
A series of 2 x 2 x 4 mixed ANOVAs was carried out on accuracy measures and 
commission/omission errors for the various memory tests and considering as factors: 
1) Alignability (alignable attributes/nonalignable attributes) - between-subjects 
2) Format (narrative/list) - between-subjects 
3) Scenario (Lunch, Glass, Holiday, Surgery) - within subjects 
The 2 x 2 x 4 mixed ANOVA was repeated for the three different types of tests and the results 
will be presented accordingly. Missing data was treated with case wise exclusion due to a 
repeated measure variable (consequently, the means in the following analyses may slightly 
differ from the means reported in Table 3.1, based on all the available cases for each scenario). 
 
3.3.3.1 Free recall 
For what concerns accuracy (proportion correct) in the free recall test, the ANOVA highlighted 
a main effect of alignability (F(1,77) = 4.118, Mse = .051, p = .046, η2 = .05), with slightly 
better accuracy in alignable conditions vs. nonalignable ones (Malign = .33, Mnonalign = .28). The 
main effect of the scenario was also significant (F(3,231) = 15.637, Mse = .008, p < .001, η2 = 
.17), with recall accuracy in the Holiday scenario being slightly better than accuracy in the other 
scenarios (.36 vs. .31 or lower, HSD all p < .001). The main effect of the presentation format 
(narrative vs. list) and all the interactions were not significant. 
The ANOVA on the proportion of commission errors highlighted main effects of alignability 
(F(1,77) = 10.350, Mse = .004, p = .001, η2 = .12), with slightly more errors in the alignable 
conditions Malign = .07, Mnonalign = .05), and format (F(1,77) = 4.540, Mse = .004, p = .036, η2 = 
.06), with slightly more errors in conditions with the list vs. the narrative format (Mlist = .07 
Mnarrative = .06). Also the main effect of the scenario was significant (F(3,231) = 19.703, Mse = 
.002, p<.001, η2 = .20), with the Lunch scenario being associated with more commission errors 
(.10 vs. .06 or lower, HSD all p < .001), as well as two interactions, the first between alignability 
and format (F(1,77) = 6.487, Mse = .004, p = .013, η2 = .08) and the second between alignability 
and scenario (F(3,231) = 11.572, Mse = .002, p < .001, η2 = .13). These interactions showed in 
particular slightly more commissions in alignable list format vs. the other conditions (.09 vs. 
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.06 or lower, HSD all p < .01 or lower), and more commissions in alignable conditions, 
especially in the Lunch scenario (.13 vs. .07 or lower, all p < .001). 
The ANOVA on the proportion of omission errors highlighted main effects of alignability 
(F(1,77) = 6.643, Mse = .064,p = .012, η2 = .08), with more forgetting in the nonalignable 
conditions Malign = .57, Mnonalign = .64), and format (F(1,77,) = 5.047, Mse = .064, p = .027, η2 
= .06), with more forgetting in conditions with the narrative format vs. the list format (Mlist = 
.58 Mnarrative = .64). The main effect of the scenario was also significant (F(3,231) = 9.919, Mse 
= .009, p<.001, η2 = .11), with more omissions in Lunch and Glass scenarios vs. Holiday and 
Surgery ones (.62 and .64 vs. .59 and .57, respectively, HSD p < .01 and lower for Surgery vs. 
Lunch, Surgery vs. Glass, Holiday vs. Glass). No interaction was significant. 
 
3.3.3.2 Cued recall 
For what concerns accuracy (number of correct responses) in the cued recall test, the ANOVA 
highlighted a main effect of alignability (F(1,75) = 4.480, Mse = 2.374, p = .038, η2 = .06), with 
slightly better accuracy in nonalignable conditions vs. alignable ones (Malign = .2.139, Mnonalign 
= 2.506). The main effect of the presentation format was nonsignificant while the main effect 
of the scenario was significant (F(3,225) = 5.985, Mse = .785, p<.001, η2 = .07), with the Lunch 
and the Glass scenario showing more correct responses than the Holiday scenario (2.585 and 
2.456 vs. 2.039, HSD p <. 01, p < .05). The ANOVA on the number of commission errors 
highlighted only the main effect of the scenario (F(3,225) = 4.036, Mse = .801, p = .008, η2 = 
.05), with the Lunch scenario being associated with fewer commission errors than the Holiday 
one (1.326 vs. 1.799, p = .010). The ANOVA on the very small number of omission errors did 
not highlight significant effects. 
 
3.3.3.3 Recognition 
The ANOVA on the proportion of correct recognition (correct source attributions: hits and 
correct rejections) did not highlight a main effect of alignability, nor any significant interaction. 
However, both the main effect of the presentation format (F(1,77,) = 4.416, Mse = .037, p = 
.039, η2 = .05) and the main effect of the scenario (F(3,231) = 3.930, Mse = 0.006, p = .001, η2 
= .05) were significant, with a slightly better performance in the list format conditions (Mlist = 
.860, Mnarrative = .815) and slight variations in accuracy across scenarios (with Holiday and 
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Lunch, .86. and .85, better than Glass and Surgery, .82 and .83, and Holiday and Glass differing 
at HSD test: p = .014). 
The ANOVA on the proportion of commission errors in recognition (false alarms) showed only 
a significant main effect of the scenario (F(3,231) = 3.600, Mse = 0.001, p = .014, η2 = .04) and 
one interaction between alignability and scenario (F(3,231) = 7.436, Mse = 0.001, p = .001, η2 
= .09), with more commission errors in the alignable vs. nonalignable conditions, in particular 
in Lunch scenario (HSD p = .037 for the Lunch scenario). 
The ANOVA on the proportion of omission errors in recognition (misses) highlighted main 
effects of the presentation format (F(1,77) = 5.829, Mse=.019, p = .018, η2 = .07), with slightly 
more forgetting in the narrative format (Mlist = .091 Mnarrative = .128) and of the scenario 
(F(3,231) = 10.981, Mse = .004, p<.001, η2 = .12), with more omissions in the Glass and 
Surgery scenarios (vs. the others HSD p at least < .05), and a significant interaction between 
alignability and scenario (F(3,231) = 3.252, Mse = .004, p = .022, η2 = .04) not resisting in post 
hoc tests. 
 
3.3.3.4 Summary 
To summarize the results of the analyses on accuracy in free recall, it can be stated that 
participants were slightly more accurate when information was presented in alignable formats, 
but they also made more commission errors when the information was alignable or presented 
in a list format, which appear to make items easier to encode and recall, but also more likely to 
be confused. Omission errors were higher in nonalignable and narrative formats, which possibly 
make information slightly harder to encode and remember. There was also some variation 
across scenarios, with the Holiday scenario remembered better and the Lunch scenario (the less 
balanced one) associated with lower recall. Possibly, less balance made the decision easier and 
as shown by Jacoby, Craik, & Begg (1979), memory tends to be better after difficult decisions. 
In cued recall, when the attributes were used as a cue, there was better recall in nonalignable 
conditions, possibly due to the lower confusability of items in these conditions vs. the alignable 
ones, and again scenario-related variation. In recognition, more accuracy and fewer omissions 
were observed with the list format, together with variation across scenarios, suggesting a 
possible influence of the presentation layout. Generally speaking, the effect sizes were small, 
thus showing that the manipulated variables had not a very strong effect on correct recall and 
errors, regardless of the test used. 
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3.3.4 ANOVAs on misremembering occurrences  
A series of 2 x 2 x 2 x 4 mixed ANOVAs were carried out on the number of misremembering 
occurrences per participant and considering as factors: 
1) choice-supportiveness (vs. non choice-supportiveness) - within-subjects 
2) alignability - between-subjects 
3) format (narrative/list) - between-subjects 
4) scenario (Lunch, Glass, Holiday, Surgery) - within subjects 
This 2 x 2 x 2 x 4 mixed ANOVA was repeated for the four different kinds of misremembering 
and for the three different types of tests. Missing data was treated with case wise exclusion due 
to a repeated measure variable 
 
3.3.4.1 Free recall 
The ANOVA on selective forgetting occurrences highlighted main effects of choice-
supportiveness, alignability, presentation format, and scenario but no significant interactions. 
Table 3.2 presents the significant effects. 
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Table 3.2: Significant effects for selective forgetting in free recall 
Effect F (df) Mse p η2 Means 
Choice-supportiveness F(1, 77) = 23.713 3.52 p < .001 .23 CS = 7.196 
NCS = 6.477 
Alignability F(1, 77) = 6.738 15.95 p = .011 .08 ALIGN = 6.428 
NONAL = 7.245 
Format F(1, 77) = 5.074 15.95 p = .027 .06 LIST = 6.482 
NARR = 7.191 
Scenario F(3, 231) = 4.469 3.35 p = .004 .05 LUNCH = 6.895 
GLASS = 7.079 
HOLIDAY = 6.491 
SURGERY = 6.882 
 
The ANOVA on misattributions showed only the main effect of alignability, and an interaction 
between choice-supportiveness and alignability, with choice-supportiveness in the nonalignable 
condition (HSD p = .049) but not in the alignable one (HSD p = .427). Table 3.3 reports the 
significant effects. 
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Table 3.3: Significant effects for misattributions in free recall 
Effect F (df) Mse p η2 Means 
Alignability F(1, 77) = 4.530 .057 p = .036 .06 ALIGN = 0.013 
NONAL = 0.053 
Choice-supportiveness × 
alignability 
F(1, 77) = 8.956 .021 p = .004 .10 ALIGN CS = 0.000 
ALIGN NCS = 0.026 
NONAL CS = 0.074 
NONAL NCS = 0.031 
 
The ANOVA on false memories highlighted the main effect of choice-supportiveness, and a 
three-way interaction between choice-supportiveness, alignability, and scenario, with choice-
supportiveness being significant in the Surgery scenario in the nonalignable conditions (HSD p 
= .007), and in the Glass scenario in the alignable conditions (HSD p < .001), but choice-
supportiveness also being generally more apparent in nonalignable vs. alignable conditions. 
Table 3.4 presents the significant effects. 
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Table 3.4: Significant effects for false memories in free recall 
Effect F (df) Mse p η2 Means 
Choice-
supportiveness 
F(1, 77) = 28.870 .564 p < .001 .27 CS = 0.547 
NCS = 0.229 
Choice-
supportiveness × 
alignability ×   
scenario 
F(3, 231) = 5.043 .485 p = .002 .06 ALIGN LUNCH CS = 0.229 
ALIGN LUNCH NCS = 0.274 
ALIGN GLASS CS = 0.797 
ALIGN GLASS NCS = 0.098 
ALIGN HOLIDAY CS = 0.644 
ALIGN HOLIDAY NCS = 0.314 
ALIGN SURGERY CS = 0.246 
ALIGN SURGERY NCS = 0.229 
NONAL LUNCH CS = 0.499 
NONAL LUNCH NCS = 0.117 
NONAL GLASS CS = 0.536 
NONAL GLASS NCS = 0.354 
NONAL HOLIDAY CS = 0.597 
NONAL HOLIDAY NCS = 0.226 
NONAL SURGERY CS = 0.830 
NONAL SURGERY NCS = 0.222 
 
The ANOVA on fact distortions showed significant main effects of alignability, format, 
scenario, and three significant interactions: between alignability and format, between 
alignability and scenario, and between choice-supportiveness and scenario. The last interaction 
showed very slight and nonsignificant choice-supportiveness in the Holiday and Glass 
scenarios, some more choice-supportiveness in the Surgery scenario (HSD p = .004), and 
nonsignificant non-supportiveness in the Lunch scenario Table 3.5 reports the findings.  
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Table 3.5: Significant effects for fact distortions in free recall 
Effect F (df) Mse p η2 Means 
Alignability F(1, 77) = 8.510 .920 p = .005 .10 ALIGN = .822  
NONAL = .602 
Format F(1, 77) = 4.911 .920 p = .030 .06 LIST = .796  
NARR = .628  
Scenario F(3, 231) = 19.161 .590 p < .001 .20 LUNCH = 1.077  
GLASS = .538   
HOLIDAY = .496  
SURGERY = .736   
Alignability × 
format 
F(1, 77) = 7.053 .920 p = .010 .13 ALIGN LIST = 1.006 
ALIGN NARR = .638 
NONAL LIST = .585 
NONAL NARR = .618 
Alignability × 
scenario 
F(3, 231) = 11.517 .590 p < .001 .13 ALIGN LUNCH = 1.470  
ALIGN GLASS = .604   
ALIGN HOLIDAY = .574  
ALIGN SURGERY = .639   
NONAL LUNCH = .683  
NONAL GLASS = .472   
NONAL HOLIDAY = .574  
NONAL SURGERY = .639   
Choice-
supportiveness × 
scenario 
F(3, 231) = 5.924 .632 p < .001 .07 LUNCH CS = 0.942 
LUNCH NCS = 1.212 
GLASS CS = 0.601 
GLASS NCS = 0.475 
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HOLIDAY CS = 0.547 
HOLIDAY NCS = 0.445 
SURGERY CS = 0.974 
SURGERY NCS = 0.499 
 
Overall, choice-supportive distortions in free recall are seen in selective forgetting and false 
memory as main effects. Not so in misattributions (very few occurrences) and in fact distortion. 
Choice-supportive misattributions (vs. non supportive ones) are apparent in nonalignable 
conditions only, in line with a significant interaction. For fact distortion, there is variation in 
choice-supportiveness related to the scenario, again qualifying a significant interaction. 
 
3.3.4.2 Cued recall 
For cued recall an ANOVA was carried out on fact distortions highlighting main effects of the 
scenario (F(3, 231) = 3.303, Mse = .401, p = .021, η2 = .04) a two-way interaction between 
scenario and format (F(3, 231) = 3.175, Mse = .401, p = .025, η2 = .04) a three-way interaction 
between scenario, alignability, and format (F(3, 231) = 3.226, Mse = .401, p = .023, η2 = .04) 
and a four-way interaction involving all the factors ((F(3, 231) = 2.852, , Mse = .647, p = .038, 
η2=.04). Only the four-way interaction involved choice-supportiveness, showing no easily 
interpretable pattern. 
 
3.3.4.3 Recognition 
For recognition three ANOVAs were carried out on selective forgetting occurrences, 
misattributions, and false memories. In addition, another ANOVA was carried out on the 
asymmetry score used in previous studies to assess choice-supportiveness (Mather, Shafir, & 
Johnson, 2000). This was computed as follows: 
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Asymmetry score = (number of positive attributes remembered as associated 
to the chosen option + number of negative attributes remembered as 
associated to the foregone option) - 
(number of negative attributes remembered as associated to the chosen option 
+ number of positive attributes remembered as associated to the foregone 
option) 
 
Thus, if the index is positive there is attribution-related choice-supportiveness, if it is negative 
non supportiveness or choice-opposition (with a balance point of zero). It should be noted that 
our asymmetry score differs from that used by Mather and colleagues in that we only included 
presented items. The ten lures were excluded to turn this into a clean misattribution test without 
false memories influencing the score.  
The ANOVA on selective forgetting showed significant main effects of the presentation format 
and scenario, and two interactions, the first involving choice-supportiveness and alignability, 
and the second choice-supportiveness and presentation format. The first interaction highlights 
more choice-supportive selective forgetting in alignable conditions vs. nonalignable conditions 
(differences not resisting HSD tests), and the second more choice-supportive selective 
forgetting with a narrative vs. list presentation format (differences not resisting HSD test). The 
effects are presented in Table 3.6. 
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Table 3.6: Significant effects for selective forgetting in recognition 
Effect F (df) Mse p η2 Means 
Format  F(1, 77) = 5.912 2.592 p = .017 .07 LIST = 0.702  
NARR = 1.010 
Scenario  F(3, 231) = 5.370 1.027 p = .001 .06 LUNCH = 0.720  
GLASS = 1.073   
HOLIDAY = 0.686  
SURGERY = 0.945   
Choice-
supportiveness × 
alignability 
F(1, 77) = 4.812 .853 p = .031 .06  ALIGN CS = .994 
ALIGN NCS = .796 
NONAL CS = .756 
NONAL NCS = .877 
Choice-
supportiveness × 
format 
F(1, 77) = 4.387 .853 p = .040 .05  LIST CS = .645 
LIST NCS = .762 
NARRATIVE CS = 1.105 
NARRATIVE NCS = 0.914 
 
The ANOVA on misattributions highlighted main effects of choice-supportiveness, 
alignability, and scenario, plus a two-way significant interaction between choice-
supportiveness and scenario. The interaction shows significant choice-supportive 
misattributions in the Glass and marginally in the Surgery scenarios (HSD, p = .022 and p = 
.068, respectively). Table 3.7 summarizes the findings related to the significant effects. 
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Table 3.7: Significant effects for misattribution in recognition 
Effect F (df) Mse p η2 Means 
Choice-
supportiveness 
F(1, 77) = 4.719 0.734 p = .033 .06 CS = .751 
NCS = .605 
Alignability F(1, 77) = 6.751 2.695 p = .011 .08 ALIGN = .510  
NONAL = .846 
Scenario F(3, 231) = 6.473 0.794 p < .001 .08 LUNCH = .694  
GLASS = .727   
HOLIDAY = .433  
SURGERY = .859   
Choice-
supportiveness × 
scenario 
F(3, 231) = 6.476 0.694 p < .001 .08 LUNCH CS = 0.548 
LUNCH NCS = 0.840 
GLASS CS = 0.937 
GLASS NCS = 0.518 
HOLIDAY CS = 0.465 
HOLIDAY NCS = 0.401 
SURGERY CS = 1.056 
SURGERY NCS = 0.661 
 
The ANOVA on false memories showed main effects of choice-supportiveness and scenario, 
plus a two-way significant interaction between choice-supportiveness and scenario, and another 
between scenario and alignability. The first interaction highlights significant choice-supportive 
false memories especially in the Glass scenario (HSD, p = .006). Table 3.8 presents the findings 
related to the significant effects. 
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Table 3.8: Significant effects for false memory in recognition 
Effect F (df) Mse p η2 Means 
Choice-
supportiveness 
F(1, 77) = 6.449 0.873 p = .013 .08 CS = .839 
NCS = .653 
Scenario F(3, 231) = 3.600 0.499 p = .014 .04 LUNCH = .737  
GLASS = .709   
HOLIDAY = .893  
SURGERY = .645   
Choice-
supportiveness × 
scenario 
F(3, 231) = 2.942 .702 p = .034 .04 LUNCH CS = 0.703 
LUNCH NCS = 0.771 
GLASS CS = 0.948 
GLASS NCS = 0.470 
HOLIDAY CS = 0.958 
HOLIDAY NCS = 0.829 
SURGERY CS = 0.749 
SURGERY NCS = 0.540 
Alignability × 
scenario 
F(3, 231) = 7.436 .499 p < .001 .09 ALIGN LUNCH = 1.002 
NONAL LUNCH = 0.664 
ALIGN GLASS = 1.017 
NONAL GLASS = 0.593 
ALIGN HOLIDAY = 0.472 
NONAL HOLIDAY = 0.755 
ALIGN SURGERY = 0.770 
NONAL SURGERY = 0.696 
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The ANOVA carried out on the asymmetry score in recognition showed only a significant effect 
of the scenario (F(3, 231) = 6.274, Mse = 11.075, p < .001, η2 = .07), with a positive value in 
the Glass scenario (1.275) and Surgery scenario (1.279) and 95%CIs not including zero for 
Glass (.522-1.028) and for Surgery (.529-2.028). 
 
3.3.5 Detailed analysis of misremembering 
3.3.5.1 Occurrence of the different kinds of misremembering in free recall 
The occurrence of the four different kinds of misremembering in free recall was analyzed 
scenario per scenario (as in experiment 1). Missing data was excluded on a variable per variable 
basis (so the means in the following analyses may slightly differ from the case wise-computed 
means reported in the ANOVAs). 
As in experiment 1, 95% confidence intervals of the proportion of participants showing at least 
one occurrence of each specific misremembering type were computed, regardless of the choice-
supportive nature of the misremembering. As Table 3.9 shows, all four types of 
misremembering in the taxonomy took place at least in one occurrence in a proportion of 
participants significantly different from zero. It is apparent that selective forgetting and fact 
distortion took place in at least one case in a big fraction of participants, a sizable fraction of 
participants also produced at least one false memory, while only a small proportion of 
participants misattributed values (although the proportion was greater than zero). The results 
are very consistent across scenarios. 
 
Table 3.9: Occurrence of the four different kinds of misremembering in free recall in each 
choice scenario (proportion of cases showing at least one occurrence of each specific type) 
LUNCH SCENARIO (n = 93) 
SELECTIVE FORGETTING MISATTRIBUTION FALSE MEMORY FACT DISTORTION 
Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI 
1  .961 to 1 .065 .024 to .135 .430  .328 to .537 .882 .798 to .939 
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GLASS SCENARIO (n = 87) 
SELECTIVE FORGETTING MISATTRIBUTION FALSE MEMORY FACT DISTORTION 
Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI 
1 .958 to 1 .046 .013 to .114  .540 .430 to .648  .747  .642 to .834  
 
HOLIDAY SCENARIO (n = 90) 
SELECTIVE FORGETTING MISATTRIBUTION FALSE MEMORY FACT DISTORTION 
Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI 
1 .959 to 1 .033 .007 to .094 .500 .393 to .607 .700 .594 to .792  
 
SURGERY SCENARIO (n = 88) 
SELECTIVE FORGETTING MISATTRIBUTION FALSE MEMORY FACT DISTORTION 
Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI Prop. 95%CI 
.989 .938 to .999 .057 .019 to .128 .523 .413 to .630 .693 .586 to.787  
 
The occurrence of the four different misremembering types was also analyzed via one-tailed t-
tests on the mean number of each specific misremembering type (against a zero mean). This 
analysis provided results converging with the ones obtained with the one carried out on the 
proportion of participants showing at least one occurrence of each specific misremembering 
type. 
The findings are presented, scenario per scenario, in Table 3.10. They show that the mean 
number of the four different kinds of misremembering in free recall in each choice scenario is 
always greater than zero in one-tailed (directional) tests. The mean number of selective 
forgetting instances is greater than the mean number of fact distortions occurrences, which is 
  
 
133 
 
in turn greater than the mean number of false memories and misattributions (low means in these 
cases, in particular for misattributions). Again, results are very consistent across scenarios. 
 
Table 3.10: Mean number of the four different kinds of misremembering in free recall in each 
choice scenario (one-sample tests against a zero mean) 
LUNCH SCENARIO (n = 93) 
 Mean SD t-test (one-tailed t-test) 
SELECTIVE FORGETTING 14 3.867 t (92) = 34.913, p < .001 
MISATTRIBUTION .086 .38 t (92) = 2.182, p = .016 
FALSE MEMORIES .656 1.005 t (92) = 6.295, p <.001 
FACT DISTORTION 2.086 1.62 t (92) = 12.418, p <.001 
 
GLASS SCENARIO (n = 87) 
 Mean SD t-test (one-tailed t-test) 
SELECTIVE FORGETTING 14.126 3.361 t (86) = 39.202, p < .001 
MISATTRIBUTION .057 .279 t (86) = 1.906, p = .030 
FALSE MEMORIES .931 1.118 t (86) = 7.767, p < .001  
FACT DISTORTION 1.069 .912 t (86) = 10.933, p < .001  
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HOLIDAY SCENARIO (n = 90) 
 Mean SD t-test (one-tailed t-test) 
SELECTIVE FORGETTING 13.089 3.594 t (89) = 34.550, p < .001 
MISATTRIBUTION .033 .181 t (89) = 1.730, p = .044 
FALSE MEMORIES .933 1.169 t (89) = 7.572, p < .001  
FACT DISTORTION 1.022 .948 t (89) = 10.227, p < .001  
 
SURGERY SCENARIO (n = 88) 
 Mean SD t-test (one-tailed t-test) 
SELECTIVE FORGETTING 13.773 3.423 t (87) = 37.745, p < .001 
MISATTRIBUTION .057 .233 t (87) = 2.295, p = .012 
FALSE MEMORIES .784 1.139 t (87) = 6.457, p < .001 
FACT DISTORTION 1.375 1.316 t (87) = 9.801, p < .001 
 
3.3.5.2 Choice-supportiveness 
McNemar tests and paired t-test were used to test the hypothesis that the different types of 
distortions are choice-supportive (vs. non choice-supportive). The tests were carried out 
scenario per scenario on free recall, cued recall, and recognition on the specific types of 
distortions that could be assessed with each kind of test (i.e., all four types in free recall, fact 
distortion in cued recall, and all types except fact distortion in recognition). 
 
3.3.5.2.1 Choice-supportiveness in free recall 
McNemar test were computed on the frequencies of participants showing/not showing at least 
one case of choice-supportiveness and showing/not showing at least one case of non-choice-
supportiveness. Probabilities associated with the test were computed as one-tailed, given the 
defined directionality of the choice-supportiveness hypothesis. The robustness of the findings 
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was assessed after Bonferroni correction for the number of the test at the scenario level 
(Bonferroni-corrected alpha levels for free recall is α = .05/4 = .013). Table 3.11 shows the 
results, highlighting choice-supportiveness in six cases out of 16 tests in free recall (37%) and 
not a single significant difference in the opposite direction. Consistent and robust effects 
corroborating the choice-supportiveness hypothesis are apparent for false memory. 
 
Table 3.11: McNemar tests for choice-supportiveness (CS) vs. non choice-supportiveness 
(NCS) in free recall on participants showing (vs. not showing) at least one case of each 
LUNCH SCENARIO 
 
CS Y 
NCS Y 
CS Y 
NCS N 
CS N 
NCS Y 
CS N 
NCS N McNemar p 
Resisting 
Bonferroni 
correction 
(α = .013) 
SELECTIVE FORGETTING 92 0 1 0 χ2(1) = 0.000, p = .50 - 
MISATTRIBUTION 1 4 1 87 χ2 (1) = 0.800, p = .186 - 
FALSE MEMORY 4 26 10 53 χ2 (1) = 6,250, p = .006 YES 
FACT DISTORTION 39 19 24 11 χ2(1) = 0,372, p = .271  - 
 
GLASS SCENARIO 
 
CS Y 
NCS Y 
CS Y 
NCS N 
CS N 
NCS Y 
CS N 
NCS N McNemar p 
Resisting 
Bonferroni 
correction 
(α = .013) 
SELECTIVE FORGETTING 87 0 0 0 cannot be computed - 
MISATTRIBUTION 0 2 2 83 χ2(1) = 0.25, p = .308 - 
FALSE MEMORY 11 27 9 40 χ2(1) = 8.028, p = .002 YES 
FACT DISTORTION 14 27 24 22 χ2(1) = 0.078, p = .389 - 
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HOLIDAY SCENARIO 
 
CS Y 
NCS Y 
CS Y 
NCS N 
CS N 
NCS Y 
CS N 
NCS N McNemar p 
Resisting 
Bonferroni 
correction 
(α =.013) 
SELECTIVE FORGETTING 90 0 0 0 cannot be computed - 
MISATTRIBUTION 0 2 1 87 χ2(1) = 0,000, p = .5 - 
FALSE MEMORY 7 28 10 45 χ2(1) = 7,605, p = .003 YES 
FACT DISTORTION 12 32 19 27 χ2(1) = 2,824, p = .046 NO 
 
SURGERY SCENARIO 
 
CS Y 
NCS Y 
CS Y 
NCS N 
CS N 
NCS Y 
CS N 
NCS N McNemar p 
Resisting 
Bonferroni 
correction 
(α = .013) 
SELECTIVE FORGETTING 88 0 0 0 cannot be computed - 
MISATTRIBUTION 0 2 3 83 χ2(1) = 0,000, p = .5 - 
FALSE MEMORY 6 27 14 41 χ2(1) = 3,512, p = .030 NO 
FACT DISTORTION 20 30 11 27 χ2(1) = 7,902, p = .002 YES 
 
Paired t-tests were also used to test the hypothesis that the different types of distortions are 
choice-supportive (vs. non choice-supportive), by comparing the mean number of choice-
supportive distortions vs. non choice-supportive ones at the participant level. Also in this case, 
one-tailed probabilities were computed, given the directional prediction, and the robustness of 
the findings was assessed after Bonferroni correction for the number of the test at the scenario 
level. 
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Table 3.12 shows the results, highlighting choice-supportiveness in eight cases out of 16 tests 
(50%) in free recall and a single significant difference in the opposite direction (not resisting 
Bonferroni correction). Consistent and robust effects are apparent for selective forgetting and 
false memory. The Hedges' g effect sizes, computed only for the effects resisting Bonferroni 
correction, are also indicated in Table 3.12. The mean overall effect size is g = .425 (medium 
size effect). 
 
Table 3.12: Paired t-tests of choice-supportiveness (CS) vs. non choice-supportiveness (NCS) in 
free recall. Hedges' g effect size is indicated in the last column. 
 
LUNCH SCENARIO 
 
Mean 
CS 
SD   
CS 
Mean 
NCS 
SD 
NCS Paired t-test 
Resisting 
Bonferroni 
correction 
(α = .013) 
SELECTIVE FORGETTING 7,516 2,229 6,484 2,150 t(92) = 4,842, p = .000  YES (g = .467) 
MISATTRIBUTION 0,065 0,288 0,022 0,146 t(92) = 1,648, p = .051  - 
FALSE MEMORY 0,462 0,802 0,194 0,516 t(92) = 2,885, p = .003  YES (g = .394) 
FACT DISTORTION 0,925 0,924 1,161 1,135 t(92) = 1,770, p = .040 NO 
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GLASS SCENARIO 
 
Mean 
CS 
SD   
CS 
Mean 
NCS 
SD 
NCS Paired t-test 
Resisting 
Bonferroni 
correction 
(α = .013) 
SELECTIVE FORGETTING 7,437 2,208 6,655 1,952 t(86) = 3,039, p = .001 YES (g = .372) 
MISATTRIBUTION 0,023 0,151 0,034 0,239 t(86)= 0,376, p = .354 - 
FALSE MEMORY 0,655 0,900 0,276 0,543 t(86) = 3,613, p <.001 YES (g = .506) 
FACT DISTORTION 0,586 0,724 0,483 0,588 t(86) = 1,013, p = .157 - 
 
HOLIDAY SCENARIO 
 
Mean 
CS 
SD   
CS 
Mean 
NCS 
SD 
NCS Paired t-test 
Resisting 
Bonferroni 
correction 
(α = .013) 
SELECTIVE FORGETTING 6,689 2,201 6,400 2,098 t(89) = 1,160, p = .124 - 
MISATTRIBUTION 0,022 0,148 0,011 0,105 t(89) = 0,575 , p = .283 - 
FALSE MEMORY 0,633 0,965 0,300 0,694 t(89) = 2,616, p = .005 YES (g = .393) 
FACT DISTORTION 0,578 0,670 0,444 0,736 t(89) = 1,215, p = .113 - 
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SURGERY SCENARIO 
 
Mean 
CS 
SD   
CS 
Mean 
NCS 
SD 
NCS Paired t-test 
Resisting 
Bonferroni 
correction 
(α = .013) 
SELECTIVE FORGETTING 7,307 2,404 6,602 2,076 t(87) = 2,028, p = .023  NO 
MISATTRIBUTION 0,023 0,150 0,034 0,183 t(87) = 0,445 , p = .328 - 
FALSE MEMORY 0,534 0,970 0,261 0,514 t(87) = 2,417, p = .009 YES (g = .349) 
FACT DISTORTION 0,932 1,059 0,477 0,742 t(87) = 3,438, p < .001 YES (g = .496) 
 
 
3.3.5.2.2 Choice-supportiveness in cued recall 
For what concerns cued recall, choice-supportiveness in fact distortion was detected with the 
McNemar (one-tailed) test in the Glass scenario (Chi(1) = 4.558, p = .016) and in the Holiday 
scenario (Chi(1) = 4.558, p = .048), but not in the Lunch and Surgery scenario (p > .05). 
Paired t-tests detected a significant effect in the expected direction for the Glass scenario (t(86) 
= 2.507, p = .014) but one in the opposite direction in the Lunch scenario (t(92) = 2.100 , p = 
.019), while the other two tests were nonsignificant (p > .05). Overall there seems to be some 
indication of choice-supportiveness even in cued recall and for fact distortion, but much less 
consistent than the evidence coming from free recall.  
 
3.3.5.2.3 Choice-supportiveness in recognition 
The recognition test allowed the appraisal of all the types of choice-supportiveness with the 
exception of fact distortion. Table 3.13 summarizes the findings of McNemar tests for what 
concerns recognition. Again, one-tailed probabilities were computed, given the directional 
prediction, and the robustness of the findings was assessed after Bonferroni correction for the 
number of the test at the scenario level. There is little evidence of choice-supportiveness in the 
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recognition data as analyzed with McNemar, with the exception of the Glass scenario 
(misattribution and false memory). 
 
Table 3.13: McNemar tests to test choice-supportiveness (CS) vs. non choice-supportiveness 
(NCS) in recognition on participants showing (vs. not showing) at least one case of each 
LUNCH SCENARIO 
 
CS Y 
NCS Y 
CS Y 
NCS N 
CS N 
NCS Y 
CS N 
NCS N McNemar p 
Resisting 
Bonferroni 
correction 
(α = .017) 
SELECTIVE FORGETTING 27 13 23 30 χ2(1) = 2.250, p = .067 - 
MISATTRIBUTION 19 9 26 39 χ2(1) = 7.314, p = .004 YES 
FALSE MEMORY 32 11 16 34 χ2(1) = 0.593, p = .220 - 
 
GLASS SCENARIO 
 
CS Y 
NCS Y 
CS Y 
NCS N 
CS N 
NCS Y 
CS N 
NCS N McNemar p 
Resisting 
Bonferroni 
correction 
(α = .017) 
SELECTIVE FORGETTING 40 14 17 16 χ2(1) = 0.129, p = .359 - 
MISATTRIBUTION 19 25 13 30 χ2(1) = 3.184, p = .037 NO 
FALSE MEMORY 15 30 13 29 χ2(1) = 5.953, p = .007 YES 
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HOLIDAY SCENARIO 
 
CS Y 
NCS Y 
CS Y 
NCS N 
CS N 
NCS Y 
CS N 
NCS N McNemar p 
Resisting 
Bonferroni 
correction 
(α = .017) 
SELECTIVE FORGETTING 22 17 19 32 χ2(1) = 0.028, p = .434 - 
MISATTRIBUTION 12 14 13 51 χ2(1) = 0,000, p = .5 - 
FALSE MEMORY 22 17 19 32 χ2(1) = 0.028, p = .434 - 
 
SURGERY SCENARIO 
 
CS Y 
NCS Y 
CS Y 
NCS N 
CS N 
NCS Y 
CS N 
NCS N McNemar p 
Resisting 
Bonferroni 
correction 
(α = .017) 
SELECTIVE FORGETTING 34 12 18 24 χ2(1) = 0.833, p = .181 - 
MISATTRIBUTION 32 18 12 26 χ2(1) = 0.833, p = .181 - 
FALSE MEMORY 34 12 18 24 χ2(1) = 0.833, p = .181 - 
 
However, paired t-tests on recognition data offer a more encouraging picture, due to their 
greater sensitivity. The results of the analysis are reported in Table 3.14. 
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Table 3.14: Paired t-tests to test choice-supportiveness (CS) vs. non choice-supportiveness 
(NCS) in recognition. Hedges' g effect size is indicated in the last column 
 
LUNCH SCENARIO 
 
Mean 
CS 
SD   
CS 
Mean 
NCS 
SD 
NCS Paired t-test 
Resisting 
Bonferroni 
correction 
(α = .017) 
SELECTIVE FORGETTING 0.753 1.204 0.839 0.992 t(92) = 0.651, p = .258 - 
MISATTRIBUTION 0.527 1.017 0.806 1.154 t(92) = 1.968, p = .026 NO 
FALSE MEMORY 0.806 1.125 0.871 1.135 t(92) = 0.528, p = .300 - 
 
GLASS SCENARIO 
 
Mean 
CS 
SD   
CS 
Mean 
NCS 
SD 
NCS Paired t-test 
Resisting 
Bonferroni 
correction 
(α = .017) 
SELECTIVE FORGETTING 1.092 1.263 1.034 1.028 t(86) = 0.402. p = .344 - 
MISATTRIBUTION 0.885 1.176 0.517 0.805 t(86) = 2.926, p = .002 YES (g = .362) 
FALSE MEMORY 0.943 1.165 0.494 0.847 t(86) = 3.259, p = .001 YES (g = .437) 
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HOLIDAY SCENARIO 
 
Mean 
CS 
SD   
CS 
Mean 
NCS 
SD 
NCS Paired t-test 
Resisting 
Bonferroni 
correction 
(α = .017) 
SELECTIVE FORGETTING 0.733 1.003 0.700 0.893 t(89) = 0.265, p = .396 - 
MISATTRIBUTION 0.467 0.851 0.400 0.747 t(89) = 0.705, p = .241 - 
FALSE MEMORY 0.911 1.056 0.822 0.856 t(89) = 0.651, p = .259 - 
 
SURGERY SCENARIO 
 
Mean 
CS 
SD   
CS 
Mean 
NCS 
SD 
NCS Paired t-test 
Resisting 
Bonferroni 
correction 
(α = .017) 
SELECTIVE FORGETTING 0.909 1.161 0.909 0.930 t(87) = 0.000, p = .5 - 
MISATTRIBUTION 1.045 1.203 0.705 0.873 t(87) = 2.618, p = .005 YES (g = .321) 
FALSE MEMORY 0.761 0.983 0.557 0.786 t(87) = 1.736, p = .043  NO 
 
These recognition findings show evidence of choice-supportiveness in particular in the Glass 
and Surgery scenario, and in particular for misattribution and false memories. The mean effect 
size for the test resisting Bonferroni correction is g = .373, highlighting a medium/small effect 
not much different from the one obtained in free recall tests. 
For what concern the Glass and the Surgery scenarios, we also computed the asymmetry score 
to assess choice-supportiveness via the analysis of the attribution of values to the options (see 
section 3.4.3). For the Glass scenario, the mean value of the index across participants is 1.069 
(SD = 3.430, n = 87), which is significantly greater than zero according to a one-sample t-test 
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(t(86) = 2.907, p = .002). The same holds for the Surgery scenario: the mean value is 1.136 (SD 
= 3.309, n = 88), which is significantly greater than zero according to a one-sample t-test (t(87) 
= 3.220, p = .001). This analysis confirms the evidence for choice-supportive misattribution in 
two of the scenarios we employed and the source recognition test, while this is not the case for 
the remaining two scenarios. 
 
3.3.6 Summary of findings on choice-supportiveness 
Table 3.15 shows the overall picture of the results in relation to choice-supportiveness in the 
four different types of misremembering and the three types of memory tests.  
 
Table 3.15: Summary of choice-supportiveness in the four different types of misremembering 
and three types of memory tests 
 
TEST of  
CHOICE-SUPPORTIVENESS 
SELECTIVE 
FORGETTING 
MISATTRIBUTION FALSE MEMORY FACT 
DISTORTION 
ANOVA free recall 
main effect 
p < .001 η2 = .23 
 
 
interaction with 
alignability 
p = .004 η2 = .10 
main effect 
p < .001 η2 = .27 
interaction with 
alignability and 
scenario                
p = .002 η2 = .06 
 
 
interaction with 
scenario 
p < .001 η2 = .07 
ANOVA cued recall 
NA NA NA No clear 
pattern in a 
four-way 
interaction 
ANOVA recognition 
 
 
main effect 
p = .033 η2 = .06 
main effect 
p = .013 η2 = .08 
NA 
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interaction with 
alignability 
p = .031 η2 = .06 
interaction with 
format 
p = .040 η2 = .05 
interaction with 
scenario 
p < .001 η2 = .08 
Asymmetry score 
significant for 2 
scenarios 
interaction with 
scenario 
p = .034 η2 = .04 
McNemar test 
free recall 
NO NO In 3 scenarios In 1 scenario 
McNemar test 
cued recall 
NA NA NA In 2 scenarios 
McNemar test 
recognition 
NO 1 scenario   
choice-opposing 
In 1 scenario NA 
Paired-t-test 
free recall 
In 2 scenarios NO In 4 scenarios In 1 scenario 
Paired-t-test 
cued recall 
NA NA NA In 1 scenario   
(1 choice-
opposing) 
Paired-t-test 
recognition 
NO In 2 scenarios In 2 scenarios NA 
 
The findings show stronger choice-supportiveness for false memory in free recall tests (with 
evidence for it in recognition, as well). Good evidence of choice-supportiveness is also seen for 
selective forgetting in free recall, but not so in recognition. However, the assessment of 
selective forgetting from the source recognition test used in Experiment 2 is not directly 
comparable to that from free recall tests, as an item will only count as forgotten if the participant 
ticks the box ‘not presented’ for it. Weak memory traces are therefore more likely to give rise 
  
 
146 
 
to other types of errors (or, indeed, no error at all) in source recognition tests than in free recall, 
where the only evidence of them may be seen as selective forgetting. There is also good 
evidence of choice-supportiveness in misattribution in recognition tests, but only in half of the 
scenarios. Weak evidence for choice-supportive fact distortion, mainly related to one scenario. 
In free recall, choice-supportiveness for misattribution and false memories is observed mainly 
in nonalignable conditions. 
The sample size had been computed for a mixed Anova, with an a-priori power of .80 for a 
medium effect size on choice-supportiveness (f = .25), alpha = .05. Taking into account the 
repeated measurements provided by the multiple scenarios, the number of participants needed 
was 82 overall. Consequently, 100 participants were recruited for this study. 
 
3.4 Discussion 
Contrary to our first experiment, we found choice-supportiveness in all conditions and all types 
of memory tests. For a discussion of the possible reasons for the differences in findings between 
our two experiments, please see the Overall conclusion and discussion. In the present section, 
I will focus on Experiment 2 and choice-supportiveness. The results not relating to choice-
supportiveness have been briefly discussed in the Results section above. 
Our hypotheses for this experiment could be divided into an overall hypothesis, i.e., that 
schema- or gist-based processing are the main causes of choice-supportive misremembering, 
and three sub-hypotheses. According to the latter, unalignable and narrative versions would 
yield the most choice-supportiveness (with the combination unalignable narrative at the top), 
the effect would be the strongest in recognition, then cued recall and the weakest in free recall, 
and we would find all four types of memory distortions described in our taxonomy. Starting off 
with the sub-hypotheses and leaving the overall hypothesis aside for the time being, it is clear 
that our results did not fully support all three.  
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3.4.1 Alignability and presentation format 
Although alignability and presentation format had effects on memory accuracy and the relative 
proportions of commission and omission errors, they did not have a significant effect on choice-
supportiveness overall. This can be compared to the results in an earlier study (Hess et al., 
2012), where alignability was found to affect choice-supportiveness. An important difference 
between that study and ours is that they used both alignable and unalignable items within the 
same options (in common with Mather et al., 2005, who did not investigate choice-
supportiveness) rather than in separate conditions. Whereas their study highlights the effects of 
mixed alignability, ours assesses potential processing differences in two divergent choice 
situations. Our prediction of finding more choice-supportiveness in the unalignable and 
narrative versions was based on the expectation that gist-based processing would be more 
evident in these conditions. An increased reliance on gist should increase choice-
supportiveness, but if alignability and presentation format have no effect on the type of 
processing used, it does not necessarily affect choice-supportiveness either.  
However, the fact that misattributions and false memories were choice-supportive mainly in the 
unalignable conditions in free recall may point to an influence of the choice on the gist 
perceived. This may only have been strong enough to be detected when coupled with the 
comparably stronger gist traces that the unalignable options provide. At any rate, the effects of 
alignability on choice-supportiveness were not large, and were only found for misattributions 
and false memories, while presentation format had no discernible effect on any type of 
distortion. This in itself provides an important contribution to the knowledge in the field, as our 
literature review highlighted an uncertainty as to whether alignability affects choice-
supportiveness. Whereas earlier research had not assessed the potential importance of 
differences in alignability and presentation format in the design of the studies, we can now 
conclude that this is not likely to be the decisive factor determining the presence or absence of 
choice-supportiveness.   
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3.4.2 Type of memory test 
We expected to find the most choice-supportiveness in the source recognition memory test, less 
in cued recall and even less or none in free recall. Clearly, it is not possible to directly compare 
the results from the three different tests, as cued recall and recognition are inherently 
cognitively less demanding than free recall for the participants in this kind of study, and also 
inevitably dependent on the types and amounts of lures and cues. In addition, the cued recall in 
this experiment could only measure fact distortion, and it was limited to testing 4 of the 23 
unique items describing the options in each scenario. Admittedly, it is therefore in isolation not 
a sufficiently sensitive test of choice-supportiveness, and perhaps as a consequence it also 
generally failed to detect choice-supportiveness.  
Despite these inherent limitations, we tried to discern whether the free recall and recognition 
tests produced different degrees of choice-supportiveness by comparing the mean effect sizes 
for the these two memory tests (see the tables reporting Hedges’ g in the preceeding results), 
and the findings showed similar effects. Thus, it appears likely that the stimuli rather than the 
type of memory test is the determining factor. This also indicates that the effect observed in 
earlier source recognition experiments was not due to participants using the heuristic ‘any 
positive item is more likely to belong to my chosen option than to the one I did not choose’ 
when guessing in cases where their memory traces were weak.  
Instead, it appears more likely that the scenarios and options we used in this experiment were 
complex and verbose enough to trigger gist-based processing in all our versions. After all, the 
contents differed only between the alignable and nonalignable versions (not between list and 
narrative versions), and the length of the descriptive text was similar in all four conditions. 
Clearly, by using both free recall and source recognition tests with the same stimuli and in the 
same experiment, we have elucidated a question we were left with after reviewing the relevant 
literature: is choice-supportive memory dependent on the use of other memory tests than free 
recall? It now appears that the answer to that question is ‘no’. 
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3.4.3 Types of distortions 
In this second experiment, we again found support for the new taxonomy in that all four types 
of memory distortions were observed. Not surprisingly, selective forgetting was the most 
common type in free recall. Both selective forgetting and false memories were shown to be 
choice-supportive, whereas no such effect was seen for misattribution and fact distortion in the 
free recall.  
Misattributions were rare, which could be explained by a high reliance on gist memory. If the 
choice is made after differentiating the two options in terms of gist, the latter provides a 
scaffolding that facilitates source attribution of the individual items. This could also explain 
why the choice-supportiveness of the misattributions was not significant overall: other factors, 
such as salience, familiarity and how closely each item conforms to the general gist of the 
option, might have provided stronger clues during retrieval than whether they were chosen or 
not.  
The absence of an effect for fact distortion could be explained by the fact that this type of 
distortion mainly occurs for details (i.e., specific numbers) that will not form part of the gist 
memory traces. Admittedly, qualifiers also gave rise to some fact distortions and in these cases, 
the errors were in some cases likely to be due to inaccurate gist traces rather than a forgetting 
of specific details. For example, leaving out a qualifier in the free recall test counted as a fact 
distortion, the direction of which depended on whether the item became more or less positive 
without the qualifier. Although even the qualifiers may have felt like unimportant details, there 
were also cases where a qualifier was distorted significantly, entirely changing the valence of 
the individual item. However, due to their infrequency, these could not have had a discernible 
impact on the general choice-supportiveness of fact distortions. 
In the present experiment, selective forgetting and false memories were choice-supportive 
overall. However, selective forgetting did not yield a main effect in the recognition test and, in 
common with misattribution and false memory, was not tested in the cued recall. It should be 
noted that in the free recall, all items that are not brought to mind and listed within the limited 
time frame count as forgotten. Thus, considering the finite patience and ability of each 
participant to fully focus on remembering as much as possible for each of the eight options in 
the time given, it may result in only the most salient items being mentioned. It could therefore 
increase the likelihood that the participant starts by listing the items that were most decisive for 
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the choice. In addition, gist-processing may contribute by adding a component to the mentally 
constructed schema for each option, namely whether it was the preferred or rejected alternative. 
That would then further increase the likelihood of choice-supportive recall. Whether the effect 
for selective forgetting would persist if participants had unlimited time that they were motivated 
to spend on retrieving as much as they possibly could about the options remains unclear and 
open for exploration in further research.    
That false memory was choice-supportive points to the importance of gist memory traces and 
that the choice made forms an integral part of them. Numerous previous studies have showed 
that false memories tend to be schematic (e.g., Miller & Gazzaniga, 1998; Neuschatz, 
Lampinen, Preston, Hawkins, & Toglia, 2002; Webb & Dennis, 2018), but whether the choice 
one has made becomes integrated with that general essence has been considerably less clear. 
The options used in this experiment were designed to enable the participants to construct 
distinct schemata for each one. That the false memories arising out of those schemata were 
choice-supportive regardless of which of the two options the individual participant had chosen 
provides strong evidence that gist processing is what gives rise to the phenomenon. In earlier 
studies, choice-supportive false alarms were found. Our source recognition test also yielded this 
result, but, more importantly, so did our free recall task. Clearly, free recall is the ‘purest’ 
memory assessment in that no hints are given and there is less of an incentive to guess than in 
source recognition tests. Likewise, in the absence of external attempts to manipulate memory 
after the encoding phase, false memory is the ‘purest’ type of memory distortion: it is entirely 
generated by the mind of the participant when elaborating the material. 
Thus, with regard to the main hypothesis, the evidence for gist memory traces being at the root 
of choice-supportive misremembering is convincing despite all conditions yielding similar 
effects. The fact that the tendency was found with these rich and complex scenarios – and in 
particular the frequency and clear choice-supportive direction of the false memories, coupled 
with the minimal effect on fact distortions – are in line with the tenets of Fuzzy-Trace Theory, 
briefly mentioned in Chapter 1. To reiterate, this theory suggests that gist memory traces and 
verbatim memory traces are stored separately and in parallel. When being exposed to a coherent 
story - or information that is sufficiently rich and contextual to enable a mental construction of 
a narrative – gist memory traces prevail. Specific details (such as precise numbers), on the other 
hand, necessitate verbatim processes for effective encoding and retrieval. As mentioned, gist 
traces are known to give rise to schema-consistent false memories, whereas fact distortions 
generally demonstrate a failure of the verbatim processes. If choice-supportiveness is caused 
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by gist and not verbatim processes, it would therefore follow that the effect should be stronger 
for distortion types relying on the former. Selective forgetting is not as clearly a direct effect of 
relying on gist traces as false memory, although it may indicate an indirect influence. If part of 
the gist of the chosen option is that it must be superior simply based on the fact that it was 
selected after consideration of all the items, this could facilitate retrieval of the items that 
support this view. Likewise, these mechanisms could explain choice-supportive misattribution 
in recognition tests, in particular for items that had not been presented, but that were not 
schema-inconsistent.  
An obvious limitation of this experiment is that our conditions failed to trigger divergent 
processing mechanisms. Instead, all conditions had similar effects and we therefore had to 
analyze the types of distortions in light of the prevailing memory theories, and compare the 
stimuli to those of previous studies in order to decipher the implications of our findings. Without 
altering the contents of the option descriptions and thereby introducing confounding factors, it 
would be difficult to construct such scenarios within the same experiment. Possibly, it might be 
sufficient to use similar option descriptions to those in our first experiment and compare them 
with lists where each option is described with sentences and verbal description replace all 
numbers, but the options would also need to be unalignable. New and additional information is 
needed to construct unalignable options, and it could therefore not be excluded that any effects 
found in such an experiment would be due to the increased cognitive load and differences in 
the included items. Thus, four conditions would still be needed and the adjustments made might 
be insufficient for an effect. 
Despite this shortcoming, our findings have illuminated the conditions necessary for choice-
supportive misremembering to occur and paved the way for further research into the side-effects 
of a memory system that strives for coherence and thrive on story-telling.  
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Chapter 4: Overall discussion and conclusion 
 
In our critical literature review, we found seemingly conflicting evidence of the strength of the 
choice-supportive misremembering phenomenon, and we therefore conducted two experiments 
to clarify the situation. The first one revealed an absence of choice-supportiveness with a typical 
design used in studies on decision making, whereas the effect was present in all conditions in 
our second experiment. This shows that some condition crucial for the effect to occur was 
present in our second experiment but not in our first. I will therefore proceed to discuss some 
of the differences between our two experiments. 
 
4.1 Comparison between Experiments 1 and 2 
4.1.1 Type of memory test 
4.1.1.1 Free recall and recognition 
Prior to analyzing the results in our second experiment, we hypothesized that source recognition 
tests may be more likely to detect choice-supportiveness than free recall test. Our literature 
review indicated that the support for the phenomenon was weak from free recall studies and we 
found no choice-supportiveness in our own free and cued recall study. As discussed previously, 
signal detection theory could explain why source recognition tests may be more sensitive to 
discerning the effect, as could SMF (see Chapter 3, Hypotheses). However, comparing the 
effect sizes of the choice-supportiveness observed in free recall and source recognition in our 
second study revealed a medium and similar effect for the two tests. As mentioned, the two 
tests could not be directly and reliably compared, but if there is a difference in sensitivity, our 
experiment did not detect it.    
 
4.1.1.2 Cued recall 
The cued recall tests in our first experiment did not show any choice-supportive tendency and 
those in our second gave inconsistent results but no clear choice-supportiveness. Although it 
could be argued that the fact that the values tested with cued recall in our experiments were not 
also tested with recognition might explain the difference in choice-supportiveness between free 
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and cued recall in our second experiment (as there is more evidence for the phenomenon from 
recognition studies), our cued recall bore similarities to recognition tests. For each item 
containing a numeric value, the full sentence was provided in the cued recall test, and the 
participant was only asked to state the missing value. An earlier study (Svenson et al., 2009) 
that used cued recall as the memory test did find significant choice-supportiveness. Their cued 
recall test was similar to that used in our second experiment in the sense that only the value was 
asked for in the memory test, but different in that Visual Analogue Scales (VAS) were used 
when presenting the values as well as in the memory test in Svenson et al. (2009), whereas we 
asked our participants to complete the sentences by entering the missing numbers. This could 
constitute a fundamental difference, as VAS may shift the focus from verbatim to gist. Indeed, 
VAS are normally used to measure subjective phenomena, and their completion tends to be 
perceived as more intuitive than writing down exact numbers (or other descriptions) exactly 
because they avoid the constraint of direct quantitative terms (Wewers & Lowe, 1990). By 
offering a continuum, they may induce the participant to access their general idea of the option 
and specific item rather than trying to bring to mind the exact missing values. In other words, 
by using VAS, Svenson et al. (2009) (and Svenson, Gonzalez, Memon, & Lindholm, 2018) 
may have impeded the kind of verbatim processing that could prevent choice-supportive bias. 
Clearly, this is a hypothesis that remains to be tested in more experiments before we can draw 
any definite conclusions.  
It is important to mention that the sensitivity of the cued recall might have been low in our 
second experiment, as we only tested recall of four items per scenario (or, in other words, two 
per option). The total number of different items was 23, i.e., 12 items per option, with the two 
options having one item in common. In other words, the cued recall tested approximately 17% 
of the items. In our first experiment, however, we tested cued recall for all 12 values, i.e., 100% 
of the items. In that experiment, we had six different parameters, but the value for each was 
what differed between the options. Thus, the total amount to be remembered was considerably 
smaller in our first experiment, but we tested all of them compared to a small proportion in our 
second experiment. This makes it difficult to compare the results of the two experiments, but if 
we compare our first experiment with Svenson et al., (2009), we see that it was similar both in 
terms of amount to be remembered and the design of the cued recall test – except that we did 
not use VAS. This may have contributed to the fact that we observed no choice-supportive bias 
whereas Svenson and colleagues did. The design in our first study could be said to encourage a 
comparison of the values item by item, focusing on the numbers, whereas it could be that the 
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experiment conducted by Svenson and colleagues – by not including precise numbers - 
encouraged a comparison of each option as a whole against the other option as a whole rather 
than item by item (i.e., the items of A compared with each corresponding item of B, and then 
choosing the option that ‘mathematically’ turned out to be the best when weighing in the 
importance of each item). Again, this is a hypothesis that remains to be tested, for example by 
conducting an experiment where half of the participants use VAS and the other half precise 
numbers (both in the scenario and option presentation and in the cued recall test). 
 
4.1.2 Types of distortions 
Comparing our two experiments, there are less misattributions and many more false memories 
in our second study. The lower degree of comparability in the alignable versions in Experiment 
2 compared to those in Experiment 1 most likely contributes to the lower proportions of 
misattributions in our second study. If the parameters are kept constant with only the values 
changing (or if the items are direct opposites of one another), the memory load is lower overall, 
but it may make misremembering of which value belonged to which option more likely. 
Although any degree of alignability can help in retrieval of the corresponding item for the other 
option, if the value is stored in memory along with the parameter, correct source attribution 
may be facilitated when the entire items differ. Furthermore, weak or non-existent gist traces 
would also make it more difficult to remember which item belonged to which option.  
Likewise, the higher frequency of false memories in our second study could be a results of a 
larger degree of gist processing in that second study. Indeed, previous research has found that 
understanding the gist promotes false memories for schematically related information (e.g., 
Miller & Gazzaniga, 1998; Webb & Dennis, 2018). This may be a similar mechanism to that 
found in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995), where a non-presented item strongly related to the studied items is 
frequently falsely recalled. As suggested by Underwood (1965), an implicit associative 
response (IAR) - which can be explained as an unintentional activation of words similar in 
meaning - may be triggered. In the free recall tests in our studies, we counted synonyms as 
correct and they did therefore not count towards the false memories, but automatic associations 
consistent with the gist of each option provide a likely explanation for the higher rate of false 
memories in our second study compared with our first. For a discussion of these findings in 
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relation to descriptive memory distortion theories, please see the next section of this thesis 
(Memory distortion theories). 
 
4.1.3 Type of stimuli 
The main difference between our experiments – other than the use of three different memory 
tests in the second and only two in the first – was in the degree of the complexity, verbosity and 
alignability of the scenarios. The descriptions of the options in our first study were brief and 
directly comparable between the two options. Although two of the versions used in our second 
study were also meant to be alignable, it was clear that the degree of alignability was not as 
high as in the first experiment even in those versions. The items in the first study were largely 
‘numeric’, as the difference between each set of two options was the score (expressed as 
numbers, stars or verbally) on the included parameters. This kind of set-up encourages a 
comparison item by item, across options, and the scores on each parameter (relative to the 
corresponding item in the other option) have to be used to make the choice. 
In our second study, we hoped to make our alignable versions similar to the stimuli in our first 
experiment, but in order to investigate the effect of alignability, we could not remove details 
from these versions while keeping them in the non-alignable versions. Likewise, our narrative 
versions could not contain more information than our list versions. The options were also 
presented with descriptive sentences rather than scores on parameters. As a consequence, all 
versions in Experiment 2 turned out to be more complex and verbose than those in our first 
experiment. It may be the case that the scenarios and options used in Experiment 2 were too 
complex to enable the participants to make their choice without first forming an overall idea of 
what each option involved. For that, we may have needed shorter and fewer items, and our 
alignable versions would have needed a higher degree of commensurability. Indeed, the terms 
‘alignable’ and ‘commensurable’ can capture a wide range of comparability. In some cases, the 
parameters are the same and only a specific value differs between the two options (as in our 
first experiment and Svenson et al., 2009), and in others, the terms refer to items that merely 
share the same dimension (as in Hess et al., 2012). In our second experiment, the degree of 
alignability varied somewhat within the alignable options although it was similar across the 
scenarios. Potentially, this could influence the type of processing used to reach the decision and 
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then retrieve the information in the memory test., which brings us back to Fuzzy-Trace Theory 
and other memory distortion accounts already briefly discussed in Chapter 1. 
 
4.2 Memory distortion theories 
Although the types of memory distortions in our taxonomy have been investigated in scientific 
experiments and much literature has focused on their various manifestations (see e.g., Schacter, 
1999; Schacter, Guerin, & St Jacques, 2011), the theories on their origins are as scattered as the 
studies on the different types of distortions. Few of them are designed to explain choice-
supportive memory specifically, even fewer on the general phenomenon rather than a specific 
type. We briefly discussed some of these theories in Chapter 1, and I will now return to them 
as well as introduce additional ones to discuss our empirical findings in their light. 
At the basis of most of these descriptive theories lies the reconstructive nature of memory, 
stressed already by Bartlett (1932), who observed that “[i]n all ordinary instances [the 
individual] has an over-mastering tendency simply to get a general impression of the whole; 
and, on the basis of this, he[/she] constructs the probable detail” (p. 5). He used the word 
‘schema’ – previously used by Immanuel Kant in philosophy, Jean Piaget in psychology and 
Henry Head in neurology8, amongst others – to refer to “an active organisation of past reactions, 
or of past experiences, which must always be supposed to be operating in any well-adapted 
organic response. That is, whenever there is any order or regularity of behaviour, a particular 
response is possible only because it is related to other similar responses which have been 
serially organised, yet which operate, not simply as individual members coming one after 
another, but as a unitary mass” (p. 3). In other words, when we interpret events, we relate them 
to elements of our past experiences, activating schemata that can fill in the gaps to provide 
coherence and a full picture even when details may be lacking. Since Bartlett’s treatise, much 
has been written on schema-based effects on memory (see Alba & Hasher, 1983, for a review, 
and Hirt, Lynn, Payne, Krackow, & McCrea, 1999, for a review focusing on their influence on 
false memories specifically) and numerous experiments have shown that inferences and 
interpretations often serve to complement incomplete recollection. For example, Dunning & 
Sherman (1997) observed that a sentence like “The rock star was upset about the amount of 
alcohol served at the party” was falsely remembered as “The rock star was upset that so little 
                                                 
8 See e.g., Kant (1998), Piaget (1936) and Head (1920). 
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alcohol was served at the party”, whereas changing the subject to a nun instead lead to it being 
falsely remembered as “The nun was upset that so much alcohol was served at the party”. From 
these observations and general principles of memory, several theories have emerged that 
attempt to elucidate how false memories, misattributions and other types of distortions arise. 
   
4.2.1 Constructive Memory Framework (CMF) 
In Chapter 1, we mentioned schema-driven and constructive processing theories that have been 
presented to explain the origin of memory distortions. One such account is the Constructive 
Memory Framework (CMF) proposed by Schacter, Norman, & Koutstaal (1998). In common 
with most – if not all – descriptive memory distortion theories, the CMF has its roots in the 
account of Bartlett (1932), who wrote that “if we consider evidence rather than supposition, 
memory appears to be far more decisively an affair of construction rather than one of mere 
reproduction” (pp. 204–205). At encoding, it emphasizes on the process of connecting features 
of an event to create a coherent trace while ensuring that this trace is sufficiently distinct for it 
to be separated from other similar events. At retrieval, it points to the process of constructing a 
description of the event that is sufficiently focused to identify the correct episode and 
distinguish it from others. After retrieval follow further monitoring and verification. Both 
perceptual and conceptual features of a past experience aid in this process of pattern completion. 
This process requires certain conditions in order to yield accurate results. If the various elements 
of an event are inappropriately connected at encoding, source memory errors of the kind 
described by the Source Monitoring Framework can ensue. The different episodes must also be 
kept apart in memory to avoid gist-based distortions that originate in the overlap between 
similar experiences depicted by the Fuzzy-Trace Theory. 
 
4.2.2 Source-Monitoring Framework (SMF) 
The Source-Monitoring Framework stipulate that source attributions are decision processes that 
can be made between external sources (e.g., did I hear it on the radio or did I see it on TV?), 
internal sources (e.g., did I actually do it or just imagine doing it?) or external and internal 
sources (e.g., did my friend or I come up with this idea?). Rather than forming an integral part 
of the memory itself, the source of the memory trace is inferred from its contents and nature. 
  
 
158 
 
An example given by Lindsay (2008) is that “a mental event with the characteristics of a 
memory is likely to be attributed to memory” (p. 325). Thus, in contrast with other theories, 
this framework stresses misattributions of sensory details rather than the feeling of global 
familiarity. Contrary to Fuzzy-Trace Theory, it also presupposes that subsystems interact and 
are not independent from each other. 
A premise in SMF is that the more diverse the sources are from each other, the easier source 
monitoring becomes. Indeed, we found more misattributions in our first experiment, where the 
options were described using scores on the same parameters, than in our second, where more 
detailed descriptions were provided for each option, and where differentiation between the two 
was facilitated. Likewise, the difference in choice-supportiveness between the two experiments 
could be explained by the chosen option being remembered as superior, and that positive items 
therefore feel more characteristic of that alternative. It would follow that negative items would 
then also feel more typical of the rejected option. 
It is also in line with the predictions of the SMF that the richer context would dictate a higher 
probability of false memories in our second experiment compared with our first. For example, 
Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade, & Garry (2004) found that showing participants a class photo 
from the year of an invented incidence significantly affected the likelihood of false memory: 
66% of those who saw the photo compared with 23% of those who did not see it were judged 
to believe that the event had occurred.  
 
4.2.3 Differentiation Consolidation account (Diff Con) 
Diff Con, briefly discussed in Chapter 1, suggests that decision making involves a holistic 
assessment of the alternatives, then a restructuring and an application of heuristics to arrive at 
or even create a sufficiently superior alternative to reach a decision. After the choice has been 
made, consolidation processes take over that serve to maintain superior mental representations 
of the chosen alternative and to protect from regret. However, immediately after making the 
final choice, the decision maker may experience cognitive dissonance or regret, as the 
opportunity to choose and the positive aspects of the rejected alternative are now lost, while the 
negative aspects of the chosen option remain. Post-consolidation processes – similar to those in 
the pre-decision differentiation phase - then take over to protect from a poor outcome. These 
processes also involve adapting the situation to render it as favourable as possible to the chosen 
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alternative, and to further restructure the mental representation to its advantage. Thus, post-
decision consolidation is an underlying cause of habits and even confirmation bias. 
In the context of memory after choice, Diff Con would predict that the chosen option would be 
remembered in a favourable light and the rejected or non-chosen alternative as worse than it 
first appeared – at least after the initial period of (possible) cognitive dissonance. As discussed 
earlier, Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory predicts that healthy adults distort conflicting 
values and beliefs to reduce the experienced dissonance. In relation to memory choice-
supportiveness, this could imply increasing the remembered attractiveness of the chosen option 
and/or reducing that of the non-chosen option.  
In common with Fuzzy-Trace Theory, schema-driven and constructive processing theories 
(e.g., Constructive Memory Framework), Diff Con presupposes that the decision arises out of 
mental (gist or schema) representations of the alternatives that are sufficiently distinct to allow 
them to be judged in terms of desirability. A strength of this theory in this context is that it 
clearly predicts that with time, the chosen alternative will – in the memory of the decision maker 
- become increasingly beneficial and the non-chosen option will decrease in attractiveness. 
However, it does not as clearly define the specific conditions needed for the effect, or when 
cognitive dissonance will be part of the process and when consolidation will take place without 
affective motivation. 
In our experiments, options that were sufficiently different to enable a choice to be made, but 
perhaps no distinctive gist to be discerned, did not yield choice-supportive memory. Thus, 
merely having selected an option and thereby decided that it was the best out of the two, did 
not trigger the consolidation processes that give rise to choice-supportive memory. Choosing 
between more complex and verbose options, however, did. Unless the added information made 
the choices appear more important, it seems likely that the difference would lie either in 
engagement with the task (which could be heightened with more details) or in the richer and 
more differentiated mental representations of the two alternatives that those added details made 
possible. Diff Con does predict that a higher degree of perceived importance will strengthen the 
effect, but not specifically that sufficiently clear and distinct mental representations are 
necessary conditions for the phenomenon.    
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4.2.4 Fuzzy-Trace Theory (FTT) 
To reiterate, FTT is a dual-process model according to which both gist and verbatim memory 
traces are formed and stored in parallel. The gist is the overarching meaning of the situation, 
whereas verbatim traces are shallow but precise details. Gist traces last longer and give rise to 
intuitions, whereas verbatim traces are quickly forgotten. The nature of the task at hand dictates 
which traces are the most important for its accurate completion. Successful solution of 
reasoning problems relies on gist-memory abilities whereas verbatim memory abilities are more 
important to respond accurately on memory tests for meaningless word tests, for example. 
Contrasting our two experiments with one another, our first study appears likely to induce 
verbatim processing, as the option descriptions were short, with identical parameters where 
only the score on each one differed between the two options. This renders it difficult to form a 
general idea of each option, especially since they were designed and tested to be balanced. As 
discussed earlier, the complexity, verbosity and lack of complete alignability in our second 
study likely induced gist-based processing in all conditions.  
Our second experiment alone did not provide an answer to the question of whether gist-based 
processing increases choice-supportiveness (which was our main hypothesis), but by comparing 
the outcome between our two experiments - rather than that of the different versions in our 
second experiment – it offers an indication that it does. Indeed, FTT appears compatible with 
the finding that presentation format can influence which processing style will prevail. Short, 
alignable and numeric descriptions that encourage item by item comparison rather than one of 
the gist of the two options should cause increased reliance on verbatim traces, whereas longer, 
more detailed descriptions that cannot easily be compared with corresponding items in the other 
option should result in a gist processing preference. If part of the gist is that the chosen option 
is better than the non-chosen one, more choice-supportive misremembering in our second 
experiment than in our first would follow.  
As the combined results of our experiments – in conjunction with the evidence from previous 
studies – provide a strong indication that gist processing tend to induce choice-supportive 
misremembering whereas verbatim processing does not, it follows that these two systems are 
likely to work independently rather than together. This is also in accordance with the Fuzzy-
Trace Theory and appears to contradict accounts (such as SMF) that suggest system interaction.  
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4.3 Practical consequences of our findings 
Knowing when and why individuals tend to remember the information in a choice-supportive 
manner is useful both to prevent detrimental consequences of this bias and – in other situations 
- to be able to harness the positive aspects of adaptive memory. As pointed out by Gordon et al. 
(2005), misattribution of information to experts (when the true source lacked any such 
credibility), could lead to life-threatening consequences if it results in a cancer patient pursuing 
a bogus miracle cure. On the other hand, diagnoses made by professionals also risk being 
influenced by prior cases and decisions rather than being based on an unbiased observation of 
the patient’s symptoms. Likewise, choice-supportive misremembering can serve to uphold 
addictions by maintaining the belief sets that support addiction (see Viscusi, 1992). 
Decision making from memory can be likened to a game of telephone, in which the original 
information is whispered from person to person, but with the added component that the last 
person in line has to make a choice based on it. Schema-based distortions may occur on the way 
(see Allport & Postman, 1947, but also Treadway & McCloskey, 1987), implying that the final 
decision is in fact based on inaccurate information. An increased awareness of the tendency to 
remember information in a choice-supportive manner and when this is likely to occur should 
lead to less reliance on the infallibility of memory. In turn, this should make us revisit the 
original information when possible rather than assuming that we remember it accurately. 
Furthermore, an understanding of these effects may promote tolerance for divergent and 
seemingly irrational choices made by others and thus prevent the kind of polarization and 
acrimony that can otherwise easily ensue. It also indicates when we should question our own 
memory and thereby promote better informed choices. In addition, such knowledge can help us 
make more accurate predictions about our own and others’ future choices, and can be used to 
nudge people in the direction of healthier ones. If we know that people will remember their 
chosen alternative as even more superior than it was and easily misremember non-presented 
items consistent with the gist of that option as actually belonging to it, an effort could be made 
to make healthy items fit that description.  
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4.4 Limitations and future directions 
4.4.1 Boundaries of the topic discussed 
In Chapter 1, we specified the eligibility criteria for the critical literature review: only studies 
in which participants were presented with at least two options with multiple features and asked 
to make a deliberate preferential choice between the options after reviewing their features (i.e., 
only studies on choice, not judgment, and not a mere quick decision as is common in studies 
on choice blindness). No additional information was to be given between the presentation of 
the options and the memory test (i.e., we are excluding misinformation and hindsight effects) 
and the participants should not themselves select which information to access. Furthermore, the 
memory test should be of the information provided in the encoding phase (i.e., not merely which 
of the options was chosen) and not focusing on the effects of prior information. Clearly, this 
excluded large bodies of literature, but was necessary to enable an isolation of the choice-
supportive effect. Naturally, the two empirical studies conducted as part of this project satisfy 
these criteria, and our conclusions are limited to these kind of situations. 
 
4.4.2 Study population 
The study population represents another limit of our empirical studies as well as of most 
experiments included in our review. Although almost half of the participants in our second 
experiment were not Psychology students, the population can be considered rather homogenous 
and excludes children, teenagers under the age of 19 and adults above age 45. Considering that 
FTT predicts that young children use a larger proportion of verbatim processing than adults, it 
would be illuminating to perform a memory choice-supportiveness study on preschoolers. If 
they exhibit less choice-supportiveness than adults, it would provide further support for the role 
of gist-based processing in giving rise to these kind of distortions. Likewise, studies on 
individuals with autism – appearing to rely more on verbatim processing than gist-processing 
(see e.g., Koldewyn, Jiang, Weigelt, & Kanwisher, 2013; Miller, Odegard, & Allen, 2014) - 
could offer valuable insight both into the phenomenon of choice-supportive memory and the 
autism spectrum disorders. 
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4.4.3 Memory tests 
Although our empirical studies indicated that the type of memory test is not a crucial factor for 
the effect, it is important to point out that only one (DeKay et al., 2014) of the studies in our 
literature review and neither of our own experiments used any other memory tests than source 
recognition, free recall and cued recall. That study did not focus on choice-supportive 
misremembering, which has not yet been tested in a standard recognition paradigm. Likewise, 
the cued recall tests in the available literature do not cover the range of possible ways to 
administer such tests. To further test the robustness of the phenomenon, more types of memory 
tests could be used.  
 
4.4.4 Study design 
As previously discussed, our second experiment was designed to test whether different 
presentation formats would affect choice-supportiveness by inducing gist vs. verbatim 
processing. Not wanting to change the information contained in the option descriptions between 
the list and narrative versions (which would have introduced confounding factors), we did not 
succeed in inducing different types of processing within the same experiment. We therefore had 
to look at the differences between our two experiments (and those reviewed in Chapter 1) to 
deduce the origins of the effect.  
Another limitation of our experiments and all of those reviewed is that they all involved binary 
choices. Our inclusion criteria for the literature review did not actually specify that only such 
studies could be included, but no experiment with a larger choice set qualified. For this reason, 
we used only binary choices in our own empirical studies. However, it has been argued that 
more options require more effort to make a decision and that the decision maker therefore 
becomes more vested in the outcome (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1992). This may augment 
the need to differentiate the chosen option from those rejected and thereby produce more 
choice-supportiveness in accordance with the Diff Con theory. Alternatively, it may make the 
memory traces sufficiently strong to resist even schema-consistent intrusions. As cognitive load 
has been found to induce a switch to a similarity-based decision strategy (e.g., Hoffmann, von 
Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2013), it would be interesting to explore the impact of the size of the 
choice set on choice-supportive misremembering.   
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It is also worth mentioning that only our first experiment included different levels of delay. 
Since the conditions in that study did not yield choice-supportive memory, we were unable to 
assess what influence delay may have on the studied phenomenon. In accordance with the 
Differentiation Consolidation account, increased delay may reinforce the differentiation 
between the meaning and attractiveness of the two options. This in turn could lead to stronger 
effects with longer delays. Future experiments with the kind of design most likely to induce 
choice-supportive misremembering effects could reveal whether this is actually the case. 
Most importantly – and as already discussed in Section 4.1 of this thesis – our two experiments 
differ in many respects, thus preventing any strong conclusions from being drawn from them. 
However, they pave the way for future experiments based on new and more specific hypotheses. 
Since they suggest that the critical conditions are related to the type of stimuli (that need to be 
sufficiently complex) and to option-based (rather than attribute-based) processing leading to a 
gist-based mental representation of the options, manipulating the complexity and presentation 
of the information could provide more conclusive evidence as to the validity of our conclusions. 
As mentioned in Section 4.4.2, studying the phenomenon in children and individuals with 
autism could also provide further insight into the implications of Fuzzy-Trace Theory as well 
as into choice-supportive misremembering. Since FTT predicts that children rely more on 
verbatim memory traces than adults, preschoolers should exhibit less choice-supportiveness 
than adults and older children. Likewise, less of this bias should be seen in adults with autism 
than in other adults. 
Thus, our literature review and experiments have illuminated which conditions are needed for 
the effect, in addition to paving the way for future explorations of how to further advance the 
knowledge to enable more precise predictions of when and to what extent choice-supportive 
misremembering will occur.  
  
  
 
165 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
In Chapter 1, we proposed a new taxonomy to categorize the possible manifestations of choice-
supportive misremembering. According to that, choice-supportive misremembering can be 
divided into four types: misattribution, false memory, fact distortion and selective forgetting. 
We then reviewed the relevant literature and found that the effect is robust when testing memory 
with source recognition and investigating misattributions, but considerably weaker with other 
memory tests and for the remaining types of distortions. Studies that used free recall did not 
yield the effect and only one study using cued recall had been conducted. Thus, our literature 
review provided the foundation for a deeper analysis of the phenomenon by revealing gaps in 
the knowledge, and our taxonomy a new tool to use when filling those gaps. 
We then conducted an empirical study, described in Chapter 2, where we investigated the 
effects of different delay levels, tested the taxonomy, and appraised the existence of choice-
supportive memory in an ecologically valid and standard choice context, using free and cued 
recall as memory tests. The study provided support for our taxonomy in that all four types of 
memory distortions were observed, but there was no tendency to remember the options in a 
choice-supportive manner, despite a high statistical power to detect any such effect. This 
finding was in line with previous studies using free recall, but conflicting with the paper that 
tested cued recall. 
However, in our second study – reported in Chapter 3 - where we tested memory with free 
recall, cued recall and source recognition, we found choice-supportiveness with all three types 
of tests. This is an important contribution to the knowledge in the field, as it shows that the 
effect may be more dependent on the type of stimuli rather than the type of memory test. By 
comparing the design of our experiments as well as by analyzing the detailed findings in light 
of the main theories proposed to explain misremembering effects, I then discussed the 
implications of our results and how they clarify the conditions needed for the effect to occur. 
The typical scenario in studies on decision making involves two options and their scores or 
values on specific attributes. The participant is then asked to evaluate the options and choose 
their preferred one. This setting is conducive of an item by item comparison, and a second stage 
where the scores on the highest valued attributes determine the final choice. Most studies on 
choice-supportive misremembering, however, contain verbal descriptions of each option on 
parameters that differ between the two. Commonly, numeric values are absent or limited, and 
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a comparison item by item would not yield a well-founded decision. Instead, the decision-
making process becomes more complex, involving an overall evaluation of each option and 
then a comparison of the results of that analysis. The extraction of meaning can thus be said to 
reach a higher level (i.e., that of the option as a whole rather than the individual item) and an 
understanding of the gist of each option becomes crucial for an adequate decision.   
Fuzzy-Trace Theory suggests that memory and reasoning are based on dual verbatim (detailed 
information, such as specific numbers) and gist (general overall meaning) processes giving rise 
to distinct memory traces. Correct recall may be based on readout from verbatim memory or a 
reconstruction from gist memory (Reyna, Corbin, Weldon, & Brainerd, 2016). The former is 
literal, whereas the latter is substantive. The kind of design traditionally used in studies on 
decision making favours verbatim processing whereas choice-supportive memory findings are 
predominantly based on settings where gist memory processes are more appropriate. 
The prevailing type of processing not only dictates the method used to reach the decision, but 
also what is likely to be recalled – both in terms of accurate and distorted memories. Where the 
gist of an option has not been the decisive factor in reaching a decision, that gist is unlikely to 
exert a significant influence on recall. The details may not always be correctly remembered, but 
meaning-consistent misremembering will be less prevalent. When compelled to guess in the 
absence of reliable memory traces, an individual may still use the knowledge of which choice 
they made to infer that any positive item is more likely to belong to that option than to the 
alternative, but this is likely to be limited to cases of pure guessing.  
On the other hand, where an individual has made a decision by comparing the gist of two (or 
more) options, memories may be more vivid and durable due to the richer context, but also 
more prone to distortions that are compatible with that extracted meaning. The factors that 
influenced the choice are more susceptible to amplification, whereby the positive items of the 
chosen option are remembered as even more positive and the negative items of the non-chosen 
option are remembered as even more negative. In addition, false memories that are consistent 
with the gist and evaluation of the options become more likely.  
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Our literature review and first experiment revealed that choice-supportive memory as a 
phenomenon may not be as robust as previously thought and indeed be the result of an 
overgeneralization. As shown by the ‘replication crisis’, it is important not to draw wider 
conclusions than the study designs permit and to continue testing hypotheses until we can be 
certain that any results are not due to confounding factors.  
Our second experiment and the application of memory theories to our findings clarified the 
boundaries of the phenomenon as well as illuminated the probable causes. Not only does this 
help us predict when the effect is likely to be observed, but it also provides insight into what 
can be done to avoid or induce it to promote better choices – both in situations where the 
accuracy of that information is crucial, and when choices-supportiveness actually leads to a 
preferable outcome. 
Lastly, this project accentuates the importance of interdisciplinary research. Although studies 
on decision making in the fields of economics and political science have used designs that may 
– at first sight - not appear significantly disparate from those in most experiments on choice-
supportive misremembering conducted in the field of psychology, a closer analysis reveals that 
the different paradigms produce considerably divergent effects - both on the processing and the 
subsequent recall of the information. 
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 2 Choice scenarios used in Experiment 2 
o 2a Nonalignable narrative version 
o 2b Nonalignable list version 
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1 Choice scenarios used in Experiment 1 
 
STUDENT PARTNER 
Immagina che tu debba scegliere un/una compagno/a di corso per svolgere un 
progetto di laboratorio collaborativo che verrà valutato dall'insegnante e che 
contribuirà alla tua valutazione finale. 
Dopo un'estrazione casuale, hai la possibilità di scegliere tra due colleghi/e (NERI 
e BIANCHI), le cui caratteristiche sono riassunte nella tabella presentata qui sotto. 
Anche se nessuna delle due persone corrisponde esattamente alla persona con cui 
vorresti lavorare, ti chiediamo comunque di indicare il/la compagno/a che preferisci.
  
Tieni presente che, nelle descrizioni qui sotto, i valori possono essere presentati 
anche utilizzando una valutazione che va da una stella (* = valore molto scarso) a 
cinque stelle (* * * * * = valore molto buono).    
 COMPAGNO/A 
NERI 
COMPAGNO/A 
BIANCHI 
Affidabilità molto buona buona 
Disponibilità tempo 3 ore al giorno 5 ore al giorno 
Organizzazione * * * * * 
Cortesia intermedia buona 
Motivazione * * * * * 
% progetti con valutazione 
positiva 
80% 75% 
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ROOM TO BE RENTED 
Immagina che tu debba scegliere una stanza da prendere in affitto. Dopo una 
ricerca, hai selezionato due possibili stanze tra cui scegliere (AZALEA e NINFEA), le 
cui caratteristiche sono riassunte nella tabella presentata qui sotto. Anche se nessuna 
delle stanze corrisponde esattamente alla stanza nella quale vorresti alloggiare, ti 
chiediamo comunque di indicare quella che preferisci.  
Tieni presente che, nelle descrizioni qui sotto, i valori possono essere presentati 
anche utilizzando una valutazione che va da una stella (* = valore molto scarso) a 
cinque stelle (* * * * * = valore molto buono).    
       
 STANZA 
AZALEA 
STANZA 
NINFEA 
 
Prezzo affitto mensile 300 euro 250 euro 
Silenziosità buona intermedia 
Distanza università * * * * * 
Ampiezza 20 m2 15 m2 
Luminosità * * * * * 
Arredamento buono molto buono 
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RESTAURANT 
Immagina di aver invitato a cena un/una amico/a. Hai selezionato due possibili 
ristoranti tra cui scegliere (RAVIOLO e AGNOLOTTO), le cui caratteristiche sono 
riassunte nella tabella presentata qui sotto. Anche se nessuno dei due ristoranti 
corrisponde esattamente al locale che vorresti trovare, ti chiediamo comunque di 
indicare quello che preferisci.  
Tieni presente che, nelle descrizioni qui sotto, i valori possono essere presentati 
anche utilizzando una valutazione che va da una stella (* = valore molto scarso) a 
cinque stelle (* * * * * = valore molto buono).    
   
    
 RISTORANTE 
RAVIOLO 
RISTORANTE 
AGNOLOTTO 
 
Prezzo medio (persona) 35 euro 24 euro 
Qualità cibo e ingredienti * * * * * * * * * 
Rapidità servizio intermedio rapido 
Atmosfera del locale * * *  * * * *  
Piatti principali sul menù 15 piatti 8 piatti 
Valutazioni clienti sui 
social 
molto buone buone 
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ENTERTAINMENT BUNDLE 
Immagina che ti siano stati proposti due pacchetti promozionali comprendenti dei 
biglietti da utilizzare per andare a vedere film e spettacoli teatrali (ORSO e GROLLA). 
Le caratteristiche dei due pacchetti sono riassunte nella tabella presentata qui sotto. 
Anche se nessuno dei due pacchetti corrisponde esattamente all’offerta che vorresti 
acquistare, ti chiediamo comunque di indicare quello che preferisci.  
Tieni presente che, nelle descrizioni qui sotto, i valori possono essere presentati 
anche utilizzando una valutazione che va da una stella (* = valore molto scarso) a 
cinque stelle (* * * * * = valore molto buono).    
   
    
 PACCHETTO 
ORSO 
PACCHETTO 
GROLLA 
 
Numero spettacoli 
compresi nel pacchetto 
24 spettacoli 18 spettacoli 
Numero sale aderenti numerose scarse 
Qualità media spettacoli 
(valutazione critici) 
* * * * * * * 
Costo per spettacolo 2,5 euro 3,5 euro 
Acustica media sale  buona molto buona 
Confort medio sale * * * * * * 
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GYM PACKAGE 
Immagina di avere la necessità di tenerti in forma, e di avere deciso di andare in 
palestra. I tuoi amici frequentano soprattutto due palestre (FIT e SHAPE) e tu hai 
deciso di andare in una delle due. Le caratteristiche delle due palestre sono riassunte 
nella tabella presentata qui sotto. Anche se nessuna delle due palestre corrisponde 
esattamente alla palestra che vorresti frequentare, ti chiediamo comunque di indicare 
quella che preferisci. 
Tieni presente che, nelle descrizioni qui sotto, i valori possono essere presentati 
anche utilizzando una valutazione che va da una stella (* = valore molto scarso) a 
cinque stelle (* * * * * = valore molto buono).    
    
 PALESTRA 
FIT 
PALESTRA 
SHAPE 
 
Prezzo abbonamento 
mensile 
35 euro 25 euro 
Qualità del luogo buona molto buona 
Qualità e varietà attrezzi * * * * *  
Costo accesso iniziale 3 euro 5 euro 
Qualità allenatori  molto buona buona 
Flessibilità orari * * * * *  
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2 Choice scenarios used in Experiment 2 
 
2a Nonalignable narrative version 
 
LUNCH RESTAURANTS   
Background:  
Imagine that you are a university student working on a stimulating assignment 
together with a friend. You are actually really enjoying yourselves and even though it 
is still early in the day, you have already made great progress. You decide to book a 
table at a restaurant for lunch and are choosing between two restaurants, both of 
which you have tried and enjoyed many times before.     
 
Options:  
The Anemone 
Relaxed ambiance. Ingredient list not available. Last time, 14 min waiting time to order. 
Tasty coffee. Licensed to serve alcohol. Welcoming staff. Tables close together. Bread 
has slight taste of yeast. Dingy bathroom. Average lunch cost is 62 SEK. Comfortable 
seating. Dishes cannot be adapted to client’s preferences. 
 
The Bluebell  
Portion size not flexible. Recently renovated. Offer 8 different desserts. Dingy 
bathroom. Don't play music you like. Tasteful modern interior. Fresh ingredients. 
Accept Swish. Slight smell of detergent. Max stay is 35 min. On a busy road. Food 
beautifully presented. 
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GLASS 
Background:  
Imagine that your kitchen window broke a few days ago when a large bird flew into it. 
It is the middle of the winter and you have fixed it temporarily with cardboard, but there 
is still a bit of a cold draft coming in. Although you don't feel that repairing it is 
particularly urgent, you have gathered some information about a few glaziers and are 
now deciding between your two preferred alternatives.   
 
Options: 
All Glass   
You have heard their glass is durable. Uninformative website. Glazier on holiday for 
next 13 days. Approachable office staff. Youth sports sponsor. Long tradition of 
making glass. Not technologically advanced. High staff turnover. Advance payment 
only. Company located 1.5 km away. Offer advice free of charge. There are no online 
reviews. 
 
Best Glass                                                        
Offer no economical option. Tidy up after themselves. Employees have at least 9 years' 
experience. Advance payment only. Don't provide time of day of arrival. Can also 
renovate the frame. Safety glass available. Company is popular nationwide. Their 
putty takes long to dry. Costs 7% more than the average. Cannot take order by phone. 
All employees carry certification ID. 
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HOLIDAY DESTINATIONS      
Background:  
Imagine that you are planning a holiday with good friends to celebrate your 
graduation. You have discussed the alternatives for several months and now that there 
is one month left before your planned date of departure, you are deciding between the 
two that everyone likes. Although everyone likes both options, half of your friends 
would prefer the first option and the other half the second. Thus, your friends have 
asked you to decide where to go, as you have all agreed to book the trip tomorrow.   
 
Options: 
Airival 
Warm climate. Humid air. Beach is 5 km from hotel. Comfortable hotel room. Low crime 
level. Hotel has swimming pool. Many beach vendors. Booking is nonrefundable. 
Weather unpredictable. Choice of 6 different water sports. Allows you to pack light. 
Noisy at night.      
 
Binair 
Far to closest food shop. Opportunity to explore wilderness. Lodging costs 73 
SEK/night. Weather unpredictable. Plane trip is long. Cozy evenings with friends. Rich 
animal life. Locals speak English. Public transportation lacking. Same 4 dishes to 
choose between every day. No cultural attractions. Scenic nature. 
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SURGERY METHODS      
Background:  
While recovering from an unusually persistent bad cough, you start feeling a 
discomfort when you are walking that you have never felt before. Your doctor tells you 
that the coughing has caused serious internal injury that will not heal by itself or with 
medication: you will need an operation. It turns out that the condition is quite common 
among older adults, but rare among people your own age. After several consultations, 
extensive searching on the internet, contact with specialists, and reading of the 
relevant scientific literature, you feel that you have to choose one of two surgery 
options.     
 
Options: 
Dr Anderson   
No need to avoid strenuous physical exercise after the recovery period. Requires 
short daily training program for rest of life. Treatment first used 3 years ago. Study 
results are positive. Health care institution invests ethically. Visible scarring is 
minimal. Loan needed to afford surgery. You barely grasp the science behind the 
method. Soreness during recovery period. May return to physical activity after 12 
days. Surgeon has solid clinical research background. Can only be performed in the 
USA.      
 
Dr Benson 
Causes impaired feeling in the skin around the navel. Your GP recommends it. 
Acquaintance who had the surgery 18 weeks ago is satisfied. Soreness during 
recovery period. You have to take time off. Short term success guaranteed. Positive 
personal experience of the hospital. Meal provided after the surgery. Repeat surgery 
often unsuccessful. Long-term failure rate is 11%. You're not as involved in treatment 
discussions as you'd like. Minimal waiting time. 
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2b Nonalignable list version 
 
LUNCH RESTAURANTS 
Background:  
Imagine that you are a university student working on a stimulating assignment 
together with a friend. You are actually really enjoying yourselves and even though it 
is still early in the day, you have already made great progress. You decide to book a 
table at a restaurant for lunch and are choosing between two restaurants, both of 
which you have tried and enjoyed many times before. 
 
Options: 
The Anemone   The Bluebell 
Relaxed ambiance 
 
Portion size not flexible 
Ingredient list not available Recently renovated 
 
Last time, 14 min waiting time to order Offer 8 different desserts 
 
Tasty coffee Dingy bathroom 
 
Licensed to serve alcohol Don't play music you like 
 
Welcoming staff Tasteful modern interior 
 
Tables close together Fresh ingredients 
 
Bread has slight taste of yeast Accept Swish 
 
Dingy bathroom Slight smell of detergent 
 
Average lunch cost is 62 SEK Max stay is 35 min 
 
Comfortable seating On a busy road 
 
Dishes cannot be adapted to client’s 
preferences 
Food beautifully presented 
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GLASS 
 
Background:  
Imagine that your kitchen window broke a few days ago when a large bird flew into it. 
It is the middle of the winter and you have fixed it temporarily with cardboard, but there 
is still a bit of a cold draft coming in. Although you don't feel that repairing it is 
particularly urgent, you have gathered some information about a few glaziers and are 
now deciding between your two preferred alternatives. 
 
Options: 
All Glass                                                       Best Glass 
You have heard their glass is durable     Offer no economical option    
 
Uninformative website Tidy up after themselves 
 
Glazier on holiday for next 13 days          Employees have at least 9 years’ 
experience            
Approachable office staff Advance payment only 
 
Youth sports sponsor Don't provide time of day of arrival   
 
Long tradition of making glass          Can also renovate the frame 
 
Not technologically advanced          Safety glass available 
 
High staff turnover          Company is popular nationwide 
 
Advance payment only          Their putty takes long to dry 
 
Company located 1.5 km away          Costs 7% more than the average 
 
Offer advice free of charge          Cannot take order by phone 
 
There are no online reviews          All employees carry certification ID 
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HOLIDAY DESTINATIONS 
Background:  
Imagine that you are planning a holiday with good friends to celebrate your 
graduation. You have discussed the alternatives for several months and now that there 
is one month left before your planned date of departure, you are deciding between the 
two that everyone likes. Although everyone likes both options, half of your friends 
would prefer the first option and the other half the second. Thus, your friends have 
asked you to decide where to go, as you have all agreed to book the trip tomorrow. 
 
Options: 
Airival                                                     Binair      
Warm climate          Far to closest food shop 
 
Humid air          Opportunity to explore wilderness 
 
Beach is 5 km from hotel          Lodging costs 73 SEK/night 
 
Comfortable hotel room          Weather unpredictable 
 
Low crime level       Plane trip is long 
 
Hotel has swimming pool          Cozy evenings with friends 
 
Many beach vendors       Rich animal life 
 
Booking is nonrefundable          Locals speak English 
 
Weather unpredictable          Public transportation lacking 
 
Choice of 6 different water sports          Same 4 dishes to choose between every 
day       
Allows you to pack light          No cultural attractions 
 
Noisy at night          Scenic nature 
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SURGERY METHODS 
Background:  
While recovering from an unusually persistent bad cough, you start feeling a 
discomfort when you are walking that you have never felt before. Your doctor tells you 
that the coughing has caused serious internal injury that will not heal by itself or with 
medication: you will need an operation. It turns out that the condition is quite common 
among older adults, but rare among people your own age. After several consultations, 
extensive searching on the internet, contact with specialists, and reading of the 
relevant scientific literature, you feel that you have to choose one of two surgery 
options.     
 
Options:  
Dr Anderson                     Dr Benson 
No need to avoid strenuous physical 
exercise after the recovery period      
Causes impaired feeling in the skin 
around the navel 
Requires short daily training program 
for rest of life 
Your GP recommends it 
Treatment first used 3 years ago          Acquaintance who had the surgery 18 
weeks ago is satisfied 
Study results are positive Soreness during recovery period 
 
Health care institution invests ethically You have to take time off              
 
Visible scarring is minimal Short term success guaranteed 
 
Loan needed to afford surgery          Positive personal experience of the 
hospital 
You barely grasp the science behind the 
method 
Meal provided after the surgery 
Soreness during recovery period Repeat surgery often unsuccessful 
 
May return to physical activity after 12 
days          
Long-term failure rate is 11%        
Surgeon has solid clinical research 
background          
You're not as involved in treatment 
discussions as you'd like 
Can only be performed in the USA          Minimal waiting time 
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2c Alignable narrative version 
 
LUNCH RESTAURANTS     
Background:  
Imagine that you are a university student working on a stimulating assignment 
together with a friend. You are actually really enjoying yourselves and even though it 
is still early in the day, you have already made great progress. You decide to book a 
table at a restaurant for lunch and are choosing between two restaurants, both of 
which you have tried and enjoyed many times before.     
 
Options: 
The Anemone 
Relaxed ambiance. Looks a bit run down from the exterior. Last time, 14 min waiting 
time to order. They play music you like. Agreeable odor. Pleasant traditional decor. 
Watery coffee. Bread has slight taste of yeast. Dingy bathroom. Average lunch cost is 
62 SEK. Located in a beautiful park. Few dishes.     
 
The Bluebell 
Pace somewhat rushed. Recently renovated. Including ordering, being served takes 
on average 7 minutes. Shrill music. A bit of smell of detergent. Tasteful modern 
interior. Tasty coffee. Several types of bread included. Dingy bathroom. Costs 9% 
more than the average in the area. On a busy road. Wide range of dishes. 
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GLASS 
Background:  
Imagine that your kitchen window broke a few days ago when a large bird flew into it. 
It is the middle of the winter and you have fixed it temporarily with cardboard, but there 
is still a bit of a cold draft coming in. Although you don't feel that repairing it is 
particularly urgent, you have gathered some information about a few glaziers and are 
now deciding between your two preferred alternatives.   
 
Options: 
All Glass 
Very economical. Uninformative website. Glazier on holiday for next 8 days. 
Approachable office staff. Provide gadgets for their customers. Friends have 
recommended the company. You need to clean up afterwards. Employee rights not 
protected. Advance payment only. Company located 1.3 km away. Flexible booking. 
Once installed, no official guarantee.   
 
Best Glass                                                      
Offer no economical option. Company is technologically advanced. Can come within 6 
hours on workdays. Contact only through web forms. Don't give out freebies. Positive 
online reviews. They keep tidy. Their workers are members of a trade union. Advance 
payment only. Their closest office is 27 km from your home. Cannot take order by 
phone. Extended warranty. 
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HOLIDAY DESTINATIONS      
Background:  
Imagine that you are planning a holiday with good friends to celebrate your 
graduation. You have discussed the alternatives for several months and now that there 
is one month left before your planned date of departure, you are deciding between the 
two that everyone likes. Although everyone likes both options, half of your friends 
would prefer the first option and the other half the second. Thus, your friends have 
asked you to decide where to go, as you have all agreed to book the trip tomorrow.   
 
Options: 
Airival 
Beach nearby. May be crowded. Accommodation costs 680 SEK/night/person. 
Comfortable hotel room. Easily accessible destination. Good nightlife. Humid air. 
Booking is nonrefundable. Weather unpredictable. Hotel restaurant has 13 different 
dishes. Allows you to pack light. Charter destination.  
 
Binair                                                      
Far from any beach. Opportunity to explore wilderness. Lodging costs 96 SEK/night. 
Only basic amenities. Plane trip is long. Cozy evenings with friends. Clean air. Free 
cancellation. Weather unpredictable. Same 4 dishes to choose between every day. 
Requires careful packing. Unique location.  
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SURGERY METHODS      
Background:  
While recovering from an unusually persistent bad cough, you start feeling a 
discomfort when you are walking that you have never felt before. Your doctor tells you 
that the coughing has caused serious internal injury that will not heal by itself or with 
medication: you will need an operation. It turns out that the condition is quite common 
among older adults, but rare among people your own age. After several consultations, 
extensive searching on the internet, contact with specialists, and reading of the 
relevant scientific literature, you feel that you have to choose one of two surgery 
options.     
 
Options: 
Dr Anderson   
No need to avoid any type of physical exercise after the recovery period. Requires 
short daily training program for rest of life. Treatment first used 3 years ago. Study 
results are positive. Health care institution invests ethically. This far, treatment has 
never failed. Loan needed to afford surgery. You have to bring your own lunch. 
Soreness during recovery period. May return to physical activity after 12 days. The 
information provided is excellent. Can only be performed in the USA.      
 
Dr Benson                                                        
Even after the recovery period, jumping and running should be avoided to prevent 
relapse. No maintenance program needs to be followed. Has been standard treatment 
for this problem for the past 11 years. Some researchers have criticized this method. 
Hospital known to underpay their nurses. Short term success guaranteed. Cost 
covered by insurance. Meal provided after the surgery. Soreness during recovery 
period. During recovery period of 23 days, minimal lifting and walking. You would like 
to be more involved in treatment discussions. Carried out in your local hospital. 
  
  
 
205 
 
2d Alignable list version 
 
LUNCH RESTAURANTS 
Background:  
Imagine that you are a university student working on a stimulating assignment 
together with a friend. You are actually really enjoying yourselves and even though it 
is still early in the day, you have already made great progress. You decide to book a 
table at a restaurant for lunch and are choosing between two restaurants, both of 
which you have tried and enjoyed many times before. 
 
Options: 
The Anemone                                                            The Bluebell 
Relaxed ambiance          Pace somewhat rushed              
 
Looks a bit run down from the exterior         Recently renovated 
              
Last time, 14 min waiting time to order         Including ordering, being served takes 
on average 7 minutes              
They play music you like       Shrill music 
              
Agreeable odor          A bit of a smell of detergent 
              
Pleasant traditional decor          Tasteful modern interior 
              
Watery coffee          Tasty coffee 
              
Bread has slight taste of yeast          Several types of bread included 
              
Dingy bathroom          Dingy bathroom 
              
Average lunch cost is 62 SEK          Costs 9% more than the average in the 
area              
Located in a beautiful park          On a busy road 
              
Few dishes          Wide range of dishes 
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GLASS 
 
Background:  
Imagine that your kitchen window broke a few days ago when a large bird flew into it. 
It is the middle of the winter and you have fixed it temporarily with cardboard, but there 
is still a bit of a cold draft coming in. Although you don't feel that repairing it is 
particularly urgent, you have gathered some information about a few glaziers and are 
now deciding between your two preferred alternatives. 
 
Options: 
All Glass                                                        Best Glass 
Very economical          Offer no economical option 
 
Uninformative website          Company is technologically advanced 
          
Glazier on holiday for next 8 days          Can come within 6 hours on workdays 
          
Approachable office staff          Contact only through web forms 
       
Provide gadgets for their customers          Don't give out freebies 
 
Friends have recommended the 
company          
Positive online reviews 
              
You need to clean up afterwards          They keep tidy 
       
Employee rights not protected          The workers are members of a trade 
union 
Advance payment only          Advance payment only 
 
Company located 1.3 km away          Their closest office is 27 km from your 
home    
Flexible booking          Cannot take order by phone 
 
Once installed, no official guarantee Extended warranty 
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HOLIDAY DESTINATIONS 
Background:  
Imagine that you are planning a holiday with good friends to celebrate your 
graduation. You have discussed the alternatives for several months and now that there 
is one month left before your planned date of departure, you are deciding between the 
two that everyone likes. Although everyone likes both options, half of your friends 
would prefer the first option and the other half the second. Thus, your friends have 
asked you to decide where to go, as you have all agreed to book the trip tomorrow. 
 
Options: 
Airival                                                      Binair         
Beach nearby       Far from any beach 
            
May be crowded          Opportunity to explore wilderness 
       
Accommodation costs 680 
SEK/night/person          
Lodging costs 96 SEK/night              
Comfortable hotel room          Only basic amenities        
    
Easily accessible destination       Plane trip is long 
              
Good nightlife          Cozy evenings with friends 
 
Humid air       Clean air 
              
Booking is nonrefundable          Free cancellation 
 
Weather unpredictable          Weather unpredictable 
              
Hotel restaurant has 13 different dishes         Same 4 dishes to choose between every 
day              
Allows you to pack light          Requires careful packing 
              
Charter destination          Unique location 
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SURGERY METHODS      
Background:  
While recovering from an unusually persistent bad cough, you start feeling a 
discomfort when you are walking that you have never felt before. Your doctor tells you 
that the coughing has caused serious internal injury that will not heal by itself or with 
medication: you will need an operation. It turns out that the condition is quite common 
among older adults, but rare among people your own age. After several consultations, 
extensive searching on the internet, contact with specialists, and reading of the 
relevant scientific literature, you feel that you have to choose one of two surgery 
options.     
 
Options: 
Dr Anderson                               Dr Benson           
No need to avoid any type of physical 
exercise after the recovery period 
Even after the recovery period, jumping 
and running should be avoided to 
prevent relapse 
Requires short daily training program for 
rest of life 
No maintenance program needs to be 
followed 
Treatment first used 3 years ago Has been standard treatment for this 
problem for the past 11 years 
Study results are positive Some researchers have criticized this 
method 
Health care institution invests ethically Hospital known to underpay their nurses 
 
This far, treatment has never failed 
 
Short term success guaranteed 
Loan needed to afford surgery Cost covered by insurance 
 
You have to bring your own lunch Meal provided after the surgery 
 
Soreness during recovery period Soreness during recovery period              
 
May return to physical activity after 12 
days 
During recovery period of 23 days, 
minimal lifting and walking 
The information provided is excellent You would like to be more involved in 
treatment discussions 
Can only be performed in the USA Carried out in your local hospital 
 
                                                                                                                                              
